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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Scarce water resources in the Western United States, in concert with population 
growth and climate change, constitute a need to better understand factors that impact 
water demand. In this dissertation, Chapter 1 provides cultural and historical context for 
water use in the West and argues that understanding water demand is important, 
especially when managing scarcity is a goal. Chapter 2 uses aggregate city-level data 
from four municipalities in New Mexico to investigate seasonal trends and breakpoints. 
Although per premises and aggregate demand tend to decline in all geographies 
investigated, existence and timing of breakpoints varies by geography. Additionally, 
drivers of declining trends are difficult to quantify but are likely related to price 
increases, uptake of water saving technology, the generally soft economic environment, 
and increased interest in water conservation. 
Chapter 3 models water demand for the city of Clovis, New Mexico using 
administrative premises-level monthly data. Water use declines are associated with 
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utility-controlled action such as price increases and rebates for landscaping changes and 
water saving technologies. Water demand was found to be price inelastic and in the 
neighborhood of -0.50. However, low-volume users were more sensitive to price than the 
high-volume users. Similarly, low-volume users were more income elastic than high 
volume users. Additionally, premises receiving water-saving toilet and washing machine 
rebates were more price inelastic than premises receiving landscaping rebates, perhaps 
implying that the most effective means of reducing water use for toilet and washing 
machine rebate-receiving premises is through the installation of new technology rather 
than price response. Finally, toilet rebates were found to be the most cost effective rebate 
type per volume of water saved.   
 Chapter 4 employs an optimal control framework to investigate utility-level fiscal 
impacts of demand management, such as rebated technology. Given that water-saving 
technologies reduce water demand, and apparently negatively impact the utility’s 
revenues and costs, it is not immediately clear what benefit this activity provides. 
Outlined are optimal paths illustrating tradeoffs between infrastructure investment, repair, 
and advertising. A testable econometric model is also developed.  
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by summarizing major findings and 
discussing limitations and future work.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Stimulated by population pressures and climate change, the fear of water shortage 
is often at the forefront of our cultural conscience. The prospect that the volume of water 
supplied may be insufficient to fulfill the quantity demanded, and the associated 
vulnerability felt by individuals and communities, is frequently highlighted by the media 
and in popular culture and serves to reinforce this point. For example, recent newspaper 
and periodical headlines from outlets such as The New York Times, The Wall Street 
Journal, National Geographic, and others include: Two-thirds of the World Faces Severe 
Water Shortage (St. Fleur, 2016); Water, Water Everywhere Can’t Quell a Western 
Drought (Carlton, 2018); These Are the Forgotten Victims of the West’s Drought (Nobel, 
2016); Drought Planning: Water Shortages Expected in New Mexico (Montoya Bryan, 
2017). Additionally, popular non-fiction books such as Cadillac Desert (Reisner, 1987) 
and Unquenchable: America’s Water Crisis and What to Do About It (Glennon, 2009) 
underline the notion that society has a history of sometimes ineffectively managing water 
resources; and works of literary fiction such as Steinbeck’s 1939 novel the Grapes of 
Wrath (Steinbeck, 2006) highlight the social and cultural dislocations that can be caused 
by extended periods of drought and water shortage. Even films such as the acclaimed 
Chinatown (Polanski, 1974) put water (and shortage) at the forefront, making the 
resource not only a passive plot device, but rather, a character integral to the narrative.    
The fact that water, and in particular water shortage, is so commonly reported on 
and used as inspiration by media, literature, and the arts is probably unsurprising, as 
access to high-quality water is critically important; without an adequate water supply, a 
population will have difficulty flourishing.  
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While there has always been an interest in cultural aspects of water, management 
over the past several decades has been further challenged by periods of extended 
drought,1 significant inter-jurisdictional challenges,2 and conflicts between agricultural 
irrigators and cities,3 all of which have punctuated a need to better understand and more 
effectively manage water resources. As a key element to effective management, much 
effort has been devoted to ensuring that water is reliably supplied (e.g. Colby et al., 2010, 
2014). Supply enhancement strategies take forms both large and small, and include 
everything from infrastructure enhancement, to water reuse and desalination, to transfers 
from one water user to another, and are based on the argument that if water shortage 
exists then bolstering supply to meet demand is an effective way to manage shortage.  
Understanding the supply side is clearly important when it comes to water 
shortage – or any type of shortage for that matter. However, the demand side is equally 
important, because it, like the supply side, also has the ability to “equilibrate” the water 
market by ensuring that the quantity of water demanded at a given price is equal to the 
quantity supplied. In other words, rather than focusing simply on increasing supply to 
match demand, it may be more effective to develop policies that decrease demand to 
match supply; the benefit of this perspective is particularly true when supply 
1 For example, see Cook et al. (2004); Diffenbaugh et al. (2015); Gutzler & Robbins (2011); and 
Woodhouse & Overpeck (1998). 
2 Such as legal challenges between NM and Texas over Rio Grande water (see Texas v. New Mexico (1983) 
and the ongoing litigation in Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, (n.d.)), or potential conflict between 
Mexico and the US over water via the Convention of May 21, 1906 (Distribution of Waters of Rio Grande, 
1906) and the Treaty of February 3, 1944 (Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the 
Rio Grande, 1944).    
3 For example, see Garrick (2015); Gleick & Heberger (2014); Molle & Berkoff (2006); and Wines (2014).  
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enhancement may be constrained by capital budgets, political challenges, and 
environmental considerations – especially in the near term.4  
Nevertheless, water demand is often ignored in favor of water supply or even 
other water-related concepts such as water quality. To put this in perspective, figure 1.1 
shows Google Trend index values for worldwide search popularity for the terms “water 
demand,” “water supply,” and “water quality” from January 2004 to March 2018.  
 
Figure 1.1 Google Trends index values from January 2004 to March 2018    
Each line in figure 1.1 shows the relative search popularity for all three terms over the 
period with an index value of 100 corresponding to the most searched term in any period 
and all other terms indexed to that term at that point in time. In other words, the most 
popular search term was “water quality” in early 2004. Since then, the term “water 
quality” has become relatively less popular. Beginning in 2009, the term “water supply” 
has become relatively more popular than the term “water quality” as shown by the water 
4 In the language of economics, an increase in supply corresponds to a “rightward” shift of the upward-
sloping supply curve and a decrease in demand corresponds to a “leftward” shift of the downward-sloping 
demand curve. Either, or both, of these movements can clear the market in a situation where the price paid 
for a good is below the true market price – as is generally the case with municipal water.  
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supply line overtaking and consistently being above the “water quality” line. Still, the 
terms “water quality” and “water supply” remained relatively popular throughout the 
entire period. The search term “water demand,” on the other hand, has always been 
relatively unpopular as it has consistently been well below the other two lines, perhaps 
suggesting that our first instincts are to focus on topics other than demand when it comes 
to water. Given that the demand side is often overlooked compared to other water-related 
issues, at least with regard to apparent public awareness, this dissertation focuses 
specifically on the demand side with particular attention on water demand in the arid 
American West.   
Before delving more deeply into understanding demand, it is useful to digress 
briefly to discuss the genesis of water institutions in the West as those institutions, and in 
particular legal institutions, undergird the current water regimes and incentive structures. 
US water law originally stems from English common law under the so-called riparian 
doctrine (Hobbs, 1997). This doctrine states that water in a river or stream is the property 
of the public and does not belong to any one individual (Hobbs, 1997; Wilkinson, 1985). 
Adjoining landowners are typically permitted to use small volumes of water for personal 
use provided that runoff returns to the stream or river and that they do not alter the 
waterway (Hobbs, 1997). The Eastern US, which was settled first (i.e. prior to the West), 
generally had a non-arid climate so was a natural fit for the system developed in England, 
which also had a generally wet climate (Hobbs, 1997). Further, rivers and streams in the 
East were typically located in places where the water could be most productively used in 
situ; these waterways gave rise to the shipping and milling industries that were important 
in the early Eastern US (Hobbs, 1997).  
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With expansion to the arid West, however, it became clear that, unlike the East, 
streams and rivers were not proximal to where the water could be most productively 
used; rather, water could be more valuable if used outside of the waterway. In particular, 
settlers discovered that the most valuable uses of water were in irrigation and mining; 
however, using water in this manner required a break from the tenants of the riparian 
doctrine as individuals had a desire to divert water from the stream to their respective 
claims and agricultural plots (Hobbs, 1997; Wilkinson, 1985). As a result, a new rule 
called the doctrine of prior appropriation was born and essentially provided the user with 
an entitlement based on seniority (Hobbs, 1997; Wilkinson, 1985).5 Under this 
mechanism, the first to divert and (beneficially) use the water had the most senior right. 
What was once recognized as a custom eventually gave way to codification in several 
states in the West and this new legal structure bestowed the user with an entitlement that 
could be secured against more junior users in times of shortage.  
Later, The US federal government, which was interested in settling the largely 
vacant West, took note of the state-sanctioned ability to divert water from the stream. Via 
large expanses of public, federally-owned, lands, the federal government instituted The 
Reclamation Act of 1902,6 which enabled funding for large scale water diversion and 
infrastructure development (Fahlund et al., 2014; Holland & Moore, 2003; Wilkinson, 
1985). So while miners and irrigators on the western frontier were the original 
beneficiaries of the newly available prior appropriation doctrine, population centers and 
5 There are other requirements under the doctrine of prior of appropriation including the requirement of 
beneficial use and the no waste requirement. There are also issues regarding management in times of 
shortage. Those issues are not discussed here; however, for a full treatment, see Hobbs (1997) and 
Wilkinson (1985).  
6 43 U.S.C §§ 371-600(e) (1994) 
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cities also benefited as prior appropriation permitted large volumes of water to be moved 
to water-poor areas, resulting in more reliable supplies.  
Through time, investments in the diversion and supply of freshwater to arid areas 
led to economic and population growth that would likely not have occurred but for 
enhanced water supplies (Tarlock, 2001). The removal of a key limiting factor to near 
term growth, however, also gave rise to a potential feedback loop: surplus water enabled 
additional population growth via net birth or in-migration, which in turn stimulated 
demand for goods and services. As a consequence of fulfilling that new demand, actions 
of enterprising individuals enhanced economic growth and prosperity and aided in 
improving the standard of living. Given new opportunities and higher standards of living, 
additional population growth was fostered and the cycle continues.  
Provided sufficient water supply to satisfy the demands of the population, 
including both current and expected future use, increases in water use can continue 
unabated. In more recent years, however, the adequacy of reliable water supplies to 
satisfy future demand in arid regions, including in the west, has been questioned (US 
Bureau of Reclamation, 2012; Zabarenko, 2011). An important driver to this conclusion 
is the common expectation that water use should rise with population and economic 
growth (City of Los Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011; Griffin, 2006). And at the 
very least, for a fixed volume of water, additional population or other demands from the 
economy necessarily reduces the volume available per capita, perhaps leading to tensions 
among users (Rijsberman, 2006).7    
7 Further exacerbating the problem is climate change which may not only impact water supply and demand 
but also may affect the legal institutions related to water (Gober et al., 2010; Hobbs, 2003; MacDonald, 
2010). 
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However, despite population and economic growth in recent decades (as well as 
increased climate variability), water use, which once appeared to move in concert with 
population growth (City of Los Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011), has apparently 
become decoupled with population levels and growth (Fleck, 2016). In other words, even 
with population and economic growth, per capita use, and in some cases total aggregate 
use, has declined in many western cities (ABCWUA, 2012; Balling & Gober, 2007; City 
of Los Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011; Donnelly, Kristina & Cooley, 2015; Fleck, 
2016).8 
For example, from 1990 to 2010 water use in Phoenix, Arizona declined from 
about 250 gallons per capita per day (GPCD) to below 190 GPCD. These figures include 
both residential and municipal and industrial (M&I) users; however, even stripping out 
M&I users, residential use declined over the same period from over 140 GPCD to about 
110 GPCD. Furthermore, while the population served by the Phoenix water utility 
increased by 8% from 2002 to 2010, total aggregate water demand declined by more than 
16% over that period (City of Phoenix, 2011).  Los Angeles, California experienced 
similar declines over the period as water use was 173 GPCD in 1990 and fell to 117 
GPCD by 2010. Like Phoenix, after peaking in aggregate water use in the early-2000’s, it 
has declined since (City of Los Angeles, 2010). Water use in Albuquerque, New Mexico 
also declined over the last few decades. Even as the number of accounts serviced by the 
utility increased by 43% from 1995 to 2012, the total aggregate volume demanded fell by 
8 In fact, the pattern of declining demand is not confined only to the American West; rather, declining use 
has been observed in other parts of the US as well as some other arid and semi-arid countries (Gleick, 
2003b; March & Sauri, 2017). 
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15%; this translates to a decline from 251 GPCD in 1995 to 148 GPCD in 2012 
(ABCWUA, 2013).     
Several factors have generally been suggested to have contributed to this 
declining trend, including improved and more efficient plumbing, smaller residential lots, 
landscaping changes, and increased awareness of drought; however, those, and other, 
factors may weigh differentially depending on location, climate, preferences, etc. (City of 
Phoenix, 2011; Fleck, 2016).   
Given a need to better understand the drivers of water demand, and to tease apart 
the various drivers of declining demand, this dissertation investigates the issue of 
declining water use with particular attention to water use trends in the Western US, and 
specifically in the arid state of New Mexico. While this research is generally useful in 
terms of understanding trends in water demand, it is particularly useful for the 
stakeholders that may be impacted by growth and changing water demand trajectories. 
One such stakeholder is the community who is interested in ensuring that adequate 
volumes of water are available to satisfy future populations given expected population 
levels and growth. Because access to reliable water supply is necessary to provide the 
community and its constituents the confidence to make costly investments (infrastructure, 
economic development, etc.) and to thrive, it is critical to understand the drivers of water 
demand.    
Similarly, water utilities that are responsible for ensuring access to a high quality 
and reliable supply of water are also impacted by the decoupling of growth and water 
demand. Over time, a utility’s pumping and storage capacity may require expansion in 
order to accommodate increased demand due to population growth, exogenous factors 
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such as climate variability, and the like. Meanwhile, existing systems degrade and must 
be maintained or replaced. Given population growth, but consistent per capita water 
demand and water rate structures, a water utility may recover its high capital investment 
costs – especially costs related to system expansion, maintenance, and replacement. 
However, while the decoupling of water demand and growth may help to achieve water 
conservation goals often imposed by legislators and regulators, reduced water demand, 
all else equal, puts financial pressure on water utilities and requires a rethinking of rate 
structures and timing of capital investments.  
Therefore, because population and economic growth can apparently no longer be 
the sole proxy for water use, the following chapters investigate various aspects related to 
better understanding water demand – and in particular factors contributing to declining 
demand. To help document and illustrate declining municipal water demand in New 
Mexico, Chapter 2 begins at an aggregate level by investigating trends in total 
(aggregate) and premises-level water use in four municipalities in New Mexico. The four 
municipalities of interest are the cities of Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and Clovis and the 
town of Edgewood, each of which has vastly different population bases and industrial 
structures. Although the localities are dissimilar with regard to composition, they share 
the common feature that significant volumes of water delivered by the water utility come 
from underground aquifers or wells. Seasonal trend analysis and breakpoint analysis, 
which are rarely utilized in published literature, are employed to identify general water 
demand trends and systematic breaks in that trend.  
Additionally, although this analysis is atheoretical or descriptive, this chapter 
highlights institutional and economic factors that help to explain (declining) trends and 
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breaks in water use trends. Results are compared by municipality and factors that are 
expected to impact trends are discussed. Although per premises and aggregate demand 
tends to decline in all geographies, existence, timing and apparent reasons for breakpoints 
varies by geography. For example, the city of Rio Rancho experienced a systematic break 
in water demand, which changed the slope from increasing to decreasing, near the end of 
2013. This is likely due to both the slowdown in manufacturing activity as well as the 
sharp increase in water price. Clovis experienced two breakpoints which were temporally 
proximal to extreme drought conditions. Meanwhile, neither Albuquerque nor Edgewood, 
despite facing similar climate patterns, experienced significant series breaks; however, 
the trend of declining demand was prominent throughout each series. Reasons for 
declines are difficult to pinpoint but are likely related to price increases, uptake of water 
saving technology, the generally soft economic environment, and increased interest by 
the community for water conservation. 
While it is true that both declining demand and breakpoints were observed in the 
data, seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis only permit a qualitative understanding of 
the factors contributing to the observed patterns. Therefore, a model of water demand at 
the spatial scale of a city is developed in an attempt to better quantify the factors 
contributing to falling demand. For this purpose, aggregated data for the city of Clovis is 
used (aggregated at the spatial scale of the entire city). Results confirm that weather and 
climate conditions impact water use in the city. In addition, econometric estimation 
suggests that water is inelastic at current prices. Estimation at the city-level is also 
compared against estimation at the US Census block group spatial scale and the 
premises-level spatial scales (both discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Results indicate that 
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while signals that generally impact all premises (i.e. climate and price signals) can be 
picked-up at large spatial scales, other more localized signals, such as premises-level 
rebates for water saving technology, cannot be accurately identified by city-level 
aggregation.     
 Utilizing a large account-level monthly administrative data set over a ten-year 
period, Chapter 3 models water demand in the city of Clovis, New Mexico. The modeling 
strategy is informed in part by results obtained in Chapter 2 as well as the relevant water 
demand literature. Outcomes from this analysis add to the extant water demand literature 
and also provide the city of Clovis with useful information that may be used in planning 
and management decisions. Pertinent results include price elasticities, the efficacy of 
water demand management strategies, effects of climate on water demand, and other 
results useful for setting policy. In addition to the narrow modeling outcomes, which may 
be utilized by the local utility, estimation may be compared against the existing water 
demand literature and results may be applied to other municipalities with similar 
population and industry characteristics. Finally, since a water utility is interested in 
ensuring sufficient capacity to satisfy demand on a day-to-day basis, Appendix 3.3.4 
examines the issue of peak day estimation.  
 This Chapter finds that water use declines are associated with utility-controlled 
actions such as price increases and rebates for landscaping changes and water saving 
technology in Clovis. Overall water demand was found to be price inelastic and in the 
neighborhood of -0.50; however, it is relatively more inelastic for premises receiving 
toilet and washing machine rebates and more elastic (though still inelastic) for premises 
receiving landscaping rebates. Average premises receiving toilet or washing machine 
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rebates reduced water use by more than 9% while premises receiving landscaping rebates 
reduced water use by less than 5%. In addition, toilet rebates were determined to be the 
most cost-effective rebate type (from the perspective of the utility) under a reasonable set 
of assumptions, with washing machine rebates being the second most cost effective per 
volume of water saved; landscaping rebates are the least cost effective. This result is 
likely due to outdoor watering only occurring in part of the year whereas toilets and 
washing machines are used throughout the year. In addition, the study provides empirical 
support for climate-related impacts related to water demand. Estimated marginal effects 
suggest that one inch of precipitation reduced Clovis water use by about 1.2%, while a 
one degree (Fahrenheit) increase in temperature increases water use by about 1.0%.    
 It is important to note that different user types had different responses to changes 
in price and income. While both high and low volume water users were found to be price 
inelastic, the low volume users were more sensitive to price than the high volume users. 
Similarly, low volume users were more income elastic than high volume users; in other 
words, that group changed its water use by a relatively larger amount for a given income 
change. Given its relatively higher income sensitivity, it stands to reason that the low 
water-use group, on average, is a relatively lower-income cohort – that in concert with 
the fact that the group was more price-sensitive, it begs the question about whether water 
rate increases in pricing are regressive. Therefore, as a policy matter, the utility and 
regulator should investigate how rate increases affect different user groups to ensure that 
equity is properly accounted for.       
While the municipal water demand literature is generally well-developed, one 
area that is understudied is the impact of spatial effects on water use. This topic is 
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pursued in Appendix 3.3. After controlling for factors shown to impact demand, this 
analysis investigates the applicability of spatial econometric methods via application of a 
spatial weights matrix to a panel municipal water consumption dataset. While diagnostics 
suggest the presence of spatial lag and spatial error, thus indicating the potential 
usefulness of spatial empirical methods, several important pitfalls must be acknowledged. 
First, the application of spatial weights in a panel setting is computationally intensive, 
especially when the number of time periods or observations is large, and perhaps 
necessitates aggregation. Second, because most users in a municipality are likely to be 
subject to similar utility action, climate, etc., a spatial lag signal may be spurious. Third, 
because premises served by the utility may enter or exit the dataset through time, the 
requirement of balanced panels requires careful consideration. Fourth, if the option to use 
premises-level (or similar) data or aggregated data are available it is typically advisable 
to use premises-level data despite the possible presence of spatial effects.        
 Because water demand management strategies were shown to effectively reduce 
demand in Chapter 3 and elsewhere (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). Chapter 4 
employs an optimal control framework, which is used to investigate financial impacts of 
demand management rebates provided by a water utility. Municipal water utilities 
regularly invest costly resources for the purpose of water demand management programs. 
One example of this activity is advertisement of water-saving technologies such as low 
flow toilets, high efficiency washing machines, and the like, and utilities often subsidize 
the purchase of qualifying products. Given that water-saving technologies reduce water 
demand, and apparently negatively impact the utility’s revenues and costs, it is not 
immediately clear what benefit this activity provides.  
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To investigate this issue, an optimal control model is developed using a capital 
accumulation framework. Under this model, the utility can use costly resources to replace 
depreciated capital through direct infrastructure investment and replacement or it can 
devote costly resources through a demand management advertising program, which 
reduces stress on existing capital and allows the utility to put off investment and repairs. 
Outlined are the optimal paths for infrastructure investment and advertising and 
enumerated are the conditions that must exist for the utility to tradeoff between 
investment types. In addition, given the results derived from the optimal control model, 
testable empirical models are developed. Because tradeoffs between infrastructure 
investment, repairs, and advertising (for rebated technology) have not yet been 
investigated in the literature, this chapter adds to the literature by providing qualitative 
outcomes for an optimizing utility, testable empirical hypotheses, and a roadmap for 
further investigation.   
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a synthesis of results, 
limitations of the current research, and discusses directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Understanding Declining Municipal Water Demand in the 
Western USA: A Time-series and Breakpoint Analysis of Water 
Demand in Four Municipalities 
 
2.1. Introduction  
Water demand projections for several western municipalities in the United States 
call for increasing aggregate water demand over the next several decades (City of Los 
Angeles, 2010; City of Phoenix, 2011; Olsen & Wilson, 2012; Woodard, 2015). 
Projections for municipalities and regions in New Mexico are no exception to this general 
trend (ABCWUA, 2013; Llewellyn & Vaddey, 2013; OSE, 2013, 2016, 2017; Stroud & 
Kilmer, 2016). However, recent analyses suggest that demand, including aggregate 
demand, is declining in some western municipalities (Fleck, 2016; Pratt, 2015; Santos, 
2013; Wentz & Gober, 2007).  
The disconnect between demand projections and the trajectory of recent aggregate 
water demand is likely due to application of the “requirements approach” to water 
demand projections (Griffin, 2006). This approach, used in one form or another by 
municipal water providers as well as state and regional planners, essentially assumes 
some baseline water use per capita, often dictated by a recent data point, or declining per 
capita demand with an arbitrary floor, and projects aggregate water demand based on 
assumed population or economic growth. Critically, the approach may not fully 
incorporate demand-side effects of increased resource scarcity, efficiency improvements, 
or temporal preference changes, all of which may invalidate the assumed floor placed on 
per capita demand. Therefore, demand is essentially taken as given, and as a result of 
increasing water scarcity, water managers and planners principally focus much of their 
energy on the supply side of the supply-demand relationship (Davis & Hanke, 1971; 
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Griffin, 2006). As such, the trajectory of per capita demand is not fully accounted-for in 
some demand projections, thereby potentially overstating future aggregate demand 
(Woodard, 2015) and possibly incentivizing unnecessary investment or supply 
augmentation.   
To investigate the demand side of this issue, this study applies time series analysis 
to aggregate and per premises water demand data from four New Mexico four 
municipalities: Albuquerque, Rio Rancho, Clovis, and Edgewood. Structural breaks are 
also estimated using breakpoint analyses; breaks are tied to exogenous events such as 
policy changes or extreme climate events. Results suggest that per capita and aggregate 
water demand is declining in nearly all cases over the last decade for both low volume 
(residential) users and high volume (industrial) users. Breakpoint analysis suggests that 
series breaks occurred in Clovis and Rio Rancho; however, likely explanations for the 
breaks are different. The major structural break in Rio Rancho coincides with large water 
rate increases, which caused a sharp and rapid decline in water demand and is confined to 
industrial users. Breaks in Clovis were upward in nature and coincided with periods of 
extreme drought; breaks were observed for both the residential and industrial water users. 
While the presence (or absence) of breaks are identifiable and related to 
exogenous events such as extreme climate or large rate changes, the persistent declining 
trend in per premises and aggregate water demand for both residential and industrial 
users in nearly every municipality in this analysis is perhaps the most critical observation. 
To that end, this study also considers factors that are likely to contribute to changing 
demand patterns, with special attention to institutional factors, population factors, 
economic factors and policy interventions, and climate. Using Clovis, New Mexico as an 
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example, an econometric model designed to capture behavioral responses, is developed. 
Results confirm that water use responded to variation in temperature and precipitation; 
additionally, water use was found to be price inelastic at current prices. While the thrust 
in this analysis is at a large spatial scale (i.e. an entire city), estimation results are also 
compared against two other spatial scales: US Census block groups and premises-level.             
2.2. Study Areas 
The cities of Albuquerque, Rio Rancho, Clovis, and the town of Edgewood, each 
in New Mexico, USA are used to investigate temporal trends in municipal water demand. 
The city of Albuquerque, which is part of the larger Albuquerque Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA), is located roughly in the center of the state and is its major economic hub; 
according the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the MSA’s share of New Mexico GDP 
averaged more than 45% from 2012-15. The city is located at the base of the Sandia 
Mountain range and is adjacent to the Rio Grande. Critically, two major US highways, 
Interstate-25 and Interstate-40, intersect in the city, which provide east/west and 
north/south thoroughfare for goods and services originating from or passing through the 
state. Its location puts it relatively close to the surrounding states of Arizona, Utah, 
Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas, as well as the US-Mexico border.  
The city of Rio Rancho, which is also located within the Albuquerque MSA and 
the town of Edgewood are both proximal to Albuquerque and there is significant 
commuter traffic to and from each municipality. Rio Rancho is about 20 miles north-west 
of Albuquerque and is its largest suburb. The city, however, provides a broad array of 
public services through its local tax base; services include public works programs such as 
streets and water, public schools, police, etc. The town of Edgewood is located about 20 
miles east of Albuquerque and is a small commuter town in the Sandia Mountains. 
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According to its own budget documents, the city’s annual budget is in the neighborhood 
of about $5.7 million dollars (http://www.edgewood-
nm.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2221). Much of its expenditures are operational in nature, 
but also include police and capital projects.    
The most geographically distinct municipality is the city of Clovis, which is 
located near the Texas border in the east-central part of the state on Interstate-60. The city 
is around 220 miles to the east and slightly south of Albuquerque. Its closest medium-
sized cities are Lubbock and Amarillo, Texas, both of which are around 100 miles further 
east.            
2.3. Institutional Frameworks & Demand Projections 
 To provide greater context for the demand projections discussed in this analysis, 
this section begins with a brief discussion of the entities charged with tracking or 
managing water resources in the respective areas or municipalities as well as developing 
projections.  
2.3.1 Institutional frameworks 
The institutional frameworks governing water use decisions in New Mexico are 
overlapping, with the state providing general guidance via the Office of the State 
Engineer (Verhines, 2013), who under Article 2 of Chapter 72 of the New Mexico State 
Code (NMSA, 2006, §72-2), is imbued with broad authority over New Mexico’s waters. 
In addition, sixteen regions within the state have some authority over general regional 
water determinations (OSE, 2013), while individual city or municipal utilities make local 
water supply decisions. 
At the city or municipal level, each water utility operating within the geographies 
contemplated in this analysis have slightly different organizational structures. EPCOR, 
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which supplies water in Clovis and Edgewood, is a private utility authorized to operate 
within the respective municipality. In 2011, EPCOR took over operations from the 
former private sector provider New Mexico American Water. The city of Rio Rancho 
currently operates its own public water utility whereas the Albuquerque Bernalillo 
County Water Authority (ABCWUA), which is a public water utility, serves 
Albuquerque. Historically, groundwater has been the source used by these utilities to 
fulfill constituent demand; while that is still generally true for the municipalities 
discussed here, the San Juan-Chama Project, which directs water from the Colorado 
River to the Rio Grande, began to supplement the city of Albuquerque’s supply in 2008. 
That surface water  now accounts for approximately 60% of Albuquerque’s total annual 
supply (Wickert, 2015).       
 Each bureaucratic layer (state, region, and municipality) develops plans to ensure 
future water supply reliability. For example, regional water planning in New Mexico 
began in 1987 for the purpose of demonstrating to other states and the federal 
government that New Mexico needed its full allotment of water (Buynak et al., 2010). To 
coordinate and systematize the disparate regional plans, and to ensure that the state was a 
good steward of it water resources, the state enacted the State Water Plan Act (2003), 
which requires the State Engineer, in conjunction with the Interstate Stream Commission, 
to produce updated plans every five years (Buynak et al., 2010). Meanwhile, cities and 
municipalities develop utility-level water plans dedicated to ensuring adequate supplies 
and water planning at a local level (ABCWUA, 2013; Rio Rancho, 2014). 
 In addition, each water utility in conjunction with its local governing body, 
develops drought management plans, which may be initiated in times of drought. 
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Drought, according to ABCWUA wastewater ordinance §4-1-3 is defined as: “when there 
is insufficient precipitation combined with other environmental factors that cause an 
increase of overall water usage.” Drought management plans may exist at all bureaucratic 
levels; even at the state level, the State Water Plan requires that the State Engineer 
develop a drought management plan “designed to address drought emergencies, promote 
strategies for prevention of drought-related emergencies in the future and coordinate 
drought planning statewide” (NMSA, n.d., §72-14-3.1(6)).  The regional drought plans 
are consistent with the State Water Plan as that plan lays out the methods for assessing 
drought conditions generally (OSE, 2013). Likewise, individual water utilities develop 
plans to manage periods of shortage. For example, contingent on approval from the local 
Water Authority Board, ABCWUA’s Executive Director is authorized to institute 
enhanced watering restrictions or temporary rate increases in times of drought 
(ABCWUA, 2012). Similarly, chapter 52 of the Rio Rancho city ordinances provides 
analogous tools to the water utility in times of shortage or drought (Rio Rancho, 2016,  
§52.05(E)).     
2.3.2 Demand projections 
Water demand projections produced by municipal water utilities as well as 
relevant state and federal agencies call for increasing aggregate municipal demand in 
many populated regions in New Mexico (ABCWUA, 2013; Llewellyn & Vaddey, 2013; 
OSE, 2013, 2016, 2017; Stroud & Kilmer, 2016). For example, the 2017 regional water 
plan for the 16th region, which includes Bernalillo and Sandoval Counties (containing the 
cities of Albuquerque and Rio Rancho, respectively), projects increasing aggregate 
demand over its planning horizon from 2010 to 2060 in both counties (OSE, 2017). 
Although the projection calls for per capita demand in Bernalillo County to slowly 
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decline from 155 gallons per capita per day (gpcd) in 2010 to 130 gpcd by 2060 (but no 
lower than 130 gpcd), projected aggregate water demand increases in both the low and 
high demand scenarios (OSE, 2017). In the near term from 2010 to 2020, projected 
aggregate demand for premises on public water supplies increase by 7.7% and 5.7% in 
the respective high and low demand scenarios (OSE, 2017).  
ABCWUA, the public utility charged with servicing the Albuquerque-municipal 
area, also recently published water demand projections. Although aggregate demand 
generally trended downward since 1990 (ABCWUA, 2013), ABCWUA projects 
aggregate demand to increase because reductions “cannot reasonably be expected to 
continue” in the future “without significant mandatory restrictions” (ABCWUA, 2013).  
The US Bureau of Reclamation similarly projects increasing aggregate municipal demand 
due to assumed constant per capita indoor demand with population growth (Llewellyn & 
Vaddey, 2013).  
The assumption of increasing demand is not only confined to the Albuquerque 
Bernalillo County service area or even to this region. The OSE projection for Sandoval 
County projects that aggregate demand will increase from 2010 to 2020 by 24.5% in its 
high scenario, and will not decline in its low scenario (OSE, 2017). The city of Rio 
Rancho’s projections also call for increasing demand (Rio Rancho, 2014). Similarly, the 
state of New Mexico’s 1st region, which includes Curry County (and the city of Clovis), 
also assumes increasing municipal demand (on public water supplies) over the period 
from 2010 to 2020 to the tune of 14.1% and 8.0% in the respective high and low demand 
scenarios (OSE, 2016). However, it is unsurprising that projections for this region are 
similar because the methodology is dictated by the larger state water plan – which, like 
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the 16th region projection, assumes a floor on per capita demand and that population 
grows more rapidly than per capita demand declines (OSE, 2013).  
2.4. Population Size and Population Growth 
 In 2014, the population within Albuquerque, the state’s most populous city, was 
estimated to total 553,576 persons. This total only includes individuals residing in the 
city limits and does not include that larger metropolitan area which was estimated to total 
about 904,587 persons. The city of Rio Rancho, which is included in the Albuquerque 
metropolitan region, but is its own separate municipality, totaled 90,627 persons in 2014. 
Illustrating the relatively small population in the state of New Mexico is that, despite the 
relatively small population of the city of Rio Rancho, it is the third most populous city in 
the state.   
Table 2.1 Population by geography through time 
State/City Population 2000* 2010* 2014 Estimate** 
New Mexico 
   Clovis 
1,819,046 
43,423 
2,059,179 
45,499 
2,080,085 
48,702 
   Edgewood 1,893 3,735 3,763 
   Rio Rancho 51,765 87,521 90,627 
   Albuquerque 448,607 545,852 553,576 
Notes: * from respective Decennial Census; ** from American Community Survey Estimate 
The city of Clovis had an estimated population size of 48,702 persons in 2014, 
making it the eighth most populous city. Meanwhile, the town of Edgewood, which like 
Rio Rancho is proximal to Albuquerque, is sparsely populated with an estimated 
population of 3,763 in 2014. In 2014, the population in the four municipalities accounted 
for about one-third of total state population. However, note that the percentage is much 
larger if the Albuquerque MSA, which includes the cities of Albuquerque and Rio 
Rancho as well as adjacent incorporated and unincorporated areas, is considered. 
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According to the American Community Survey, the population in the MSA totaled nearly 
900,000 persons in 2014, or about 44% of total state population.     
The population in the city of Clovis experienced relatively slow growth from 
2000 to 2010, growing at an average rate of growth of only 0.5% per year; however, from 
2010 to 2014, growth accelerated to 1.8% per year on average. The town of Edgewood, 
on the other hand experienced the opposite, as did the cities of Rio Rancho and 
Albuquerque. Edgewood population grew an average of 9.7% per year from 2000 to 2010 
but then slowed to only 0.2% per year from 2010 to 2014. The population of Rio Rancho 
grew at an average rate of 6.9% per year from 2000 to 2010 and only 0.9% per year from 
2010 to 2014 while the city of Albuquerque grew at average rate of 2.2% per year from 
2000 to 2010 and then slowed to 0.4% per year on average from 2010 to 2014.    
Table 2.2 Housing units by geography through time 
State/City Housing Units 2000* 2010* 2014 Estimate** 
New Mexico 
   Clovis 
780,579 
18,421 
901,388 
19,138 
907,233 
19,623 
   Edgewood 755 1,563 1,647 
   Rio Rancho 20,209 33,964 34,800 
   Albuquerque 198,465 239,166 240,961 
Notes: * from respective Decennial Census; ** from American Community Survey Estimate 
 
 The number of housing units in each municipality has increased through time, 
with particularly large increases from 2000 to 2010 in Edgewood and Rio Rancho. Clovis 
and Albuquerque only experienced modest gains. However, growth from 2010 to 2014 
slowed considerably in all four places.  
 Building permit data, or permits granted by permit-granting jurisdiction for future 
construction of single- or multi-family homes are available from the University of New 
Mexico’s Bureau of Business and Economic Research from January 2005 through 
August 2016 for the cities of Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and Clovis. Contractor or builder 
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demand for permits are related to the demand for new construction. Increases in permit 
demand may also be correlated with population growth and perhaps even increasing 
incomes. In all cities, but especially in Albuquerque and Rio Rancho, permits granted 
were especially high in 2005 and 2006; however, building permits fell during the Great 
Recession and growth has essentially been flat since 2008. 
 
Figure 2.1 Building permits by jurisdiction   
2.5. Economy and Economic Transformation 
 The state of New Mexico has experienced significant shifts in industry 
composition over the last decade. Movements away from goods producing industries 
such as manufacturing have given way to rapid increase in service industries such as 
healthcare and accommodation and food services. Likely exacerbating the shift is the 
intervening Great Recession from which the state is yet to recover completely.  
The city of Albuquerque’s economy is relatively diverse. The city supports Sandia 
National Laboratories, which is privately managed but is funded through the US 
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Department of Energy; the city also houses Kirtland Air Force Base. Albuquerque also 
has a relatively large contingent of small high technology manufactures that specialize in 
a variety of enterprises. However, over time, the economy has moved away from large-
scale manufacturing and toward healthcare and hospitality jobs. The city also boasts the 
University of New Mexico, which is the state’s flagship university.    
Rio Rancho has grown significantly over the last three decades as it has moved 
away from being solely a commuter suburb, has developed its industrial base, and 
expanded the reach of its public services. Principally responsible for the transformation is 
Intel, which began operations in the area in 1980. As worldwide demand for personal 
computers expanded in the 1990’s, Intel expanded its manufacturing operations. 
However, as demand has waned, so have the number of jobs at Intel – which now number 
fewer than 50% of the job-peak (Robinson-Avila, 2016). Meanwhile, the rest of the 
economy has become more diversified and relatively less reliant on one large employer. 
As a result, much like Albuquerque, the center of mass has moved away from 
manufacturing to healthcare services and the hospitality industry.  
The city of Clovis is generally reliant on a small number of relatively large 
employers. Although not within the city limits, Cannon Air Force Base employs Clovis 
residents. Individuals that provide local services, including local government workers, 
such as police or public school teachers, are another relatively large bloc. Within the 
private sector, Clovis has a large number of healthcare and retail workers. Additionally, 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway has been a mainstay, although it has recently 
moved some employees out-of-state. Clovis also has a large cheese manufacturing plant, 
which has seen recent expansion. Edgewood, given its small size and proximity to larger 
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population centers such as Albuquerque and Santa Fe, has little industry and is primarily 
a commuter town. Therefore, it is unlikely that employment- and industry-dynamics, at 
least within the town, are major drivers of water demand.  
 Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show total employment and manufacturing sector employment 
levels, respectively. In each case, employment levels are shown for the county that each 
city of interest is located. This is done for two main reasons. First, city-level employment 
data tend to be relatively unreliable, especially for relatively low-population cities. 
Second, the highlighted cities, with the exception of Edgewood, are the largest population 
and industrial centers within each county; so county-level data is likely to reflect the 
trends in those cities. The table shows that the Great Recession affected Bernalillo 
County negatively as employment levels in 2010 are well below the 2005 level; as of 
2015, the level continued to stay below the 2005 threshold. Curry and Sandoval Counties, 
on the other hand, saw no similar slowdown as 2010 levels are above 2005 levels. 
However, although growth was still positive from 2010 to 2015, employment growth 
slowed in both counties.     
Table 2.3 Total employment by county through time (except Santa Fe County) 
State/City County* 
Total Employment 
2005 
2010  
(growth since 2005) 
2015 
(growth since 2010) 
New Mexico N/A 778,233 781,694 (0.4%) 822,991 (5.3%) 
   Clovis Curry County 16,034 16,764   (4.6%) 17,217   (2.7%) 
   Edgewood Santa Fe County N/A N/A N/A 
   Rio Rancho Sandoval County 27,114 29,114   (7.4%) 29,156   (0.1%) 
   Albuquerque Bernalillo County 319,561 311,725(-2.5%) 318,962 (2.3%) 
Notes: * Employment given by county totals from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
  
 The manufacturing sector is a key water user and employment in this sector can 
offer insight into the direction of water demand (Hester & Larson, 2016). In the cities of 
Albuquerque and Rio Rancho, manufacturing employment has fallen. From the period 
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2005 to 2010, employment fell by nearly 3,000 persons in Albuquerque, and the slide, 
although slower, continued through 2015. Rio Rancho also lost significant jobs over the 
period with manufacturing employment levels in 2015 being about half of the 2005 level. 
Clovis, on the other hand, experienced an uptick in employment over the period. 
Although the absolute levels are relatively low, numbering fewer than 1,000 persons, 
employment growth in this sector averaged around 5% per year.      
Table 2.4 Manufacturing employment by county (except Santa Fe County) through time 
State/City County* 
Manufacturing Employment 
2005 
2010 
(growth since 2005) 
2015 
(growth since 2015) 
New Mexico N/A 36,306 29,026 (-20.1%) 27,778 (-4.3%) 
   Clovis Curry County 443 614 (38.6%) 678 (10.4%) 
   Edgewood Santa Fe County N/A N/A N/A 
   Rio Rancho Sandoval County 6,424 4,123 (-35.8%) 3,277 (-20.5%)     
   Albuquerque Bernalillo County 15,588 12,685 (-18.6%) 12,428 (-2.0%) 
Notes: * Employment given by county totals from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
  
2.6. Climate and Drought 
Average annual temperature in all municipalities is generally similar. Over the 
period from 2006 to 2015, both Clovis and Rio Rancho experienced an average annual 
temperature of 56.2° Fahrenheit; Albuquerque’s average annual temperature was slightly 
higher at 58.3° Fahrenheit. No data were available for the town of Edgewood. Over the 
ten- year period, Clovis experienced an average of 16.9 inches of rainfall per year. Rio 
Rancho and Edgewood experienced similar rainfall volumes at 10.9 inches and 10.4 
inches, respectively. The city of Albuquerque only experienced 8.7 inches per year on 
average.  
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Table 2.5 Location and climate statistics 
City/Town Lat., Long.  Elevation Temperature Precipitation 
Clovis 34.5988°, -103.2161° 4,435.04 ft. 56.2° F 16.9 Inches 
Edgewood 35.1764°, -106.176° 6,751.97 ft. N/A 10.4 Inches 
Rio Rancho 35.2836°, -106.6194° 5,229.99 ft. 56.2° F 10.9 Inches 
Albuquerque 35.0419°, -106.6155° 5,310.04 ft. 58.3° F 8.7 Inches 
Notes: Lat.,Long. represents the latitude and longitude of measuring station; elevation is the height above 
sea level of that station. Temperature is the annual average temperature from 2006 to 2015 and 
precipitation is the average annual precipitation over that period for Clovis, Rio Rancho and Albuquerque 
and 2008 to 2015 for Edgewood. 
In terms of annual temperature variation, figure 2.2 shows that all geographies 
experienced similar inter-annual trends from 2006 to 2015 with the Clovis and Rio 
Rancho trends usually overlapping and with Albuquerque temperature generally 
surpassing the other two. 
 
Figure 2.2 Average monthly temperature (Fahrenheit) 
Precipitation trends throughout the year, from the period 2006 to 2015, were also 
generally similar – at least in terms of peaks and valleys. In most cases, the cities of 
Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and the town of Edgewood overlap especially with regard to 
summer peaks. Precipitation generally trends downward for the remainder of the year 
with the possibility of an end-year spike. Clovis precipitation is also similar in that it 
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peaks in the summer; however, it trends upward earlier. 
 
Figure 2.3 Average monthly precipitation (inches) 
Both central New Mexico, which includes Albuquerque, Rio Rancho and 
Edgewood, and the eastern part of the state have experienced several periods of drought 
since 2000; this is especially true over the last several years where both regions have 
experienced prolonged, deep, drought. Figure 2.4 shows Palmer Drought Severity Index 
(PDSI) values for the Albuquerque Area (data collected at the Albuquerque International 
Airport) and Clovis. Positive values indicate wet conditions while negative values 
indicate dry conditions; large deviations from the horizontal axis indicate relatively larger 
anomalies. Unique values are not available for Rio Rancho or Edgewood; however, due 
to spatial proximity, PDSI behavior is likely similar to Albuquerque.   
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 Figure 2.4  Palmer Drought Severity Index (monthly): 2000-2015 
Both Albuquerque and Clovis experienced drought-like conditions from 2002 to 
2004 and for a short period in 2006. Beginning in 2008 and extending to about the end of 
2013, Albuquerque experienced prolonged drought. That trend was broken in 2014 when 
the area oscillated between wet and dry conditions. Clovis’ recent drought, on the other 
hand, began in earnest in 2011 and finally broke near the end of 2014. For much of 2015, 
the city experienced conditions that were much wetter than normal.        
2.7. Policy Interventions 
 Policy interventions include any decision made by a governing jurisdiction (such 
as regulators, the legislature, or local municipality) or water use decisions made by the 
utility itself. Specific examples of interventions include water rate adjustments or the use 
of rebates for water-saving technology, both of which have been shown to impact 
demand (Arbués et al., 2003; Kenney et al., 2008). In fact, recent empirical work on 
Albuquerque has shown that premises-level water demand falls as price increases and 
that water rebates reduce water use (Price et al., 2014).   
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 2.7.1 Water rates  
 In all jurisdictions, marginal water rates are given by an increasing block-rate 
schedule and rates have been adjusted a number of times in each jurisdiction. 
Albuquerque experienced water rate increases in 2007 and each year from 2013 to 2015. 
The most recent increases were done to compensate the utility for reduced water use over 
the period. The city of Clovis, after adjusting rates in 2005, has increased rates on three 
separate occasions: in 2007, 2009 and 2012. After purchasing the interest in a private 
utility servicing the city of Rio Rancho, the city has (recently) increased rates four times: 
it increased rates twice in 2013 and then once in 2014 and 2015. Rio Rancho rate 
increases are notable because they were large. In particular, the rate adjustment in 
February 2013 increased the average bill 8.8% and was subsequently followed by 
additional increase of 7.8% in July of the same year. The average rate has increased each 
July since by 7.8% in each year (Lucero, 2016). The town of Edgewood is an outlier. 
Although the town has increased rates twice, in 2010 and 2015, it actually lowered rates 
in 2012. Table 2.6 shows the month and year of rate changes in each jurisdiction.  
Table 2.6 Summary of water rate change dates (2005-2015) 
City/Town 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Clovis Feb - Jun - May - - May - - - 
Edgewood - - - - - Jul** - May* - - Jun 
Rio Rancho - - - - - - - - Feb/July Jul Jul 
Albuquerque - - Jul - - Jul** - - Jul Jul Jul 
Notes: * Edgewood received a rate decrease in that year; ** Rate hike to a small number of 
residents taken over by utility 
 2.7.2 Water rebate programs 
The city of Albuquerque has the greatest number and variety of rebate programs 
and has had rebate programs for a number of years. The city currently provides rebates 
for the installation of low-flow toilets, showerheads, washing machines, and hot water 
recirculating systems (Price et al., 2014). The city also provides a rebate for converting 
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outdoor turf to xeriscape. Rio Rancho has three rebates for water-saving technology, 
including rebates for clothes washing machines, toilets and evaporative cooler 
thermostats (http://ci.rio-rancho.nm.us/index.aspx?NID=422). The city of Clovis offers 
toilet rebates, clothes washer rebates, and landscaping rebates 
(http://www.epcor.com/efficiency-conservation/rebates-clovis/Pages/rebates.aspx). The 
town of Edgewood does not offer rebates.  
 2.7.3 Outdoor watering restrictions 
 The cities of Rio Rancho and Albuquerque each have outdoor water restriction 
programs; however, the Rio Rancho program is mandatory while the Albuquerque 
program is voluntary. The city of Rio Rancho restricts outdoor sprinkler/spray irrigation 
from April 1 through October 31 to hours after 7:00 P.M. to before 11:00 A.M. However, 
watering by hand, or the use of drippers and low-emitting bubblers are allowed at any 
time (http://www.rrnm.gov/index.aspx?NID=913). Albuquerque’s current program is 
voluntary but suggests watering once a week in March, twice a week in April and May, 
three times a week in June, July and August, twice a week in September and October, and 
once a week in November (http://www.abcwua.org/Water_by_the_Numbers.aspx). The 
program does not restrict the day of the week or the timing of watering. Neither the city 
of Clovis nor the town of Edgewood have restricted watering schedules.      
2.8. Methods 
 Seasonal decomposition and breakpoint analysis are applied to data provided by 
municipal water authorities. This analysis extends the time series methods utilized by 
Hester and Larson (Hester & Larson, 2016), who investigated water demand trends in 
North Carolina, USA municipalities; those municipalities, unlike the municipalities 
studied here, tend to experience high levels of precipitation, relatively less aridity, and 
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have different institutional and industrial structures. The authors found that declines in 
per capita demand likely coincided with reduced manufacturing demand in the late 
1990’s. Additionally, coordinated state-level drought responses in the late 2000’s 
suppressed demand and conservation pricing in 2010 in at least one municipality 
(Raleigh) caused demand to fall further.     
 2.8.1 Water data 
 A variety of sources provided water consumption data for this analysis. The 
Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Authority (ABUCWA) provided data for its 
coverage area; Rio Rancho data from the city water authority; Edgewood and Clovis 
from private supplier EPCOR.  
Water data are reported in terms of aggregate consumption on a monthly time-
step. Total water use includes residential and industrial users within each city or town. 
Analysis is done based on aggregate water consumption as well as on an average water 
user basis. This analysis is different from Hester and Larson (Hester & Larson, 2016), 
who used an estimated per capita figure (based on American Community Survey 
estimates), because the number of accounts in each month is known with certainty but the 
population is not. Monthly demand was divided by the number of days in each month to 
produce two statistics: mean daily total daily demand and mean daily demand per 
premises.  
 2.8.2 Water data decomposition procedure  
 Seasonal trend analysis is employed to strip out the seasonal elements (Cleveland 
et al., 1990). Water demand is assumed to take the following form  
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 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
𝑡𝑡 = 1, … . . ,𝑛𝑛 (2.1) 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is water use in a city in time 𝑡𝑡 (total aggregate demand and per premises 
water demand are estimated separately); 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 is an unobserved trend component; 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is the 
recurring seasonal component – with monthly data there are twelve periods, so 𝑠𝑠 = 12; 
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 is an unobserved residual.  
 2.8.3 Breakpoint analysis 
 Breakpoint analysis elucidates structural breaks in the data. Models are estimated 
based on total water use in each period and water use per premises and takes the 
following form  
 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 +  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠−1
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−1∗ + 1, . . … , 𝑡𝑡,∗ 
(2.2) 
𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are the intercept and slope parameters, respectively, for the 𝑗𝑗 regimes occurring 
between the 𝑚𝑚 breakpoints (Bai & Perron, 2003; Haywood & Randal, 2014; Hester & 
Larson, 2016). Seasonal effects are estimated by 𝛿𝛿 for each season 𝑖𝑖 through a series of 
monthly indicators, 𝐷𝐷.   Application of the breakpoint analysis to water use data was 
done using the BFast and strucchange packages in R (Chu et al., 1995; Hester & Larson, 
2016; Verbesselt, Hyndman, Newnham, et al., 2010; Verbesselt, Hyndman, Zeileis, et al., 
2010; Zeileis et al., 2002). Dependent variables are log transformed in all cases.   
2.9. Seasonal Trend and Breakpoint Results 
Results are estimated for each municipality using each municipality’s entire 
dataset. Data are then subsetted into low volume (residential) water users and high 
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volume (industrial) users to determine wither there are differences in behavior between 
broad user classes. In the case of Clovis, low volume users are grouped based on the use 
of less than 2,000 average gallons used per day. However, unknown is whether the 
particular account is technically residential or non-residential.  
The Central Limit Theorem requires at least 12.5% of the observations before and 
after the estimated breakpoint (Bai & Perron, 2003; Zeileis et al., 2003). However, given 
only 120 monthly periods for Clovis, 93 periods for Rio Rancho, 96 period for 
Albuquerque, and 94 periods for Edgewood, this study imposes a requirement of at least 
15% of the data pre- and post-estimated breakpoint. The conservative window is used to 
better control for drought-like conditions that began early in 2006 (in the case of Clovis) 
as well as the protracted drought from 2011 to nearly 2014 – both of which may be 
expected to impact aggregate water demand and on a per premises demand. Forthcoming 
figures display premises-level data because demand responses are likely to be at that 
level; however, supplemental material contain aggregate-level results. In addition, results 
from statistical test of each break identified in the breakpoint analysis are shown in table 
2.9 in Appendix 2.1.  
Figure 2.5 shows seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean water use in Clovis for 
all water users and high volume users (left panel and right panel, respectively). The top 
graphs show monthly mean water use with shaded regions representing drought 
(sequential PDSI readings of -1.5). The middle graph shows the seasonally decomposed 
trend with breakpoints given by the vertically hashed loci and 95% confidence intervals 
shaded. The bottom graph shows estimated breakpoints with confidence intervals and 
fitted trend lines.   
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Figure 2.5 Seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean daily water use per premises in Clovis for all 
premises (left) and for high volume premises (right) 
Figure 2.6 shows seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean water use in Rio 
Rancho for all water users and low volume users (left panel and right panel, respectively).  
 
Figure 2.6 Seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean daily water use per premises in Rio Rancho for all 
premises (left) and for low volume premises (right) 
The left panel in figure 2.7 shows seasonal trends and breakpoints (or rather, lack 
of breakpoints) for water use in Edgewood. The de-seasoned trend clearly indicates 
declining water use from 2009 through 2015. The trend also indicates a sharp uptick 
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beginning at the end of 2015 through September 2016; however, because a full year of 
2016 data are not yet available, it is unclear whether the pattern is truly indicative of a per 
premises uptick or whether partial year data are causing the sharp increase. Even so, the 
data exhibit no significant breakpoints. The right panel in figure 2.7 shows seasonal 
trends and lack of breakpoints for the city of Albuquerque from the period from January 
2009 to December 2015. In this case, mean daily water use for all premises is displayed; 
however, the outcome, with regard to continuously declining demand throughout the 
period, as well as lack of breakpoints, is consistent across type of user and metric.     
 
Figure 2.7 Seasonal trends and breakpoints for mean daily water use per premises in Edgewood (left) and 
Albuquerque (right) for all premises 
2.10. Seasonal Trend and Breakpoint Discussion 
 In most cases, municipalities experienced declining total use and use per premises 
over the periods investigated. However, existence, timing, and reason for breakpoints 
appear to be different in each case. Demand trends and breakpoints for each place are 
discussed in turn.  
The city of Clovis generally experienced declines in water use; however, data for 
all water users (low and high volume users) suggest that the series experienced two 
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breakpoints. The timing of the breakpoints does not appear to relate to significant 
economic or industrial events, nor do they appear to relate to rate changes; rather, the 
breakpoints logically occur in relation to the timing of drought. For example, in figure 5, 
the first breakpoint occurs as the series flattens out after the short-but-severe drought in 
the first half of 2006. Because drought occurred near the start of the series, the fitted 
series adjusts upward at the start. Providing additional evidence of these drought effects 
is the timing of the second breakpoint, which occurs in 2011, and is proximate to the start 
of the second period of drought. 
However, this does not explain the water use patterns (per premises) for high 
volume users, which is generally increasing, although the series experiences a downward 
break in 2011. However, the reason for the upward sloping trend is that the number of 
premises classified high volume (i.e. 2,000 gpd) declined through time, thereby leaving 
only the largest users in the dataset. In particular, premises that are relatively close to the 
2,000 gpd threshold began to reduce water use through time and fell into the low-user 
category. For example, in 2006, the average number of premises that qualified as a high 
volume user totaled 257 premises; by 2016, the average number fell to 123 premises. The 
very high users, on the other hand, who are likely to be larger business and 
manufacturing interests, continued to use high water volumes, thus increasing use per 
premises for the high volume group. Supporting this position is that when total aggregate 
water use for high volume users (instead of per premises use) is examined, the series and 
breakpoints appear similar to the analogous series for low volume users.    
Although water use has generally declined through time in Rio Rancho – 
especially residential use – high volume use dipped significantly in 2013 and continued 
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to fall. A likely culprit for the decline is the change in the manufacturing sector, and 
specifically the change in the water demand from Intel. The company, which uses a 
combination of water supplied from the city water utility as well as its own wells and 
reuse programs, began to reduce its reliance on city wells in 2013 (Intel, 2014). In 
particular, from June 2012 to December 2013, the monthly volume of water purchase by 
Intel fell from 118.4 million gallons to 968,000 gallons (Intel, 2014). Additionally, to the 
extent that employment and production are correlated, reduced manufacturing 
employment levels may help to explain reduced demand. However, production 
efficiencies also likely contribute to the decline. Nevertheless, because Intel is a large 
water consumer, changes in its water use patterns is the leading candidate to explain the 
breakpoint.  
Left unexplained, however, is the generally declining water use trend through 
time. While it is unclear exactly why this seemingly sharp decline exists for these groups, 
it may be related to the series of relatively large rate adjustments beginning in February 
2013. These rate adjustments likely play a role in recent water use reductions for 
residential consumers and likely also explain why Intel traded off city water use with its 
own well use. However, without premises-level data and an ability to estimate price 
elasticity of demand, this effect cannot be quantified accurately.  
Data from the town of Edgewood also suggest declining water demand at both the 
aggregate and premises level. Output from seasonal trend analysis suggests that per 
premises use declined almost uninterrupted from 2009 to near the end of 2015. The 
analysis also suggests an uptick in demand near the start of 2016. However, despite the 
apparent change in direction, the uptick is not accompanied by an identifiable breakpoint. 
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The lack of a breakpoint in this case may be due to not having enough data near the end 
of the series to characterize the break.  
Similar patterns of generally declining demand but a recent uptick are shown at 
the premises level when all data are examined as well as for low- and high-volume users. 
This is also generally true for aggregate demand except for high volume users, who 
experienced large variation and directional change several times over the period. For the 
period, three breakpoints, as shown in table 2.9, were detected: March 2010, November 
2011 and May 2015 (although statistical significance was rejected), which broke the 
series into four distinct regions: declining from January 2009 to March 2010, increasing 
from March 2010 to November 2011, flat from November 2011 to May 2015 and then 
increasing after May 2015.  
However, volatile aggregate water use for high volume users in Edgewood is 
probably unsurprising given that it is primarily a commuter town (so little industry) and 
because there are relatively few users (an average of 75 per month) in this category. In 
addition, the average user in this group uses only 571 gallons per day, which is much 
different from the nearly 5,800 gallons per day and 2,650 gallons per day used by high 
volume users in Clovis and Rio Rancho, respectively. This suggests a categorical 
difference between the types of operations undertaken by high volume Edgewood users 
and likely makes their water use trends and patterns not directly comparable to high 
volume users elsewhere.9                
9 Because Edgewood is primarily a commuter town (and almost entirely residential) it probably makes 
sense to compare all of its users to low volume water users in the other municipalities. When examining all 
users in Edgewood, no statistically significant breakpoint is observed and the series generally declines (see 
left panel of figure 2.7).    
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The city of Albuquerque, like the other municipalities, experienced declining 
water demand over the period of study. This is true of both demand per premises and 
aggregate demand, even though the number of premises increased over the period – from 
an average of 194,758 premises in 2009 to 201,742 premises in 2015. Although not 
discussed specifically in this context, prior analysis investigated some of the factors that 
are likely related to declining demand, including price increases, rebates for water saving 
technology, and rebates for conversion of turf to xeriscape (Price et al., 2014).   
However, Price et al. (2014) did not assess or estimate all of the potential factors 
that are likely linked to reduced demand in Albuquerque. One possible factor is that the 
Albuquerque economy has fared poorly since the Great Recession.10 Some of this is 
captured by the decline in total and manufacturing employment shown in tables 2.3 and 
2.4, respectively. To give greater context, the Albuquerque Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
which is comprised of a four county region (including Sandoval County, where Rio 
Rancho resides), was only the 387th fastest growing region in terms of employment 
growth (0.2% over the period) out of 436 metro regions as defined by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics from 2009 to 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/). Furthermore, the 
Albuquerque MSA experienced the slowest rate of growth of any metro region with at 
least 200,000 jobs. Given the relative lack of business growth and the likely dearth of 
investment, it is perhaps not surprising that water use is declining.  
10 Price et al. (2014) included a time trend in a secondary analysis which may have captured at least some 
of the effect of the poorly performing economy. However, to the extent that other factors influencing 
demand, such as uptake of rebated technology (or other factors potentially impacting demand), are 
temporally correlated with Albuquerque’s poorly performing economy, the time trend will be unable to pull 
apart the impact of both effects.    
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Additionally, increasing preference for water conservation is not estimated by 
Price et al. (2014) but may be driven by myriad factors. These include the public 
information campaigns pursued by ABCWUA regarding relative water vulnerability – 
which, among other things, required water supply investment via the San Juan-Chama 
water project; the large number of news stories by local media outlets; and perhaps a 
greater awareness of the potential impacts on the water supply due to climate change.  
An additional avenue of potential investigation in all municipalities is the rate of 
housing stock turnover and the extent to which new or improved building materials or 
different landscaping standards have reduced water demand per-premises, which has not 
been fully investigated in the literature (Woodard, 2015). Relatedly, improvements may 
have been made to existing businesses, households and city infrastructure – all of which 
may have reduced system leakage. Further investigation is needed to uncover and 
quantify these and additional drivers of declining demand in Albuquerque and elsewhere.   
2.11. Econometric Estimation: Case of Clovis, New Mexico 
Given the results from the previous section, it appears as though either extreme 
drought conditions (in the case of Clovis) or severe utility action (in the case of Rio 
Rancho) may create a series break at least in some instances. In effort to quantify a more 
precise behavioral response, this section estimates an economic model of water demand 
for the city of Clovis. Output from this model is compared against known output from 
models at the US Census block group level and premises-level. Of particular interest is 
the degree to which water users respond to utility action, such as rate changes and rebate 
programs, and climate conditions. For a thorough discussion of the empirical challenges 
involved in estimating water demand, including managing endogenieity and fixed effects, 
please see Chapter 3.4.      
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 2.11.1 Data  
 Monthly data on water use (January 2006 to December 2015) in Clovis was 
converted to average daily water use. Average water price (per gallon) was calculated by 
taking the bill amount (i.e. amount paid by water users) and dividing by the volume used. 
Because the time period is relatively long (10 years), price is adjusted for inflation on an 
annual basis using the consumer price index (CPI) using 2015 as the base year. Data on 
rebates for water saving technology and landscaping changes were provided by EPCOR. 
Data are known at the premises-level; at larger geographic scales (i.e. US Census block 
group or city levels), the relevant variables are defined as the fraction of premises that 
received a rebate by rebate type.        
 Daily temperature data was used to construct average temperature for each month 
while daily precipitation data was summed to arrive at a monthly precipitation total. Over 
the study period from January 2006 to December 2015, Clovis experienced several 
periods of extreme drought: from a short period of drought in 2006 to extended and deep 
drought from 2011 to 2014. Monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) data were 
also employed in an effort to better account for the effects of drought.  
 In an attempt to control for socioeconomic and demographic shifts, county-level 
(Curry County) estimates for household size and income were employed. Also used were 
permits granted for single family construction in the city of Clovis; this was done to 
proxy for the age of the housing stock. Table 2.7 shows descriptive statistics and data 
sources for the key variables used in this analysis.   
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Table 2.7 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Period Unit Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Source 
WU 
Average daily 
household water use  
Month Gallons 323.6 653.51 EPCOR 
AvgPrice Average water price Month $/Gallon 0.003 0.002 EPCOR 
ToiletPrem 
Premises toilet rebate 
indicator 
Month 1/0 0.03 0.18 EPCOR 
Washer 
Washing machine 
rebate indicator 
Month 1/0 0.02 0.13 EPCOR 
Landscape 
Landscape rebate 
indicator 
Month 1/0 0.01 0.08 EPCOR 
Income 
Average household 
income in county 
Ann. Dollars 40,945 1.02 
US Census 
(ACS) 
HHSize 
Average household 
size in county 
Ann. Persons 2.61 0.08 
US Census 
(ACS) 
Permits 
Number of single 
family building permits 
Month Permits 10.37 5.47 BBER & Clovis 
Temp 
Average monthly 
temperature 
Month Fahrenheit 56.80 14.86 NOAA 
Precip 
Average total monthly 
precipitation  
Month Inches 1.28 1.44 NOAA 
PDSI 
Palmer Drought 
Severity Index 
Month Unitless -0.28 2.45 NOAA 
 2.11.2 Model and estimation  
Econometric estimation is undertaken according to the following model:  
 lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2Temp𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3Precip𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝐵𝐵4lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵5HHsize𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵7BldPermit𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵8PDSI𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ �𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3
𝑗𝑗=1
+ �𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘Month𝑘𝑘11
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙MeterSize𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖3
𝑙𝑙=1
+ 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(2.3) 
𝐵𝐵0 is the intercept and terms from 𝐵𝐵1 to 𝐵𝐵8 correspond to estimated coefficients on 
continuous variables.  lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1), is water price lagged one month. Due to 
endogenous price, this variable is constructed based on a first stage estimates using 
marginal price as instruments (Arbués & Villanúa, 2006; Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 
2014). 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗, at the premises-level, corresponds to the receipt of a rebate and at the more 
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aggregated spatial scales to the proportion of premise that had received a toilet rebate, 
washing machine rebate and/or landscaping rebate at the respective spatial scale. 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 is 
the coefficient on month; December is the base month. 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 controls for the size of the 
water deliver pipe attached to the premises. 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 controls for premises or block group fixed 
effects (at the city spatial scale, fixed effects are not employed), while 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the error 
term. 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are indices that correspond to premises (or census block) and time period, 
respectively.     
Table 2.8 Modeling results 
 
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 
 
FEIV FEIV 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Variable Name Premises-Level Block Group City-Level City-Level City-Level 
lnAvgPrice -0.534*** -0.406*** 0.021 -0.440*** -0.508*** 
 
(0.008) (0.039) (0.670) (0.147) (0.125) 
ToiletPrem -0.083*** -0.123 -12.194** 
  
 
(0.004) (0.106) (4.483) 
  Washer -0.060*** -0.613*** 21.890* 
  
 
(0.006) (0.157) (10.165) 
  Landscape -0.100*** -0.937*** -11.207*** 
  
 
(0.007) (0.170) (1.894) 
  lnIncome 0.568*** 0.829*** 0.044 0.590 0.232 
 
(0.027) (0.142) (0.481) (0.507) (0.437) 
Temp 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.996) (0.004) (0.003) 
Precip -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.019*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.992) (0.008) 
 PDSI   
  
-0.021*** 
          (0.003) 
N 1,575,980 3,960 119 119 119 
R2 0.280 0.581 0.865 0.856 0.892 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. The following variables and controls suppressed: 
month, BldPermit, HHsize, suppressed. MeterSize control used in premises-level estimation but 
not block group or city-level estimation. No fixed effects are employed in the city-level 
estimation.  
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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 Models 2.1 and 2.2 correspond to estimations undertaken at the premises level 
and US Census block group level, respectively. Models 2.3-2.5 correspond to estimates at 
the city-wide spatial scale. In other words, the data are aggregated to the spatial level of 
the entire city. It is clear that the larger spatial scales improve the overall model fit; at the 
premises-level (model 2.1), R2 is only 0.28, at the block group level (model 2.2), R2 is 
0.58 and the fit nearly reaches 0.9 in the city-wide estimations (models 2.3-2.5). 
However, despite the improved model fits, compressing the data into a single spatial 
scale comes at a cost. For example, at the larger spatial scales, the estimated coefficients 
on the rebate variables, in terms of magnitude and significance, are affected (when 
compared against the results from the premises-level analysis). Additionally, the rebate 
variables appear to impact the magnitude and significance of the price variable 
(lnAvgPrice). It turned out that at the most aggregated level (city level), the price variable 
was found to correlate at a 1% level with the toilet, washing machine, and landscaping 
rebates (𝜌𝜌 = 0.82, 0.83, and 0.74, respectively). The justification for including the rebate 
variables at the spatial scale of an entire city is somewhat dubious (because it effectively 
applying a premises-level concept to an entire city), so it may make sense to exclude 
those variables when investigating water demand at large spatial scales. Results are 
shown in models 2.4 and 2.5. 
 In models 2.4 and 2.5, several salient points are illuminated. First, demand is price 
inelastic, and depending on the particular model, falls near to the elasticity estimates in 
models 2.1 and 2.2. Therefore, although the breakpoint analysis did not appear to identify 
a significant break in trend due to rate increases, the regularity of the increases appeared 
to operate to reduce demand and likely helped contribute to the declining trend.  Second, 
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the temperature coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level across models, 
indicating that increased temperatures give way to increased demand. In models 2.1, 2.2, 
and 2.4, the precipitation variables are negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that water use increases in times of low precipitation. Overall, the temperature and 
precipitation variables are particularly interesting because they are similar across models 
and imply that in times of low precipitation or high temperature, water use increases. In 
model 2.5, precipitation is replaced with PDSI. Precipitation is removed in this model 
because it is correlated at a 1% level with PDSI (𝜌𝜌 = 0.40). The estimates of the climate 
variables provide some support for the notion that weather-related events, including 
drought, may not only impact water use, but might also contribute to the systematic 
breaks seen in the breakpoint analysis. Overall, at the city-wide level, the estimates 
suggest that much of the variation can be understood in terms of price change and 
weather/climate conditions. Therefore, if adequate projections for price and climate are 
known, that information may be used to produce projections of water demand at large 
spatial scales, especially in the near term. This issue is briefly considered Appendix 2.2.        
2.12. Conclusion  
This analysis utilized seasonal trend decomposition and breakpoint analysis to 
investigate trends in temporal water demand in four arid municipalities in New Mexico. 
These methods can help inform water demand analysis by stripping away seasonal noise 
to uncover trends in demand and systematic series breaks. Seasonal trend and breakpoint 
analysis have been relatively underutilized in a water demand estimation context (Hester 
& Larson, 2016); however, given the relatively light data requirements, these analyses 
can be useful in quickly identifying patterns or trends that can be qualitatively compared 
against known events.  
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 This study found that water demand has been declining in the investigated 
municipalities. This pattern is generally true for both high and low volume users and 
terms of aggregate water use or per premises water use. However, there are a few of 
exceptions to this general rule. For instance, water use per premises for high volume 
users appeared to be increasing in the city of Clovis and water use per premises for high 
volume users increased (slightly) from about 2009 to 2014 in Rio Rancho. However, 
those are exceptional cases. In the case of Clovis, the pattern is explained by the decline 
in the number of high volume users through time, leaving only highest water demanders 
in the high volume cohort. Rio Rancho’s explanation is different not only because of the 
large increase in the number of water users over the period, but also because the city’s 
population and industrial growth likely contributed to increased water use from high 
volume users. However, it is important to note that although the trend was only slightly 
increasing until about 2014 but has been falling since. 
 Likewise, significant breakpoints were uncovered in the trends for the cities of 
Clovis for all users, and Rio Rancho for high volume users. Despite the generally 
declining trend in water demand in the city of Clovis, upward breaks appear to be related 
to severe drought conditions. This is interesting because, despite the fact that all 
municipalities experienced drought over their respective series, no other municipality 
exhibited that degree of apparent climate sensitivity. Nevertheless, given the timing of the 
Clovis breaks drought is the most likely culprit. The explanation for the break in the Rio 
Rancho series, however, is likely associated with the large rate increases experienced in 
the municipality and the associated reduction in demand from industrial users, and in 
particular, reduced demand from Intel.  
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No significant breakpoints were detected for Albuquerque or Edgewood. While 
there is no definitive reason for the lack of breaks in these two municipalities, one 
plausible explanation is the relative size of each municipality (in terms of the number of 
water-user accounts in each place). For example, the large number and type of varied 
users in Albuquerque could operate to put a floor or ceiling on rapid declines or spikes in 
demand. Edgewood, on the other hand, experiences high statistical variability due to 
having relatively few users. This statistical noise can operate to muffle the effect of 
spikes.            
Exceptional cases aside, this leads back to a primary theme in this analysis: that 
aggregate and per premises water demand is generally declining in the municipalities 
investigated in this study. However, although it appears that premises-level demand is 
likely to continue to fall in the near future, left unanswered is how long aggregate 
demand declines will persist. And although some projections assume that aggregate 
demand declines “cannot reasonably be expected to continue” (ABCWUA, 2013), given 
the recent trend, it makes demand projections, especially in the near term, somewhat 
puzzling and it perhaps calls into question the use of the requirements approach, at least 
in its current form (Griffin, 2006). Nevertheless, the application of the requirements 
approach, or placing a seemingly reasonable but arbitrary floor on assumed per capita 
demand, is understandable in terms of risk aversion as the risk of being wrong is likely 
more palatable in cases of oversupply as compared to undersupply (Woodard, 2015). 
However, if the errors always fall on the side of oversupply, costly overinvestment in 
infrastructure or potentially unnecessary supply augmentation strategies may be 
incentivized.  
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As such, agencies engaged in water demand projections should seek to minimize, 
or at least limit, the oversupply buffer. Seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis provides a 
preliminary approach to understanding premises-level and aggregate water demand 
trends in the four municipalities. This knowledge may be leveraged in the development of 
economic models and further econometric estimation strategies such as those suggested 
in section 2.11. This type of analysis can allow for a deeper investigation and important 
insights into some of the elements and key variables that impact demand even relatively 
large spatial scales. However, the utility of large scale estimation is clearly limited; while 
it is possible to make some useful inferences regarding general water use, it is nearly 
impossible to develop more fine-tuned inferences of individual or premises level action 
using only city-level or aggregate data.  
With the goal of developing a better understanding of the factors that are likely 
contributing to declining demand at smaller spatial scales in mind, Chapter 3 develops 
models at the premises-level.  
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Appendix 2.1 Statistical breakpoint analysis 
Table 2.9 Breakpoint statistics 
  Municipality User Type 
Mean 
Number of 
Premises Mean Usage 
Water-use 
Statistic 
Breakpoint 
Date 95% Confidence Interval F-statistic Prob > F 
  
Clovis 
All Users 14,986 333 gal/day 
Total water use 
June 2007 May 2007 - January 2008 11.67 0.0000 
 
February 2011 August 2010 - March 2011 29.45 0.0000 
 
Use per premises 
June 2007 May 2007 - November 2007 15.81 0.0000 
 
January 2011 September 2010 - February 2011 39.34 0.0000 
 
Low Volume 14,786 259 gal/day 
Total water use 
June 2007 May 2007 - January 2008 12.71 0.0000 
 
February 2011 July 2010 - March 2011 23.07 0.0000 
 
Use per premises 
June 2007 May 2007 - November 2007 18.56 0.0000 
 
January 2011 August 2010 - February 2011 33.74 0.0000 
 High Volume 199 5,795 gal/day 
Total water use 
June 2007 May 2007 - April 2008 6.89 0.0015 
 
January 2011 September 2009 - February 2011 33.48 0.0000 
 Use per premises October 2009 June 2009 - April 2010 3.82 0.0251 
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Table 2.9 (cont.) 
Municipality User Type 
Mean 
Number of 
Premises Mean Usage 
Water-use 
Statistic 
Breakpoint 
Date 95% Confidence Interval F-statistic Prob > F 
  
Rio Rancho 
All Users 32,082 301 gal/day 
Total water use June 2013 May 2013 - February 2014 22.07 0.0000 
 
Use per premises June 2013 May 2013 - January 2014 28.87 0.0000 
 
Low Volume 30,779 205 gal/day 
Total water use None 
 
Use per premises None 
 
High Volume 1,303 2,650 gal/day 
Total water use May 2013 April 2013 - April 2014 19.60 0.0000 
 Use per premises May 2013 March 2013 - December 2013 19.44 0.0000 
  
Edgewood 
All Users 1,929 185 gal/day 
Total water use None 
 
Use per premises None 
 
Low Volume 1,854 169 gal/day 
Total water use None 
 
Use per premises None 
 
High Volume 75 571 gal/day 
Total water use 
March 2010 February 2010 - June 2010 1.03 0.3617 
 
November 2011 October 2011 - July 2012 3.92 0.0238 
 
May 2015 January 2015 - June 2015 7.62 0.0009 
 
Use per premises None 
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Table 2.9 (cont.) 
Municipality User Type 
Mean 
Number of 
Premises Mean Usage 
Water-use 
Statistic 
Breakpoint 
Date 95% Confidence Interval F-statistic Prob > F 
  
Albuquerque 
All Users 198,238 365 gal/day 
Total water use None       
 
Use per premises None       
 
Low Volume 184,105 296 gal/day 
Total water use None 
   
 
Use per premises None    
 
High Volume  14,133 1,264 gal/day 
Total water use None 
   
 
Use per premises None    
Notes: Low volume water users in Clovis defined as using less than 2,000 gpd and high volume water users defined as using at least 2,000 gpd. High water users 
in Rio Rancho, Edgewood and Albuquerque defined as commercial users. Low volume users in Albuquerque defined as residential and multifamily users.  
Breakpoints and confidence intervals estimated using the bfast procedure in R; Manual (Chow, 1960) test used to determine breakpoint significance. 
 
 
 Appendix 2.2 City-level sample prediction 
Using the estimates given in models 2.4 and 2.5, near-term projections can be 
developed by water managers. Specifically, figure 2.8. shows in-sample projections using 
temperature and precipitation is explanatory variables (model 2.4) and temperature and 
PDSI as explanatory variables (model 2.5). Also shown is a series that only includes a 
monthly time trend as well as the actual data series.    
 
Figure 2.8 Trends actual and predicted series (gallons per day per premises) 
It is clear that all estimated series account for the generally declining trend over 
the period. However, time trended series does not account for the peaks and valleys of the 
series. The predictions that use temperature and precipitation (or PDSI) follow the peaks 
and valleys of the actual series and have a much stronger model fit – although the PDSI 
has the strongest model fit over the series. In order to visually inspect to model fit, figure 
2.9. shows predicted versus actual values for the three estimated series already described 
as well as a series using an annual (rather than monthly) time trend.    
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(a)                                                             (b) 
 
(c)                                                             (d) 
Figure 2.9 Scatter plot, predicted versus actual with 45-degree line: (a) From model 3.4; (b) From model 
3.5; (c) monthly time trend; (d) annual time trend (horizontal axis are actual vertical axis are predicted) 
Panels (a) and (b) provide similar results with panel (b) fitting slightly more 
tightly with the 45-degree line. Panels (c) and (d) show the results from a monthly and 
yearly time trend, respectively; both models fit poorly. With regard to the models that fit 
well, panels (a) and (b), although the PDSI model appears to be slightly more accurate, in 
terms of the development of actual projections, and the requirement of input series to 
produce out-of-sample estimates, it may be more realistic to use precipitation projections. 
In any event, the utility of using this method to project demand ultimately turns on the 
quality of the price and climate projections; the more accurate those projections, the more 
accurate the demand projections are likely to be. In addition, the underlying equations 
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 should be periodically re-estimated to ensure that the statistical relationships hold. If 
those relationship change through time then the updated estimates should be employed.  
Given that the econometric model (that includes precipitation in inches) and the 
PDSI model (which uses PDSI but excludes precipitation) generally produce the 
strongest fit, models 2.4 and 2.5 were re-estimated in an effort to perform out-of-sample 
prediction. In particular the estimation range was restricted from the full 120 months to 
the 60 month period from January 2006 to December 2010. Based on these estimation 
results, an out-of-sample predictions beginning January 2011 were produced. A 
comparison of the two out-of-sample predictions and the actual series is shown in figure 
2.10.       
 
Figure 2.10 Out-of-sample prediction (gallons per day per premises) 
 Interesting is that although the model fit for the PDSI model (model 2.5) was 
slightly stronger than the model fit in the econometric model (model 2.4), with an R2 of 
0.89 versus 0.86, the out-of-sample prediction for the econometric prediction 
(precipitation model) is generally tighter to the actual series than the PDSI prediction. 
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 This result provides some evidence of the benefit of using a more straight-forward 
measurement (precipitation) as opposed to a measurement that may be more attractive at 
first glance (PDSI). Chapter 3 in this manuscripts toils with the same issue in choosing 
the appropriate model variables and also settles on the use of precipitation over PDSI. In 
that case, the justification is similar: precipitation data are nearly instantaneous and is 
easy to understand whereas PDSI data are required to be computed from other underlying 
data, are complex, and may not be instantaneously available.     
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 Appendix 2.3 Full Seasonal Trend and Breakpoint Output   
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 Chapter 3: Understanding Falling Municipal Water Demand in a Small 
City Dependent on the Declining Ogallala Aquifer: a Case Study of 
Clovis, New Mexico 
 
3.1 Introduction 
I cross over the state line into Clovis, a city with ambition but not enough water. 
Irrigation has drawn the aquifer down so low here that 73 wells deliver less water 
than what 28 wells delivered to Clovis residents in 2000. “We are in a race to the 
bottom,” Mayor David Lansford says (Parker, 2016). 
 
Scarce water resources and a changing climate create incentives for more efficient 
municipal water management, especially in areas such as the arid American southwest 
where climate may be affecting snowmelt run-off, mountain-front recharge, and storage 
(Brookshire et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2004). Compared with historical averages, water 
managers must plan for projected temperatures increases, potentially greater precipitation 
variability, and severe drought conditions, all of which underscores the significant 
vulnerabilities facing municipal water supply (Deser et al., 2014; Gutzler & Robbins, 
2011). This is acutely the case for the dispersed cities and towns of the high plains region 
over the Ogallala aquifer, where agricultural withdrawals over the past century have 
rapidly depleted groundwater supplies (Foster et al., 2017; McGuire, 2014; Steward & 
Allen, 2016). The High Plains aquifer, of which the Ogallala is a part, is the primary (or 
sole) source of water for a large number of municipalities and has seen average water 
level declines of 15 feet over the last several decades; municipalities in some states such 
as New Mexico, Texas, Kansas and Oklahoma in the central and southern portion of the 
aquifer, have fared worse (McGuire, 2014). Figure 3.1 shows a selection of 
municipalities that are also dependent on the High Plains aquifer.  
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Figure 3.1  Declining High Plains Aquifer: predevelopment to 2013 
Notes: High plains aquifer boundary from Qi (2010); water level change from McGuire (2014). Map based 
on USGS digital data. Map produced by D. Ruiz at the Bureau of Business & Economic Research, UNM.   
Given population pressures and a changing climate, rapid aquifer declines have 
compromised the ability of municipalities to satisfy current and future demand and call 
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 for a careful evaluation of the factors that impact demand. This includes untangling the 
effects of complicated histories of both changing rate structures and a mix of non-price 
demand management programs implemented in combinations over time. Because Clovis’ 
situation is not unique with regard to depending on a declining aquifer, a better 
understanding of the factors that influence water demand can be leveraged by similarly 
situated municipalities.  
Municipal water managers regularly confront shortage and scarcity. On the 
demand side of the ledger, managers have both price and non-price tools at their disposal 
to influence user behavior (Kenney et al., 2008; Krause et al., 2003). Due in part to these 
efforts, per capita demand is falling in many large western cities in the US (Balling & 
Gober, 2007; Brelsford & Abbott, 2017; Donnelly & Cooley, 2015; Kenney et al., 2008; 
Price et al., 2014). In addition to the availability of demand-side response, relatively large 
cities, given large population and tax bases, may have a reasonable degree of 
maneuverability with regard to the supply side. For example, as part of a larger project, 
diversions of Colorado River water to the city of Tucson, Arizona, via the Central 
Arizona Project (CAP), became possible following aqueduct completion in 1993 and, 
after substantial groundwater depletion, the city began to use significant volumes of its 
CAP entitlement for domestic purposes in 2000 (Zuniga, 2000). Due to similar aquifer 
depletion, Albuquerque, New Mexico bolstered its supplies in early 2009 as a result of 
the San Juan Chama project; that project diverts water from the San Juan River to the Rio 
Grande via a series of channels and tunnels and ultimately to the city (Wickert, 2015).    
While much is known about large cities, less is known about small to mid-size 
cities and towns (i.e., less than 50,000 residents). A number of small to mid-sized cities, 
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 especially those within the declining southern Ogallala aquifer, are dependent on the 
aquifer as their sole source of water. Due to constraints such as small tax bases or the 
inability to capture economies of scale in infrastructure investment, however, many of 
these municipalities must operate almost exclusively on the demand side.  
Using Clovis, New Mexico as our focus, this study analyzes monthly premises-
level panel data from 2006 to 2015 to quantify the effects of pricing and demand 
management efforts in a small municipality. Analysis accounts for factors such as 
household income and climate factors in an effort to estimate the relative cost efficacy of 
different utility actions that have contributed to declining water demand. Our focus is on 
a small but rapidly growing city that is located in the arid southwest, is solely dependent 
on the dwindling southern Ogallala aquifer, and at the present time has been unable to 
engage in a large scale supply enhancement project. This analysis adds to the municipal 
water demand literature by providing estimates of price and income elasticities, assessing 
the cost efficacy of water rebate programs, and providing estimates for demand 
responsiveness to drought conditions in a small municipality. These estimates may be 
used by and compared against similar localities facing similar hydrological and climate 
conditions as well as comparable demand management programs and resource 
constraints.  
3.2 Background and literature review  
 3.2.1 Background on Clovis, NM 
Clovis, which is located in Curry County, New Mexico, is a small city near the 
New Mexico/Texas border in the east-central part of the state whose population is 
growing at a rapid rate. According to estimates from the 2015 American Community 
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 Survey, the city’s population numbered 39,480 persons – up from 37,775 persons in the 
2010 US Decennial Census, and up more than 7,000 persons from the 2000 Decennial 
Census. The climate in Clovis is arid and characterized by generally warm temperatures 
and relatively low precipitation. Average annual daily temperature typically ranges from 
around mid-30° F in the winter to the mid-70° F in the summer; meanwhile, total annual 
precipitation has averaged around 15 inches over the last decade. Like most of the 
western US, the area has recently experienced extended droughts; according to the US 
Drought Monitor, 100% of Curry County, the county that Clovis resides in, was under (at 
least) severe drought conditions from 2012 to 2014 (Simeral, 2016).   
 The city of Clovis is solely dependent on groundwater from the Ogallala aquifer 
and therefore is an important case study for other municipalities that rely on a single 
dwindling groundwater source or even where Ogallala water is a source within their 
supply mix. For example, water utilities in cities shown in figure 3.1, such as Imperial, 
Nebraska; Garden City, Kansas; and Guymon, Oklahoma, in the Oklahoma panhandle, 
each rely entirely on groundwater sources to supply its municipal customers, with most 
(or all) of the supply coming from the Ogallala formation. Even more populous cities 
such as Amarillo and Lubbock, Texas, whose utilities use some surface water in their 
respective supply mix, also use significant volumes of Ogallala water. However, at least 
in the case of Lubbock, the city recognizes that because of aquifer’s relatively low water 
table and due to decades of agricultural pumping, municipalities must seek alternative 
supplies to satisfy future demand (City of Amarillo, 2012; City of Lubbock, 2013).  
In Clovis, one proposed option for ensuring sufficient future supplies is via 
construction of the long-proposed Ute reservoir and pipeline that would divert water from 
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 the Ute Lake in eastern New Mexico southward to towns such as Clovis. Although some 
progress has been made along this front, the high cost of construction, which has been 
estimated to be in the neighborhood of USD 550 million to USD 750 million, combined 
with the fact that the project will require ongoing operational costs, have thus far 
generally stalled this large-scale investment (Suzan Montoya Bryan, 2017).  
Alternatively, municipalities may attempt to bolster supplies through water trades 
and leases from local and regional users not supplied by the utility (Colby et al., 2010, 
2014). This relatively small-scale purchase and lease activity is currently being 
undertaken by EPCOR, the private water utility that is contracted by the city to supply the 
roughly 15,000 premises (including residential, business and governmental entities) in 
municipal Clovis. However, while this may be an effective near-term strategy, given that 
irrigators are subject to the same dwindling aquifer and perhaps relatively greater stresses 
due to climate change (Ziolkowska & Reyes, 2017), opportunities for trade may be 
constrained.  
Despite a general uptick in the number of premises that EPCOR services, from 
about 13,500 premises in 2006 to about 15,500 by 2015, total water demand and water 
demand per serviced premise has generally declined over the last decade. In particular, 
mean daily water use per premises declined from about 360 gallons per day (gdp) in 2006 
to 310 gpd in 2010 and then to 250 gpd in 2015. Similarly, aggregate demand declined 
from about 5 million gpd to 4.7 million gpd and then to 3.9 million gpd in 2006, 2010, 
and 2015, respectively. This trend of falling demand has been seen in other nearby cities 
(Balling & Gober, 2007; Donnelly & Cooley, 2015). Fully understanding this apparent 
behavioral change, and what might cause it to reverse (e.g., extended drought, a warming 
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 climate, continued population growth, or altering a rebate program, etc.) is an especially 
critical challenge for a municipality like Clovis that does not have ready access to 
alternative supplies.    
 3.2.2 Factors under the utility’s control 
            Strategies that utilities employ to influence water demand can broadly be 
described as price and non-price strategies (Kenney et al., 2008; Krause et al., 2003). 
With regard to price strategies, the law of demand suggests that price increases will bring 
about a reduction in the quantity demanded; most empirical research has borne out this 
expectation with regard to water use. In an analysis of the empirical water demand 
literature, Worthington & Hoffman (2008) note that estimated price elasticities are almost 
always negative and inelastic. Likewise, in a recent and large meta-analysis of water 
demand studies from 2002 to 2012, Sebri (2014) found a mean price elasticity of -0.37, 
confirming the general tendency of inelastic demand at current prices; however, given 
inelastic demand, price increases will only result in relatively small decrease in quantity 
demanded (Arbués et al., 2003; Dalhuisen et al., 2003). While most studies focus on the 
short-run, several studies estimate long run price elasticity. Most find the long run 
elasticity to be greater than the short run but still in the inelastic region (Almendarez-
Hernández et al., 2016; Worthington & Hoffman, 2008), and some studies even find 
water demand to be price elastic in the long run (Ben Zaied & Binet, 2015; Yoo et al., 
2014). Still, the finding of generally (price) inelastic demand persists in the recent 
literature. A collection of recent studies that have estimated price elasticity of water 
demand, along with key meta-analyses, is presented in Appendix 3.1.        
 Because water demand tends to be inelastic, non-price strategies are often favored 
by water utilitiess, especially when water conservation is a goal (Olmstead et al., 2007). 
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 Non-price policies include a variety of activities such as water use restrictions, public 
information campaigns, rebates for the purchase (and replacement) of low-flow 
appliances, landscaping subsidies, and other similar strategies. Especially popular 
policies are rebate programs for low-flow appliances (e.g. toilets, showerheads, and 
washing machines). Rebate programs of this type have been shown to be effective at 
reducing water demand (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014).  
 3.2.3 Factors not under the utility’s control 
 Household-level characteristics have also been shown to impact water demand. 
For example, Arbués et al. (2003), Dalhuisen et al. (2003), and others, point out that 
income impacts water demand in a positive fashion, making water a “normal” good. This 
general result continues to be been borne out in the recent literature (see Appendix 3.1). 
In addition, household size has been used to explain water demand; Arbués et al. (2010) 
put a finer point on the topic when the authors find that smaller households are relatively 
more sensitive to price changes than larger households.           
 Weather and climate-related variables also impact water demand, although studies 
vary with regard to which climate variables to include or how to characterize weather. 
Arbués et al. (2010) used the number of days in a billing cycle over a certain temperature 
and no variable for precipitation; Kenney et al. (2008) included the average maximum 
daily temperature over a billing period and the total precipitation over that period; and 
Price et al. (2014) used average daily temperature over the billing period and total 
precipitation. Furthermore, inter-annual or seasonal variation, which may be related to 
outdoor activities such as gardening or pools, is likely to exist (Arbués et al., 2003). 
 In addition, vegetation conditions in the locality are unlikely to be under the 
control of the water utility but may impact water demand. Gage & Cooper (2015), for 
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 example, investigated semi-arid Aurora, Colorado and found that land cover was 
predictive of water use and that tree canopy cover and height reduced water use. The 
authors also found consistency with previous studies that demonstrated that vegetation 
cover was a spatially structured  phenomenon; in other words, similar vegetative cover 
type is likely in defined spatial areas (Franczyk & Chang, 2009; House-Peters et al., 
2010; Wentz & Gober, 2007).      
3.3 Data  
 3.3.1 Water use and price  
 Monthly data on water use by premises from January 2006 to December 2015 was 
provided by EPCOR and average daily water use by premises for each month was 
computed. As this study is interested in measuring water user responsiveness to utility 
price and non-price actions, this computed variable serves as the dependent variable for 
all empirical estimation. Premises location was geocoded based on listed address. Water 
price is given on a per unit basis and is determined jointly by the size of the premises’ 
delivery pipe and according to an increasing block rate structure. In this instance, one unit 
is defined as one CCF (100 ft3) and equivalent to 748 gallons delivered to the premises. 
Over the ten year period, the rate (price) structure has been adjusted three times: June 
2007, May 2009 and May 2012, giving four distinct rates over the period. In addition, the 
number of blocks has increased: for example, the residential block rate structure changed 
in June 2007 from two blocks to three, while the structure for commercial premises 
connected with a 1" water delivery pipe changed from a flat rate structure to a two block 
structure. The left panel in figure 3.2 shows the nominal change in the residential block 
rate structure through time and the right panel shows the change in the block rate 
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 structure for premises connected with a  1" delivery pipe. Combined, these two premises 
types account for approximately 97% of all observations in the dataset.  
   
Figure 3.2 Change in block number and increase in nominal rates through time 
Notes: Horizontal axis measured in CCF where 1 CCF = 748 gallons. Vertical axis measures marginal price 
in USD. Left panel shows residential rates. Right panel shows non-residential rates for premises that have a 
1” hookup.     
For estimation purposes, because the time period is relatively long (10 years), price is 
adjusted for inflation on an annual basis using the consumer price index (CPI) using 2015 
as the base year.     
 3.3.2 Rebate programs 
 EPCOR’s rebate program, which began in 2008, and is ongoing, provides rebates 
for toilets, washing machines and low water-use landscaping (i.e. conversion from turf to 
xeriscape). Rebate data are at the premises level, which allows for estimation of changes 
in water use due to the installation of qualifying technology or landscape change.   
Nearly USD 500,000 has been spent by EPCOR on rebates over the life of the 
program with toilet rebates and landscaping rebates accounting for the majority of total 
funds spent. While 927 premises qualified for a toilet rebate, 1,686 total toilet rebates 
were granted; therefore, on average, 1.8 toilet rebates were granted per premises. With 
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 regard to the landscaping rebates, approximately 565,000 square feet have been 
converted from turf to xeriscape. 
 3.3.3 Climate  
 Daily climate data, and in particular temperature and precipitation data, were 
obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2017). 
Daily temperature data was used to construct average temperature for each month while 
daily precipitation data was summed to arrive at a monthly precipitation total. Over the 
study period from January 2006 to December 2015, Clovis experienced several periods of 
extreme drought: from a short period of drought in 2006 to extended and deep drought 
from 2011 to 2014. These trends are captured by the Palmer Drought Severity Index 
(PDSI, 2017) readings from the city shown in figure 3.3. Negative values, as those shown 
from about January 2011 until about January 2015 indicate dry conditions.  
 
Figure 3.3 Palmer Drought Severity Index in Clovis, New Mexico by month (2006 – 2015) (PDSI, 2017) 
 3.3.4 Socioeconomics 
 Individual household-level socioeconomic data are unknown in this analysis; 
however, aggregate data are available through the US Census’s American Community 
Survey program. Although individual premises-level or census tract level data would 
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 have been preferred, and have been shown to perform relatively well (Ouyang et al., 
2014), this study utilizes county-level estimates for Curry county, the county that the city 
of Clovis resides in, because tract-level estimates are sparse. In addition, given the 
relatively large confidence intervals on the tract-level data, imputation was deemed to be 
inappropriate. As county-level data were available for most, but not all years, linear 
interpolation was used to interpolate between known years. The specific socioeconomic 
data used in this analysis are data that have been shown to impact water demand in prior 
studies; in particular, median household income (ACS, 2017b) and household size (ACS, 
2017a), both at the county level, are included as explanatory variables. However, because 
these data vary over time and not space, only temporal variation is captured.   
 In addition to characteristics of individuals residing in the household impacting 
water demand, the characteristics of each or premises, or trend in aggregate premises 
characteristics, should also impact demand. For example, the size of the housing stock 
should be positively related to aggregate water use all else equal; however, it is unclear 
how the size of the housing stock would impact unit-level water use. Also, the age of the 
stock may be related to both aggregate or per capita water use (Brelsford & Abbott, 
2017); if the stock ages, system losses and inefficiencies might be expected to increase 
water use, while a stock that is getting younger through time (through attrition of 
relatively old stock and replacement through new construction) are more likely to be built 
with water efficiency in mind. Both housing stock size and housing stock age were 
considered; however, preliminary analysis suggested insufficient variation in housing 
stock size to explain aggregate or premises-level water use. In addition, estimates of 
housing stock age via the American Community Survey (ACS, 2017) were correlated 
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 with other model variables. Therefore, permits granted for single family construction in 
the city of Clovis were used as a proxy to control for housing stock age. These monthly 
data were collected and compiled by the University of New Mexico’s Bureau of Business 
& Economic Research (BBER, 2017).  
 3.3.5 Vegetation data 
 This analysis incorporates remote sensing data via the Normalized Difference 
Vegetation Index (NDVI), utilizing the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer 
(AVHRR) Phenology series, produced by the United States Geologic Survey (USGS, 
2017). The index, which is computed from remote satellite data, measures wavelengths of 
light absorbed and reflected by green plants. In general, higher index values correspond 
to ‘greener’ or denser plant coverage. At the time of analysis, data were available through 
2013.   
This analysis specifically utilizes a measure called the time integrated NDVI, 
which is the cumulative value of NDVI from the start to the end of the growing season. 
This measure was chosen in an attempt to better capture longer-term trends over the 
growing season rather than other vegetation-related indices, which are more likely to 
capture a particular peak or valley in at a point in time. Spatial resolution is 1 km2; each 
square was geocoded and overlaid on premises-level geocoding – thus matching, at the 
given spatial resolution, the appropriate index to each premises. The study utilizes a 
larger spatial scale than Gage & Cooper (2015) and is a more general interpretation of 
vegetation. This is done because the present analysis is interested in controlling for 
aggregate inter-annual vegetation trends rather than specific premises- or neighborhood-
level impacts. 
Descriptive statistics for variables are shown in table 3.1.  
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 Table 3.1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Period Unit Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Source 
WU 
Average daily 
household water use  
Month Gallons 323.6 653.5 EPCOR 
AvgPrice Average water price Month 
USD per 
Gallon 
0.003 0.002 EPCOR 
ToiletPrem 
Premises toilet rebate 
indicator 
Month 1/0 0.03 0.18 EPCOR 
Washer 
Washing machine 
rebate indicator 
Month 1/0 0.02 0.13 EPCOR 
Landscape 
Landscape rebate 
indicator 
Month 1/0 0.01 0.08 EPCOR 
Income 
Average household 
income in county 
Ann. Dollars 40,945 1.02 
US Census 
(ACS, 2017) 
HHsize 
Average household 
size in county 
Ann. Persons 2.61 0.08 
US Census 
(ACS, 2017) 
BldPermit 
Number of single 
family building permits 
Month Permits 10.37 5.47 (BBER, 2017) 
Temp 
Average monthly 
temperature 
Month Fahrenheit 56.80 14.86 (NOAA, 2017) 
Precip 
Average total monthly 
precipitation  
Month Inches 1.28 1.44 (NOAA, 2017) 
VegIndex Vegetation index Ann. Unitless 12.72 9.16 (USGS, 2017) 
PDSI 
Palmer Drought 
Severity Index 
Month Unitless -0.28 2.45 
NOAA (PDSI, 
2017) 
Note: The low standard deviation for household income occurs because the data are county-level and 
annual in nature; thus, income variation is solely based on interannual behavior.      
3.4 Modeling approach 
 A primary objective of this analysis is to estimate the impact of EPCOR’s price 
and non-price policies on water demand in Clovis. A fixed effects instrumental variable 
approach is used for this purpose. Although several explanatory variables are included in 
this analysis, some important premises-level characteristics that may impact demand, 
such as evaporative cooler use, yard size, irrigation type, and the like, are unknown. For 
this reason, a fixed effects approach is brought to bear to control for those unknown 
premises-level characteristics. Additionally, unlike Kenney et al. (2008), this analysis 
controls for household (or community) socioeconomics that are expected to relate to 
water demand. In that study, the authors attempted to use Decennial Census data, which 
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 did not vary through the study period and fixed effects analysis requires that explanatory 
variables vary through time. Therefore, to control for socioeconomic characteristic, the 
present study uses county-level annual estimates from the American Community Survey.       
In addition, because water price is included as an explanatory variable in the 
demand estimation, an instrumental variable approach is applied. This is done to remove 
the inherent statistical bias resulting from endogeneity in the price signal when estimating 
water demand (Arbués et al., 2004). In other words, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊, or water use, is estimated as a 
function of price (among other things). However, price is also inherently a function of 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊, so changes to 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 can affect price. Therefore, if price was used as a regressor it 
would likely be correlated with the error term, which would bias the estimated parameters 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  
To remedy this problem, a first stage estimation is undertaken where price is the 
dependent variable and is a function of a chosen set of instruments. In this case, marginal 
price, per the increasing block rate structure, is used to instrument for average price 
(Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). Next, predicted prices from the first stage 
estimation are computed and then used as the new price variable, rather than actual price, 
in the main regression. This process ensures that the new (predicted) price variable is 
uncorrelated with the error term. Instrument validity was confirmed using the under-
identification and weak identification tests.    
An empirical challenge with estimating water demand stems from the block rate 
pricing structure employed by EPCOR and many water utilities. Because the analysis 
estimates the effect of pricing on water demand, choosing the correct price, or price 
proxy, is important. There has been considerable debate over the years concerning the 
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 management of price under a block rate structure; however, because there is not a single 
price for which water is sold under a block rate structure, a composite price must be 
developed. Common practices analysts have used to create a composite price include: 
marginal price, computation of an average price, or applying the so-called Nordin (1976) 
specification.  
Economic theory suggests that demand should respond to marginal price – or the 
price of the last unit sold. However, for this to be the case in a municipal water demand 
context, consumers are required to have contemporaneous information of their water use 
in each period as well as an intimate understanding of the rate structure (Arbués et al., 
2003; Carter & Milon, 2005; H. S. Foster & Beattie, 1979). In practice, however, both 
requirements are unlikely (Ito, 2014; Kenney et al., 2008). The Nordin (1976) 
specification utilizes marginal price as well as an additional term captured by computing 
the difference between the total bill and what the user would have paid if all units were 
charged at the marginal price; this variable is designed to proxy the income effect 
imposed by the block rate structure (Arbués et al., 2003). As a practical matter, this 
technique suffers from the same downsides as the use of straight marginal price.    
Therefore, because consumers are likely to only have a general understanding of 
the relationship between their water use and their water bills, the present analysis 
employs an average price structure similar in nature to Kenney et al. (2008) and Price et 
al. (2014). Under this method, average price is computed by dividing the total bill amount 
by the water volume consumed (i.e., the volume reflected in the bill in gallons). Because 
a consumer is unlikely to have real-time knowledge of water use, but may change 
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 behavior from month to month based on the amount billed, this constructed variable is 
lagged one billing period. 
While water demand studies regularly use a FEIV (or similar) empirical strategy 
due to its straightforward nature (Kenney et al., 2008; Porcher, 2014; Price et al., 2014; 
Romano et al., 2014; Wichman et al., 2016), other recent studies employ alternative 
methodologies in an effort to  account for shortcomings associated with this approach. 
For example, Klaiber et al. (2014) and Wichman (2014) utilize an experimental approach 
and a difference-in-difference estimation methodology to account for omitted variable 
bias. Also attempting to account for the effect of omitted variables, Brelsford & Abbott 
(2017) use the decomposition procedure put forward by Gelbach (2016). Although the 
underlying estimation approach is FEIV in nature, Clarke et al. (2017) and Hung & Chie 
(2013) employ a Stone-Geary functional form, which allows for greater flexibility by 
allowing for non-fixed elasticities. Meanwhile, Ben Zaied & Binet (2015) and 
Ghavidelfar et al. (2016) harness the time series analysis literature by employing 
cointigration and error correction methodological approaches (Appendix 3.1contains a 
table of recent water demand studies along with elasticity estimates and  methodological 
innovation).  Nevertheless, and despite the situational benefits of alternative estimation, 
the present study uses a straightforward FEIV estimation approach.      
 3.4.1 The model 
All estimation proceeds according to variations on the following general model 
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  lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2Temp𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3Precip𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝐵𝐵4lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵5HHsize𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵6BldPermit𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ �𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3
𝑗𝑗=1
+ �𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘Month𝑘𝑘11
𝑘𝑘=1+ �𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙MeterSize𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖3
𝑙𝑙=1
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(3.1) 
In this model, 𝐵𝐵0 is the intercept term and terms from 𝐵𝐵1 to 𝐵𝐵6 correspond to estimated 
coefficients on continuous variables. On preliminary analysis, it was determined that 
Precip was correlated with both VegIndex (𝜌𝜌 = 0.40,𝑝𝑝 < 0.000) and PDSI (𝜌𝜌 =0.47,𝑝𝑝 < 0.000); because precipitation is straightforward and an input into both indices, 
it was retained and VegIndex and PDSI were excluded. For estimation that includes the 
two indices, see table 3.8 in Appendix 2.2. The natural logarithm of water use is the 
dependent variable, and the water price and income variables are log-transformed so that 
their estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as elasticities.  
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 ,𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 . 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 are coefficients on indicators for particular states or events. The 
coefficient on rebates, 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗, corresponds to three non-mutually exclusive events: receipt of 
toilet rebate, washing machine rebate, and landscaping rebate. The coefficient on Month, 
𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 , corresponds to the billing month and is mutually exclusive; December is the base 
month. While one could argue that monthly control is unnecessary and behavior should 
be tied to actual measurable phenomena, such as temperature and precipitation (which 
may be correlated with months anyway), it is likely that there are both psychological and 
systematic calendar-based arguments, such as holidays, watering schedules, or turning off 
an evaporative cooler, for it use (Kenney et al., 2008).  
The coefficient on MeterSize, 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙, is mutually exclusive and controls for the size of 
the delivery pipe connected to the premises. Only three sizes are explicitly identified in 
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 this analysis, 5
8
"
, 1", and 1.5". However most observations (around 98%) occur within 
these three sizes; the remaining sizes are combined into a composite base category. The 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 term controls for the premise-level fixed effects, while 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the error term. The 
subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are indices that correspond to premises and time period (month), 
respectively.                                                
3.5 Results & discussion 
 3.5.1 Model of entire dataset  
Models based on equation (3.1) were estimated utilizing all available data; results 
are shown in table 3.2. Although not shown, controls for billing month and water delivery 
pipe size are employed in all cases.    
Because the dependent variable (gallons of water demanded per day) is log-
transformed, interpretation of the continuous explanatory variables is relatively 
straightforward as is the interpretation of the log-transformed continuous variables. With 
regard to the non-logged continuous variables (such as temperature or precipitation), the 
estimated coefficients correspond to a percentage change in the water use (gallons per 
day) for a one unit change in the variable of interest. Therefore, a one inch increase in 
precipitation reduces daily water use by 1.2%, all else equal. Estimated coefficients from 
the log-transformed variables represent elasticities. For example, the estimated 
coefficient on water price in model 3.1 indicates that a 1% increase in water price will 
reduce water demand by 0.53%, all else equal.  
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 Table 3.2 2SLS regression results (full model) 
  Variable Model 3.1 
 
lnAvgPrice -0.534*** 
  
(0.0076) 
 
ToiletPrem -0.083*** 
  
(0.0042) 
 
Washer -0.060*** 
  
(0.0059) 
 
Landscape -0.100*** 
  
(0.0071) 
 
lnIncome 0.568*** 
  
(0.0268) 
 
HHsize -0.009 
  
(0.0122) 
 
BldPermit 0.007*** 
  
(0.0001) 
 
Temp 0.010*** 
  
(0.00001) 
 
Precip -0.012*** 
  
(0.0004) 
 
Constant -3.658*** 
   (0.2554) 
 
Obs. 1,575,980 
 
Premises 16,904 
  R2 0.280 
 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses 
 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the rebate indicators (and in 
particular, marginal effects), however, is more complex and are computed according to 
Kennedy (1981), 
 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 = 100 �𝑒𝑒�𝛿𝛿𝚥𝚥�−𝑉𝑉��𝛿𝛿𝚥𝚥��2 � − 1� (3.2) 
Where 𝛿𝛿𝚥𝚥�  corresponds to the estimated coefficient on the  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ rebate and where 𝑉𝑉��𝛿𝛿𝚥𝚥�� is 
the estimated variance of the estimated coefficient. Therefore, the effect on the average 
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 toilet-rebate-receiving premises is 7.9%. On a per premises basis, the average effect of 
the qualifying landscaping rebate on water demand is a 9.5% reduction in water demand. 
Because the average size of landscaping changes in the dataset is 1,960 square feet, the 
average effect on water demand is a reduction of 0.49% per 100 square feet. The receipt 
of the washing machine rebate reduces demand by 5.8%. All of these are roughly in line 
with the recent results found by Price et al. (2014), in the much larger city of 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.  
Unlike Arbués et al., (2010), the estimated coefficient on the household size 
variable is not significant in model 3.1, while the estimated coefficient on the building 
permit variable is positive and significant at a 1% level. In particular, the estimated 
coefficient on this variable is interpreted as premises-level water use increasing by 0.7% 
for each additional building permit. This general result implies that, all else equal, 
relatively newer premises use more water than older premises. As this variable is used to 
proxy for housing stock age, this result is somewhat puzzling because one might expect 
that relatively newer constructed homes would use less water than older homes; some 
empirical analysis has found this to be the case (Brelsford & Abbott, 2017; Ouyang et al., 
2014). This seemingly contradictory result requires additional investigation and will be 
discussed further in Section 3.5.3.   
The estimated coefficients on temperature and precipitation are significant at a 
1% level; the estimated coefficient has the expected (positive) signs for temperature in all 
cases and the expected (negative) signs on precipitation. Although the R2 is on the low 
side (0.28), a relatively low model fit is likely due to “noisy” data associated with 
individual premises-level records. This includes the effects of unbalanced panels, 
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 premises entering or leaving the dataset at irregular intervals, and idiosyncratic water use 
patterns.  
  Interestingly, rebate-receiving households used more water on average than those 
not receiving rebates in each year (2006 to 2015). Table 3.3 shows predicted mean, 
standard deviation and, number of observations for premises that received at least one 
type of rebate at some point over the ten year period and those that never received a 
rebate. Median values are also reported to control for the possibility of outliers. Both the 
mean and median values generally trend downward; however, the data imply that 
relatively higher water-using premises tend to be attracted to rebates. 
Table 3.3 Predicted gallons used per day per premises: non-rebate & rebate comparison 
Year 
Without rebate   With rebate 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Obs.   Mean Std. Dev. Median Obs. 
2006 240 94 226 117,716 
 
305 98 305 13,588 
2007 215 88 200 133,067 
 
264 92 253 15,504 
2008 215 101 201 139,792 
 
269 85 261 16,243 
2009 217 81 202 139,839 
 
274 85 254 16,027 
2010 202 75 188 143,189 
 
241 77 232 16,136 
2011 213 90 197 139,784 
 
258 98 249 15,871 
2012 213 152 199 144,963 
 
253 83 239 16,356 
2013 187 75 174 151,652 
 
215 73 205 16,834 
2014 180 65 170 153,297 
 
202 65 196 16,898 
2015 171 62 160 152,340  187 63 179 16,884 
Total 204 94 190 1,415,639   245 89 233 160,341 
Note: Without rebate subset only includes premises that never received a rebate at any 
time. With rebate subset only includes premises that received at least one rebate at any 
time.  
The reason for the pattern of premises that received rebates for water-saving 
technology using relatively more water on average is unclear; however, it is likely that 
higher-use premises have more to gain by investing in water saving technology or 
xeriscaping precisely because they are higher demand users. In addition, it may be the 
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 case that lower-water-using households have already installed water saving technology or 
a xeriscape yard. However, the present data does not allow for that analysis.  
To better characterize responses among different water use cohorts, data were 
subsetted based on whether the user was a low, medium, or high water users. Here low 
water users were those whose daily use averaged the lowest 25th percentile (less than 
124.3 gallons per day); medium users were those whose daily use was between the 25th 
and 75th percentile (between 124.3 and 288.4 gallons per day) ; high water users were 
those whose daily use averaged over the 75th percentile (more than 288.4 gallons per 
day). Estimation proceeds according to equation (3.1) with the focus on estimated price 
and income elasticities. Key results are shown in table 3.4.         
Table 3.4 Comparison of elasticities subset by low, medium and high volume users 
 
Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
Variable Low Water Users Medium Water Users High Water Users 
lnAvgPrice -0.596*** -0.563*** -0.434*** 
 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.016) 
lnIncome 0.611*** 0.559*** 0.462*** 
 
(0.056) (0.036) (0.054) 
Obs. 383,218 799,935 392,827 
Premises 4,747 8,062 4,095 
R2 0.269 0.293 0.336 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Low water users used less than 124.3 
gallons per day; medium water users used 124.3 gallons to 288.4 gallons on average per 
day; high water users used more than 288.4 gallons per day. Price and income elasticities 
shown; remaining variables suppressed.   
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Estimation demonstrates that low water users are less price inelastic than high 
water users. In other words, low water users are relatively more impacted by water rate 
changes compared to medium and high water users. In addition, low water users are more 
income elastic than medium and high water users meaning that a marginal change in 
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 income will constitute a relatively larger change in water use by low water users.11 
Although data are not available to better understand the composition of each group (i.e. 
socioeconomic composition), it stands to reason that the low water-using group is likely 
the most economically disadvantaged group. This is inferred because the low water user 
group is the most impacted by marginal income changes. Similarly, this group is also 
most heavily impacted by water rate changes. If it is indeed true that the low water user 
group is indeed the most economically disadvantaged, then water rate changes – and in 
particular rate increases – may operate to be regressive. In terms of policy and equity 
considerations, the water utility and regulator should investigate how groups are 
differentially impacted prior to adjusting water rates.           
 3.5.2 Subset analysis: rebate models 
To further isolate the effects of the rebates, additional regression analyses were 
conducted on three data subsets. Only included in each regression were premises from the 
original data set that had participated in the toilet, washing machine, and landscape rebate 
programs, respectively. Overall, the estimated coefficients on rebates, water price, 
temperature and precipitation are highly significant and have the expected signs in all 
11 Two things to note are that although the point estimates are nominally different, the 95% confidence 
intervals for the price elasticity estimate overlap for the low- and medium- volume users and the 95% 
confidence interval overlaps for the income elasticity estimate for the low- and high-volume users. 
Specifically, the 95% price elasticity confidence intervals for the low, medium, and high users are: -0.623 
to -0.567; -0.583 to -0.541; and -0.464 to -0.404, respectively. The fact that the confidence intervals for the 
low and medium users slightly overlap may not be surprising given that there is no definitive data 
separation between the two groups (i.e. the cutoff for each group is somewhat arbitrary and they flow into 
each other). The 95% income elasticity confidence intervals for the low, medium, and high users are: 0.502 
to 0.720; 0.490 to 0.631; and 0.356 to 0.568, respectively. Overlap in the confidence intervals is also 
probably unsurprising given that the income data has no spatial variation; in other words, income is not 
defined at the premises level. Nevertheless, the key result related to the direction of the nominal estimates 
remains and makes consideration of the disparate impacts on various groups an important consideration for 
policy makers.         
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 cases. With regard to temperature and precipitation, estimated coefficient magnitudes are 
similar to those shown in the estimation original estimation.  
Table 3.5 2SLS regression results (subset model) 
 Model 3.5 Model 3.6 Model 3.7 
Variable ToiletPrem Washer Landscape 
Rebate -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.049*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
lnAvgPrice -0.426*** -0.303*** -0.712*** 
 
(0.032) (0.050) (0.047) 
lnIncome 0.374*** 0.644*** 0.251 
 
(0.101) (0.150) (0.167) 
HHsize -0.146** -0.207** -0.01 
 
(0.048) (0.070) (0.076) 
Temp 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Precip -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
BldPermit 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -1.668 -3.689** -2.335 
  (0.949) (1.405) (1.576) 
Obs. 100,870  47,460  34,616  
Premises 926 459 328 
R2 0.3504 0.3541 0.4242 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses 
Month and MeterSize indicators not shown. 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
The estimated coefficient (elasticity) on water price in the toilet rebate model 
is -0.43 and -0.30 in the washing machine model; both elasticities are similar to those 
found in Price et al. (2014): -0.34 for toilet rebates and -0.30 for washing machine rebates 
in that case. The estimated coefficient on water price in the landscape model is -0.71, 
which makes that group more price elastic than the toilet and washing machine rebate 
groups. This result is consistent with prior analyses showing that outdoor water use is 
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 more responsive to price change than indoor use (Dandy et al., 1997; Lyman, 1992; Price 
et al., 2014).  
Application of equation (3.2) to the estimated coefficient of the rebate variable in 
the toilet rebate model indicates that a premise with a low-flow toilet reduces water use 
by 9.3%. This is a stronger effect than the whole model estimation, which was estimated 
to be 7.9%. Following the same procedure, the average effect of the qualifying 
landscaping change on water demand is a 4.8% reduction in monthly water demand; this 
effect is much lower than the one estimated in the whole dataset. Because the average 
size of landscaping changes in the dataset is 1,960 square feet, the effect on water 
demand is a reduction of 0.24% per 100 square feet. The receipt of the washing machine 
rebate reduces demand by 9.3%; this is larger in magnitude than with the whole dataset.  
The difference between the computed marginal effects using the entire dataset and 
the subsetted models, which were targeted at the individual rebate programs, illustrates 
why selecting the proper data subset is important if the particular question of interest is 
the impact of the individual (voluntary) rebate programs. To make this point more 
concrete, when the entire dataset is used, the control (or base) group includes premises 
that never received a rebate at any point in addition to premises that had not yet received 
a rebate. As a result, the estimation for the rebate variable of interest is likely to be 
imprecise because it is subject to the additional statistical noise resulting from including 
the extraneous premises that never participated in the rebate program. However, when the 
data are subsetted to only include premises that received a rebate at some point, the 
control group is premises that had not yet received a rebate but at some point receive a 
rebate. Therefore, the estimated coefficient in the subset analysis for the relevant rebate 
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 variable more accurately captures the rebate effect, which is the primary goal of this 
analysis.     
Interestingly, as the number of premises (and observations) decline from 926 
(100,870) in the toilet rebate case, to 459 (47,460) in the washing machine rebate case 
and 328 (34,161) in the landscape rebate case, the model fit tends to improve (with an R2 
of 0.35, 0.35 and 0.42, respectively). This is likely due to increasing homogeneity with 
regard to the type of premises that are likely to participate in the various types of rebate 
programs. 
 3.5.3 Subset analysis: premises age 
Because premise-level analysis is conducted, it is possible to discern trends based 
on when the premises began to receive water from the water utility. A possible 
contributor to declining demand is rebalancing of the housing stock such that newer 
construction is likely to use less water than relatively older construction all else equal 
(Brelsford & Abbott, 2017; Ouyang et al., 2014). To investigate this issue, the data are 
subsetted into premises served by EPCOR prior to 2007 and into premises that began 
receiving water from EPCOR after 2008. A two-year gap in data (2007 and 2008) is used 
to ensure temporal separation between subsets. In addition, estimation is confined to the 
84-month period from January 2009 to December 2015 in an effort to compare periods 
where premises in both data subsets were present.       
Most premises in the analysis existed in 2006 at the start of the series and only an 
additional 10% was added over the period from 2009-2015; however, estimation results 
suggest group differences with older premises appearing to be relatively more price 
elastic than newer premises and older premise being relatively less income elastic than 
92 
 
 newer premises. In addition, although washing machine and landscaping rebates 
significantly reduced water demand for both older and newer premises, toilet-rebate 
premises only significantly reduced demand in older premises. Based on the estimations 
results, table 3.6 shows estimated water demand for each subset.  
Table 3.6 Gallons used per day per premises: prior to 2007 versus post-2008 
Year 
In dataset prior to 2007 
 
Entered dataset post-2008 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Obs.   Mean Std. Dev. Median Obs. 
2009  219   65   210   149,907    219   141   160   1,136  
2010  203   60   197   150,780    229   141   172   3,623  
2011  215   76   202   145,764    247   161   189   5,401  
2012  212   108   199   148,682    260   159   196   7,705  
2013  188   64   179   151,374    228   141   174   11,299  
2014  180   53   174   150,884    211   126   160   13,377  
2015  169   50   165   149,242    199   120   153   14,199  
Total  198   73   190   1,046,633    223   139   170   56,740  
It is clear that premises in the dataset prior to 2007 and premises that entered after 
2008 both experienced declining water demand over the period from 2009 to 2015. 
However, it is also true that premise-level demand, in terms of average gallons per day, is 
lower for pre-2007 premises, indicating that relatively newer premises use more water 
than older premises. This result is inconsistent with the expectation that newer premises 
tend to be more water-efficient than older premises, but it explains the positive 
coefficient on the estimated building permit (BldPermit) variable seen in model 3.1. On 
the other hand, water use for the median premises is relatively lower for the new 
premises, implying that outliers in the new premises group are likely pulling up the 
average. The contradictory results, and the fact that average use does not conform to 
expectations, indicates a need for better understanding the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
each premises, such as number of bathrooms, lot or premises size, etc.; in this case, the 
data are not available for that type of premises-level detail.    
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 3.6 Cost effectiveness of rebate programs 
 While it is clear that each rebate program reduces the quantity of water demanded, 
less clear is cost-effectiveness of each program. Given constrained budgets, evaluating 
the cost-effectiveness of rebate programs is a critical element to effective municipal water 
demand management. In order to rank the effectiveness of this type of rebate program, at 
least with regard to cost effectiveness from the perspective of the utility, Fane & White 
(2003) and Price et al. (2014) suggest the use of the following levelized cost formula,   
 Levelized cost =  ∑ Ckn(1 + r)n
∑ Skn(1 + r)n (3.3) 
In this case, levelized cost is given as the present value of costs divided by the present 
value of water conserved. Here Ckn denotes the cost of rebate-type k in year n, Skn the 
annual volume reduction in water demand resulting from rebate-type k in year n, and r is 
the annual discount rate. Because the purpose of the assessment is to compare the relative 
cost-effectiveness of rebate programs and not absolute cost-effectiveness, it is assumed 
that the nominal value for water reduction is USD1 at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0. In addition, note that 
this calculation does not take into consideration the cost outlays by the consumer for the 
purchase of water saving technologies (or landscaping changes) nor does it account for 
reduced payments by the consumer for the purchase of water that accrue due to lowered 
water demand. Rather, the levelized cost calculation only contemplates the utility’s 
outlays for qualifying rebates and the water saved due to reduced demand.    
Marginal effects, based on the estimated coefficients and standard errors from 
equation 3.1, are computed from the appropriate rebate outcomes presented in table 3.5 
(i.e. subset analysis). However, in the case of toilet rebates, data type and availability 
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 make it impossible to accurately compute the marginal effect of a single installation; in 
particular, the premises-level effect is likely inaccurate because the average premises 
received more than one rebated toilet. This problem is mitigated somewhat because it is 
probable that the first toilet installation provides the greatest water use reduction since it 
is likely replacing the most frequently used or most inefficient toilet. And as Price et al. 
(2014) found, the marginal benefit of the second toilet rebate was much lower than the 
marginal benefit of the first toilet rebate.  
Therefore, in order to improve the accuracy of this assessment, the estimated 
impact of the first toilet rebate is computed as follows. First, because the average rebate-
receiving premises received 1.8 toilet rebates, or 90% of 2.0 toilet rebates, the marginal 
effect calculation is inflated by 11.1% (i.e. 1
0.9) to arrive at a likely marginal effect 
assuming that premises received a full 2.0 toilet rebates. Price et al. (2014) provides 
estimated water demand reductions for the first and second toilet installation, in this case: 
37.98 gallons per day for the first installation and a total reduction of 46.87 gallons per 
day for the first and second installation. Therefore, the first toilet accounts for 
approximately 81% of impact for the first and second toilet installation. This percentage 
is applied to the computed marginal effect in order to better estimate the impact of a the 
first toilet. It is important to note that the reported results therefore assume that the 
relative impact of first and subsequent toilet use in Clovis is similar to the relative impact 
in Albuquerque.          
  Change in daily water use is computed by applying the marginal impact to mean 
estimated water use for each premise prior to obtaining the rebate. Rebate value is the 
rebate amount paid by EPCOR per device: USD150 for toilets and washing machines and 
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 USD 40 per 100 ft2 converted to xeriscape. Device lifespan is assumed to be 25 years for 
a toilet, 12 years for a washing machine (Gleick, 2003a), and 25 years for xeriscape 
(Price et al., 2014). Outcomes are given under the assumption of 5%, 7% and 10% rates 
of interest. While 10% rates of interest are high, this rate is included to show how high 
the rate must be before a washing machine rebate begins to overtake the toilet rebate as 
the most cost effective. Results are shown in table 3.7.  
Table 3.7 Change in water use due to low-flow device and levelized cost 
Rebate 
Marginal 
effect 
per 
device 
(percent) 
Change in 
water use 
(gal/day) 
Rebate 
value per 
device   
(USD) 
Device 
lifespan 
(years) 
Cost 
r=5%    
(USD per 
1000 
gal.) 
Cost r=7%    
(USD per 
1000 gal.) 
Cost 
r=10% 
(USD 
per 
1000 
gal.) 
ToiletPrem -8.36 -31.74 150 25 0.87 1.04 1.30 
Washer -9.21 -37.70 150 12 1.17 1.28 1.45 
Landscape 
(100 ft2) 
-0.24 -0.98 40 25 7.55 8.96 11.19 
Notes: Marginal effects computed by applying equation (3.2) to estimated coefficients in 
model 3.1. Change in water use computed by applying marginal effects per device to the mean 
water use prior to receipt of water rebate.  
 
 The results suggest that on a device-by-device comparison, washing machine 
rebates are more effective at reducing water use than toilet rebates and both toilet rebates 
and washing machine rebates are more effective at reducing water use than the average 
premises that received a 1960 ft2 landscaping rebate. Given the rebate prices and the 
respective expected lifespans, the most cost effective rebate type is the toilet rebate 
which, at a 5% discount rate, costs less than USD 1.00 per every 1,000 gallons of water 
conserved.12  
12 A related issue that is not directly considered here, but is discussed in Appendix 3.4, is the notion of peak 
day demand. Peak day demand corresponds to the highest, or peak, demand in a particular year and 
typically occurs in the summer months. Since landscaping changes are likely to reduce water use primarily 
in the summer months – when the peak day is likely to occur – it may be the case that landscaping rebates 
are undervalued in this analysis in terms of cost-effectiveness.         
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 In contrast, washing machine rebates cost about 20% more than toilet rebates at 
just under USD 1.20 per 1,000 gallons conserved. Although washing machine rebates are 
more effective than toilet rebates in terms of reducing water use, the expected lifespan of 
only 12 years make those rebates more costly per volume conserved. Landscaping rebates 
are significantly more expensive per volume conserved.   
3.7 Conclusion 
 This analysis investigated factors contributing to declining water demand in 
Clovis, New Mexico, a small but growing municipality that has an arid climate and 
depends on the dwindling southern Ogallala aquifer. While Clovis is the focus of our case 
study, its experience can be used as a benchmark for other small to mid-sized 
municipalities in the region that may also be confronting declining demand, a changing 
climate, are dependent on rapidly dwindling groundwater supplies, and that do not have 
sufficient resources or population bases to enhance supplies. While this appears to be a 
very particular set of characteristics, Clovis’ experience is far from unique for many 
municipalities that sit atop of the declining Ogallala. We argue that detailed 
understanding of the effects of various demand-side factors will be especially critical for 
these municipalities going forward, and cannot just be the purview of large-scale water 
utilities; hence the need for detailed case studies. 
With regard to rebates for water-saving technology, results indicate that rebate 
programs successfully reduce premises-level water use. Overall, after controlling for 
confounding factors such as temperature and precipitation, the installation of a rebated 
toilet reduced water use by an average of nearly 32 gallons per day, installation of a water 
saving washing machine reduced water use by an average of about 38 gallons per day, 
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 and an average household receiving a landscaping rebate saved 19 gallons per day. While 
it might be surprising that landscaping rebates save so little water, it is likely due to the 
fact that irrigation only takes place in part of the year; washing machines and toilets, on 
the other hand, are used year-round.          
In addition, this analysis confirmed that water demand is price inelastic at current 
prices in Clovis; however, elasticity varies depending on which data are studied, with 
data subsets based on rebate type experiencing different levels of (in)elasticity. Elasticity 
for the entire dataset, as well as those households that did not receive a rebate, was 
around 0.50. When the data is subset to only include premises that received toilet or 
washing machine rebates, price becomes relatively more inelastic; however, premises that 
received landscaping rebates, while still price inelastic, were much less so, indicating the 
relative ease at which premises can reduce their outdoor water consumption in the face of 
price increases.  
Given the likely effects of climate change (e.g. longer more prolonged droughts, 
Deser et al., 2014; Gutzler & Robbins, 2011), this analysis confirmed that climate plays 
an important role in influencing water demand; as the temperature increases water use 
increases and as precipitation increases, water use declines. This result provides useful 
information which can be brought to bear in times of high temperature or low 
precipitation, such as the period from 2011 to 2014 when Clovis experienced prolonged 
drought. In general, income variables show that water is a normal good – as income 
increases, water demand increases.  
It is important to note that this analysis only looks at part of the story. Building 
upgrades, such as pipe and plumbing replacement and new efficient building practices 
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 may also play a role in reducing water demand, but the data in this analysis lacks the 
richness to fully investigate this issue. Causing additional confusion is the subset analysis 
that showed that the mean premises built prior to 2007 used relatively less water than the 
mean premises built after 2008, while the median behavior shows the opposite. Further 
research could be devoted to better understating the premises-level characteristics that are 
likely driving this result. In addition, changes to preferences, or an increasing desire of 
the population to conserve, may also play a role in declining demand. Future work could 
include an assessment of some of those factors. For example, panel or repeated cross 
section surveying methods may be used to uncover true household-level responses. In 
addition, improved accuracy with regard to spatial scale, especially with regard to 
vegetation, could better pinpoint landscaping changes and its impact on water use. 
Although the cost of the washing machine rebate and the toilet rebate is the same 
(USD 150), toilet rebates are the most cost effective rebate program of the three 
programs. However, as the discount rate increases to around 10%, the washing machine 
begins to approach the toilet rebate program in terms of cost effectiveness. Despite 
initially appearing to be inexpensive (USD 0.40 per ft2), landscaping rebates are the most 
expensive per unit of water conserved. This implies that toilet rebates should generally be 
prioritized before washing machine rebates and both should be prioritized before 
landscaping rebate. However, it is important to note that it is not uncommon for premises 
that received landscaping rebates to have already participated in other rebate programs. 
So if a water user has a relatively high propensity to participate in rebate program and 
they have already received a toilet or washing machine rebate, the landscaping rebate 
program may be the only way to significantly reduce that user’s actual demand.    
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 Furthermore, it is important to note that the analysis really only considered the 
cost-effectiveness from the standpoint of the utility and did not consider the rebate type 
that is most attractive to the consumer. In general, one would expect that toilets are likely 
to be less costly than qualifying washing machines (and also landscaping changes), so 
toilet changes are likely to be the most attractive to consumers, strictly in terms of cost 
savings. 
It is clear that rebates for water-saving technology induce water savings by water 
users. However, from the utility’s perspective, a question remains as to why it would 
subsidize the purchase of products that effectively reduce the demand for the product that 
it sells (namely, water). Therefore, the Chapter 4 introduces a theoretical justification for 
the provision of rebates for water-saving technology. Additionally, a model is developed 
demonstrating some of the tradeoffs that a utility faces when deciding to engage in that 
type of problem. Finally, an empirical model is developed that may be used to test 
whether utilities participating in water rebate programs are behaving optimally.    
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 Appendix 3.1 Recent studies estimating price and income elasticity 
Author Study 
Location 
Estimated 
Price 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Estimated 
Income 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Empirical 
Methodology or 
Innovation 
Clarke et al., 
2017 
Tucson, 
Arizona, USA 
-0.12 to -0.37  Stone Geary model, 
investigating 
seasonal elasticities 
Brelsford & 
Abbott, 2017 
Las Vegas, 
Nevada, USA 
  Decomposition of 
drivers of declining 
demand using 
Gelbach (2016) 
O’Donnell & 
Berrens, 2017 
Clovis, New 
Mexico, USA 
-0.29 to -0.53 0.57 to 0.83 Spatial fixed effects 
instrumental variable 
estimation  
Hung et al., 2017 Taipei, Taiwan -0.23 to -0.45 0.23 Agent-based 
modeling using 
Stone Geary model 
Cabral et al., 
2017 
Nuevo León, 
Mexico 
-0.40 to -0.60 0.12 to 0.16 Understanding 
residential price 
perception under 
increasing block rates 
using Shin (1985) 
Almendarez-
Hernández et al., 
2016 
El Vizcaino 
Biosphere 
Reserve, 
Mexico 
Short run:  
-0.26 to -0.28 
Long run:  
-0.67 to -0.71 
Short run: 
0.10 to 0.13 
Long run: 
0.27 to 0.29 
Understanding short- 
and long-run 
residential price 
elasticities using 
Shin (1985) 
Ghavidelfar et 
al., 2016 
Auckland, New 
Zealand 
Short run:  
-0.14 
Long Run:  
-0.12 
 Multifamily (high-
rise) residence 
analysis using 
cointigration & error 
correction models 
Mieno & 
Brozović, 2016 
Southwestern 
Nebraska, USA 
-0.12 to -0.76  Examination of 
biased price elasticity 
estimation for 
irrigator groundwater 
consumption 
Ghimire et al., 
2016 
Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, 
USA 
-0.38 to -0.66 0.28 to 0.30 Two-stage least 
squares model with 
random effects used 
to assess effects of 
drought and 
seasonality 
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 Author Study 
Location 
Estimated 
Price 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Estimated 
Income 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Empirical 
Methodology or 
Innovation 
Ashoori et al., 
2016 
Los Angeles, 
California, 
USA 
Negative Ambiguous 
based on 
user type 
Analysis of water 
demand by water 
user type 
Wichman et al., 
2016 
Municipalities 
in North 
Carolina, USA 
-0.15 to -0.30  Assessment of 
demand 
responsiveness to 
prescriptive versus 
price strategies using 
fixed effects 
instrumental variable 
approach 
Zuo et al., 2016 Murray-Darling 
Basin, Australia 
-0.53 to -0.69  Combination of 
irrigator stated and 
revealed preference 
data to estimate 
elasticities given 
different water 
entitlement types  
Fullerton Jr. et 
al., 2016 
El Paso, Texas, 
USA 
-0.32  Development of 
municipal water 
demand  forecasting 
model 
Ben Zaied & 
Binet, 2015 
Tunisia Short run:  
-0.07 to -0.37 
Long run: 
-1.95 
0.08 to 0.23 Seasonal and non-
seasonal modeling 
using cointigration 
analysis  
Lee & 
Tanverakul, 
2015 
East Los 
Angeles and 
South San 
Francisco, 
California, 
USA 
-0.22 to -0.44  Comparison of price 
responsiveness in 
two California cities 
with different pricing 
structures 
Galaitsi et al., 
2015 
Palestinian 
West Bank 
-0.19 to -0.37  Household survey 
methodology 
focusing on water 
security 
Yoo et al., 2014 Phoenix, 
Arizona, USA 
Short run:  
-0.66 
Long run:  
-1.16 
0.14 to 0.58 A difference in 
consumption design 
with direct measures 
of price 
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 Author Study 
Location 
Estimated 
Price 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Estimated 
Income 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Empirical 
Methodology or 
Innovation 
Klaiber et al., 
2014 
Phoenix, 
Arizona, USA 
-0.12 to -1.83  A quasi-experimental 
research approach 
using a difference in 
consumption design 
to assess seasonal 
effects, climate 
conditions, and water 
use 
Price et al., 2014 Albuquerque, 
New Mexico, 
USA 
-0.28 to -0.48  Evaluation of low-
flow appliances and 
demand-side water 
management  
Ouyang et al., 
2014 
Phoenix, 
Arizona, USA 
-0.04 0.19 to 0.34 Analysis of demand 
on multiple spatial 
scales 
Binet et al., 2014 Réunion 
(French 
Territory) 
-0.31 0.25 Updated version of 
Shin (1985) to 
estimate water price 
perceptions 
Baerenklau et al., 
2014 
Western 
Riverside 
County, 
California, 
USA 
-0.76 0.16 Investigation of 
increasing block rate 
structure on 
residential water 
demand 
Romano et al., 
2014 
Key town in 
Italian 
provinces 
Negative Positive, but 
small 
Linear mixed-effects 
model estimated 
using maximum 
likelihood methods 
Sebri, 2014b N/A -0.37 0.21 Meta-analysis from 
2002 to 2012 
Porcher, 2014 Municipalities 
in France 
-0.22 to -0.60  Fixed effects 
regression to estimate 
welfare changes 
(Brelsford & 
Abbott, 2017) 
Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina, 
USA 
-0.43 to -1.14  Difference in 
difference approach 
Hung & Chie, 
2013 
Taipei, Taiwan -0.22 to -0.61  Proposal for using 
augmented price 
signal to resolve 
conflicting 
residential uses 
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 Author Study 
Location 
Estimated 
Price 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Estimated 
Income 
Elasticity of 
Demand 
Empirical 
Methodology or 
Innovation 
Polycarpou & 
Zachariadis, 
2013 
Urban Cyprus -0.25 to -0.45 0.53 to 0.75 Novel geographic 
analysis; assessment 
of effect of 
interrupted supply on 
demand 
Worthington & 
Hoffman, 2008 
N/A Short run: 0.0 
to -0.5 
Long run: 
 -0.5 to -1.0 
Positive and 
less than 
unity 
Review of literature 
Dalhuisen et al., 
2003 
N/A -0.41 (mean) 
-0.35 
(median) 
0.43 (mean) 
0.24 
(median) 
Meta-analysis from 
1963 to 2001 
Espey et al., 
1997 
N/A -0.51  Meta-analysis from 
1967 to 1993 
Note: Short run elasticities are displayed unless stated otherwise 
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 Appendix 3.2 Robustness checks  
Variations of equation (3.4) were estimated in an effort to also include explanatory 
variables VegIndex and PDSI.   
 lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2Temp𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3Precip𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝐵𝐵4lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵5HHsize𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵6VegIndex𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝐵𝐵7BldPermit𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵8PDSI𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + �𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3
𝑗𝑗=1+ �𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘Month𝑘𝑘11
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙MeterSize𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖3
𝑙𝑙=1
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(3.4) 
 
Specifically, four models were estimated: model 3.1 (i.e. the same model 3.1 
estimated in the main text) controls for water price, rebate type, household income and 
size, building permits in the city, and temperature and precipitation. Model 3.7 also 
includes controls for PDSI; model 3.8 is the same as model 3.1 but also controls for 
vegetation index values; model 3.9 controls for both PDSI and vegetation index. The 
number of observations (and premises) declines when moving from model 3.1 to 3.8 
because only eight years of vegetation index data were available (whereas ten years of 
data was available for other series). Nevertheless, estimated coefficients, in terms of 
signs, levels and significance are generally similar across most models. Because 
VegIndex and PDSI were found to correlate to temperature and precipitation, the focus 
will be on those variables.  
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 Table 3.8 2SLS regression results (full model including VegIndex and PDSI) 
  Variable Model 3.1 Model 3.8 Model 3.9 Model 3.10 
 
lnAvgPrice -0.534*** -0.584*** -0.448*** -0.494*** 
  
(0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0084) (0.0083) 
 
ToiletPrem -0.083*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.078*** 
  
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
 
Washer -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
  
(0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0069) (0.0068) 
 
Landscape -0.100*** -0.094*** -0.009 -0.019 
  
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0114) (0.0113) 
 
lnIncome 0.568*** 0.301*** 0.387*** 0.064* 
  
(0.0268) (0.0264) (0.0295) (0.0296) 
 
HHsize -0.009 0.067*** 0.055*** 0.029* 
  
(0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
 
BldPermit 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
Temp 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
  
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
 
Precip -0.012*** 0.005*** -0.006*** 0.005*** 
  
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
 
PDSI 
 
-0.018*** 
 
-0.015*** 
   
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
VegIndex 
  
-0.001*** 0.000 
    
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
Constant -3.658*** -2.111*** -1.114*** 2.111*** 
   (0.2554)  (0.2862) (0.2827) (0.2862) 
 
Obs. 1,575,980  1,575,980  1,173,761  1,173,761  
 
Premises 16,904  16,904  15,533  15,533  
  R2 0.280 0.292 0.254 0.265 
 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses 
 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The estimated coefficients have the expected (positive) signs, levels of significance, 
and magnitudes for temperature in all cases. However, the expected (negative) signs on 
precipitation are present only in models 3.1 and 3.9. The common denominator in models 
3.8 and 3.9, however, is the inclusion of PDSI, which is likely causing the sign to flip due 
to the expected correlation between precipitation and PDSI. Therefore, either PDSI or 
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 precipitation should be chosen as explanatory variables, but not both. Because of the 
straightforward nature of the precipitation variable, the present analysis prefers 
precipitation over PDSI. 
 To further isolate the effect of rebate programs on water demand, an additional 
regressor (RebateControl) is introduced that controls for the presence of other rebates. 
For example, the toilet rebate subset is based on premises that received a toilet rebate; 
however, an indicator is assigned to that premises if they participated in an additional 
rebate program (i.e. washing machine or landscaping). This step is undertaken because 
the presence of additional rebate programs could conceivably bias the estimated rebate 
coefficient.  
Applying equation (3.2) from the full analysis renders marginal effects similar to 
those already reported. According to the toilet rebate model, the average premises with a 
low-flow toilet reduces water use by 9.3%. On a per premises basis, the average effect of 
the qualifying landscaping change on water demand is a 4.7% reduction in water demand. 
Because the average size of landscaping changes in the dataset is 1960 square feet, the 
effect on water demand is a reduction of 0.24% per 100 ft2. The receipt of the washing 
machine rebate reduced demand by 9.2%. 
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 Table 3.9 2SLS regression results (sub-model: rebate type and additional control) 
 Model 3.14 Model 3.15 Model 3.16 
Variable ToiletPrem Washer Landscape 
Rebate -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.048*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
RebateControl -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.040**  
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
lnAvgPrice -0.411*** -0.278*** -0.690*** 
 
(0.032) (0.051) (0.048) 
lnIncome 0.368*** 0.633*** 0.24 
 
(0.101) (0.150) (0.167) 
HHsize -0.141** -0.195** 0.003 
 
(0.048) (0.070) (0.076) 
Temp 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Precip -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
BldPermit 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -1.538 -3.467* -2.111 
  (0.952) (1.410) (1.579) 
Obs. 100,870  47,460  34,616  
Premises 926 459 328 
R2 0.3479 0.3497 0.4226 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
Month and MeterSize indicators not shown. 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
All other estimated coefficients are also generally similar to the full model. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on the RebateControl indicator is negative and 
significant (at a 5% level or better) indicating that households engaging in more than one 
rebate program reduce their water use by an additional amount due to that program. That 
outcome is probably not surprising given the results shown in the original estimation.  
While the previous models provide insight into the behavior of rebate-receiving 
premises, they clearly do not explain the behavior of premises that did not receive 
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 rebates. Table 3.12 shows the results from estimations that only include premises that did 
not receive any type of rebate. While there are fewer regressors (because no premises 
received a rebate), remaining estimated coefficients are similar to those from the full 
model. 
Table 3.10 2SLS regression results (sub-model: no rebates) 
Variable Model 3.17 
lnAvgPrice -0.544*** 
 
(0.008) 
lnIncome 0.587*** 
 
(0.028) 
HHsize 0.0034 
 
(0.013) 
Temp 0.010*** 
 
(0.000) 
Precip -0.012*** 
 
(0.001) 
BldPermit 0.007*** 
 
(0.000) 
Constant -4.119*** 
  (0.269) 
Obs. 1,415,639  
Premises 15,394 
R2 0.273 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
Month and MeterSize indicators not shown.   
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Of particular interest is that the estimated coefficient on the price variable are 
negative and in the neighborhood of 0.50. Like the other models, this implies inelastic 
demand, although that figure makes non-rebate premises relatively more price elastic 
than premises receiving toilet or washing machine rebates and less price elastic than 
premises receiving landscaping rebates.   
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 Appendix 3.3 Spatial panel econometric analysis 
While spatial effects have been acknowledged to impact demand (Brelsford and 
Abbott 2017), and spatial panels used to assess water utilization efficiency (Sun et al., 
2014), only static spatial demand analysis has been undertaken (de Maria André & 
Carvalho, 2014). Using monthly municipal consumption data (2006-2015) in Clovis, 
New Mexico, this analysis applies spatial panel econometrics to water demand 
estimation, and compares to non-spatial estimations. Results inform future empirical 
strategies as well as future data collection requirements.          
 Appendix 3.3.1: Data and modeling approach 
 
 As shown in table 3.12, monthly premises-level data on water use (2006-2015) 
were provided by EPCOR, Clovis’ water utility, as were rebate and price data. Average 
unit price was computed and adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index. 
County-level monthly average temperature and precipitation data was obtained from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. County-level median income 
estimates from the American Community Survey were used.  
Table 3.11 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Period Unit Mean Std. dev. Source 
WU Average daily household water use  Month Gallons 190.6 2.75 EPCOR 
AvgPrice Average water price Month $/Gallons 0.002 1.54 EPCOR 
ToiletPrem Toilet rebate indicator Month 1/0 0.03 0.18 EPCOR 
Washer Washing machine rebate indicator Month 1/0 0.02 0.13 EPCOR 
Landscape Landscape rebate indicator Month 1/0 0.01 0.08 EPCOR 
Income 
Average household income in 
county 
Annual Dollars 40,945 1.02 
US Census  
(ACS) 
Temp Average monthly temperature Month Fahrenheit 56.80 14.86 NOAA 
Precip Average total monthly precipitation  Month Inches 1.28 1.44 NOAA 
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 A fixed effects instrumental variable (FEIV) approach at the premises and Census 
block group levels is employed. Instrumental variable estimation is undertaken  to 
remove bias from price endogeneity (Arbués et al., 2004). Spatial weights matrices are 
constructed based on the nearest 2, 3, and 4 neighbors and are applied in spatial 
estimations.  
Estimation follows:  
 lnWU𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝐵𝐵2Temp𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3Precip𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
+ 𝐵𝐵4lnIncome𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + �𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗Rebate𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3
𝑗𝑗=1
+ �𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘Month𝑘𝑘11
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(3.5) 
lnWU is logged monthly water consumption. 𝐵𝐵0 to 𝐵𝐵5 are estimated coefficients.  lnAvgPrice𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1), is lagged water price (Arbués et al., 2010). 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 corresponds to premise 
receipt of one or more available rebates. 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 is the coefficient on month (December base). 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 controls for fixed effects; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the error term. 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are indices for location and time 
period, respectively.       
Rewritten in matrix form: 
 lnWU = (𝜄𝜄𝑇𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁)𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽 + 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝜀𝜀 (3.6) 
lnWU is a vector if size (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x 1), stacked by location, 𝑁𝑁, and then time period, 𝑇𝑇. ⊗ 
represents the Kronecker Product, 𝜄𝜄𝑇𝑇 is a ones vector sized 𝑇𝑇, 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 is an (𝑁𝑁 x 𝑁𝑁) identity 
matrix; 𝜄𝜄𝑇𝑇 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇) matrix; 𝛼𝛼 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x 1) vector of fixed effects. 𝑋𝑋 is 
a (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x 𝐾𝐾) matrix; 𝐾𝐾 is the number of non-endogenous explanatory variables; 𝛽𝛽 is a (𝐾𝐾 x 1) vector of estimated coefficients. 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x 1) vector of price, with 
estimated coefficient 𝑙𝑙. 𝜀𝜀 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x 1) vector of residuals, 𝜀𝜀 ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷[0,  𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇].   
Simplifying:   
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 lnWU = 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼 + 𝑍𝑍𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀 (3.7) 
𝑍𝑍 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x (𝐾𝐾 + 1)) matrix; 𝑍𝑍 = [𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑋𝑋] and 𝛿𝛿 is a �(𝐾𝐾 + 1) x 1� vector of 
coefficients.  
  Equation (3.8) illustrates the spatial lag model:  
 lnWU = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇WU + 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼 + 𝑍𝑍𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀 (3.8) 
𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 is a (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 x 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇) spatial weights matrix for 𝑁𝑁 locations across 𝑇𝑇 periods. 𝜆𝜆 is an 
estimated spatial lag coefficient and 𝜀𝜀 ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷[0,  𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇]. Failure to account for spatial lag 
can lead to biased and inconsistent estimation (Anselin et al., 2008; Elhorst, 2010). 
In (3.9), the error structure is given by 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝜀𝜀, where 𝜌𝜌 is estimated, plus 𝑢𝑢;  
𝑢𝑢~𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷[0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇]. Spatial error leads to inefficient estimation (Anselin et al., 2008; 
Elhorst, 2010).  lnWU = 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼 + 𝑍𝑍𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀 
𝜀𝜀 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝜀𝜀 + 𝑢𝑢 (3.9) 
If neither spatial lag nor spatial error exists estimation simplifies to (3.5).    
Several methods of panel balancing were considered including multiple 
imputation, deletion, and temporal and geographical aggregation. Due to a large amount 
of missing data, imputation and deletion methods were discarded. Estimation was 
undertaken by averaging key variables across Census block groups while retaining all 
time periods producing a 3,960 x3,960 weights matrix (33 block groups, 120 months). 
Census block estimation was disregarded due to missing data and high computational 
requirements. Centroids were computed for each block group and spatial weights 
matrices were computed for the nearest two, three, and four neighbors (𝑘𝑘 = 2,𝑘𝑘 =3, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘 = 4).     
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 The splm package in R is used to estimate spatial models (Kapoor et al., 2007; 
Millo and Piras, 2012). The spgm command accounts for endogenous price (Millo & 
Piras, 2012). Although Akaike’s information criterion is typically the preferred measure 
of model fit for spatial models, an R2 measure according to Elhorst (2010) is instead 
computed for consistency and to facilitate comparability with non-spatial models.  
 Appendix 3.3.2: Results and discussion 
 
 As shown in table 3.13, FEIV estimation in models 3.1 and 3.15 provide baselines 
for comparing spatial models (3.16-3.20). Fixed effects are applied in spatial models as 
the Hausman specification test was rejected in the lag model (𝜒𝜒2 = 41.8,𝑝𝑝 < 0.01); 
although not rejected in the error model (𝜒𝜒2 = 1.1,𝑝𝑝 = 0.999), fixed effects were 
retained for comparability. Lagrange Multiplier tests for spatial dependence could not 
rule out the presence of either spatial error or spatial lag (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 217.2,𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =248.1,𝑝𝑝 < 0.01, respectively).  
Price is negative (inelastic) and significant in models 3.1 and 3.15, which is 
consistent with prior research (Sebri, 2014) and significant in all cases except model A14 
(positive but insignificant). Estimated coefficients on rebate variables are negative 
implying that they decrease demand; however, coefficients, especially on ToiletPrem are 
insignificant in models 3.15-3.18.  lnIncome is positive and significant in nearly every 
case and the temperature and precipitation variables retain the expected signs and are 
significant in most cases.       
The spatial lag parameter, 𝜆𝜆, is positive in all cases, nominally increases with 𝑘𝑘 
and is statistically significant when 𝑘𝑘 = 3 and 𝑘𝑘 = 4. Similarly, the spatial error 
coefficient, 𝜌𝜌, increases with 𝑘𝑘. R2 in models 3.1 and 3.15 are 0.280 and 0.581, 
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 respectively. Improved fit in model 3.15 is likely due to data aggregation which reduces 
noise, but may limit accuracy; e.g., ToiletPrem which is insignificant in the model 3.15. 
R2 in the spatial error models is about 0.630, whereas it ranges from 0.652 to 0.963 and 
increases with 𝑘𝑘 in the spatial lag estimations.  
The spatial lag effect dominates other explanatory variables as 𝑘𝑘 increases. Price 
loses significance when 𝑘𝑘 = 4, and given the weight of evidence suggesting significant 
inelastic demand (Sebri, 2014), spatial lag estimation is difficult to justify. Spatial 
proximity may be correlated with factors impacting demand and overshadowing other 
meaningful signals. Spatial dependence may explain demand because each location 
confronts similar factors.      
 Appendix 3.3.3 Conclusion 
 Although spatial panel analysis has been understudied in a water demand, 
diagnostics suggest that demand is subject to spatial error and lag. Controlling for spatial 
error produces estimates similar to the analogous non-spatial analysis. Although spatial 
lag models appear to fit well, given reduced statistical significance of key variables, there 
is little justification for spatial lag estimation in this context. This is especially true where 
premises are subject to similar exogenous factors such as climate and pricing. 
Furthermore, due to data constraints such as incomplete panels and high computational 
requirements in panel spatial estimation, the benefits may not outweigh the costs of 
losing the additional detail from a more fine-grained premises-level analysis. 
Nevertheless, if data are only available at relatively large geographic scales, testing and 
controlling for spatial effects, and particularly spatial error, is prudent.
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Table 3.12 FEIV and spatial models 
Variable 
Model 3.1 Model 3.15 Model 3.15 Model 3.16 Model 3.17 Model 3.18 Model 3.19 Model 3.20 
FEIV FEIV Spatial Lag Spatial Error Spatial Lag Spatial Error Spatial Lag Spatial Error 
Premises-
Level Block Group 𝑘𝑘 = 2 𝑘𝑘 = 3 𝑘𝑘 = 4 
lnAvgPrice -0.534*** -0.406*** -0.407*** -0.392*** -0.285*** -0.389*** 0.0358 -0.383*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0386) (0.0967) (0.0423) (0.0823) (0.0445) (0.0924) (0.0471) 
ToiletPrem -0.083*** -0.123 -0.107 -0.156 -0.152 -0.148 -0.268** -0.176* 
 
(0.0042) (0.1061) (0.1140) (0.1047) (0.1112) (0.1046) (0.1215) (0.1031) 
Washer -0.060*** -0.613*** -0.595*** -0.683*** -0.659*** -0.769*** -0.836*** -0.738*** 
 
(0.0059) (0.1567) (0.1601) (0.1570) (0.1628) (0.1531) (0.1794) (0.1490) 
Landscape -0.100*** -0.937*** -0.921*** -0.864*** -0.856*** -0.814*** -0.670*** -0.722*** 
 
(0.0071) (0.1697) (0.1698) (0.1688) (0.1739) (0.1700) (0.1933) (0.1650) 
lnIncome 0.568*** 0.829*** 0.806*** 0.829*** 0.635*** 0.821*** 0.229 0.826*** 
 
(0.0268) (0.1415) (0.1744) (0.1704) (0.1705) (0.1838) (0.1888) (0.2004) 
Temp 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.003** 0.011*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0013) 
Precip -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.001 -0.011** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0039) 
𝜆𝜆  
 
0.021 
 
0.227** 
 
0.738*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.1337) 
 
(0.1146) 
 
(0.1309) 
 𝜌𝜌      0.183   0.246   0.321 
N 1,575,980 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,960 3,960 
R2 (FEIV) 0.280 0.581 
      R2 (Spatial)    0.652 0.631 0.776 0.630 0.963 0.630 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
 
 Appendix 3.4 Peak Day Demand Estimation   
 In this analysis, peak day demand volume is estimated. One peak day data point 
per year was provided and regression analysis was conducted. Several variables, and sets 
of variables, were tested to determine which fit best. Tested variables included 
temperature, precipitation, Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), Atlantic Multidecadal 
Oscillation (AMO), Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), Palmer Drought Hydrologic 
Index (PDHI) and others. The more ‘exotic’ series like PDO and PDSI were tested 
because it was hoped that those series could be leveraged several months prior to the 
peak day volume in order to prepare well in advance; however, in most cases those series 
produced relatively poor fit. The variables that tended to fit best were straightforward 
temperature and precipitation variables. The upshot is that those variables are fairly 
contemporaneous, intuitive, and easy to defend.  
 
Figure 3.4 Peak day volume in each year (1987-2015) 
 Variations of the following model are estimated: 
 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 
 
(3.10) 
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 Where 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷 is peak demand volume, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 is the sum of precipitation over the prior 
six months (in inches), 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 is average temperature over the last fourteen days (in 
Fahrenheit), 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎is a trend series beginning in 1987 through 2015 (1-29), 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙is 
a dummy variable indicating 2013 to 2015, which experienced sharp declines in peak day 
demand.  𝛽𝛽0, 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, 𝜏𝜏, and 𝛿𝛿 are estimated coefficients. The subscript 𝑡𝑡 corresponds to 
the particular data point in a particular year.  
 The first model presented includes all listed variables (shown in table 3.14). As 
the table shows, all variables are highly significant and the model fits well (adjusted R2 is 
0.74).  
Table 3.13 Peak day model: best fit 
Regression Statistics 
   Multiple R 0.879 
   R Square 0.773 
   Adjusted R Square 0.735 
   Standard Error 0.069 
   Observations 29 
   
     Variable Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 8.640 0.241 35.889 0.00 
Precipitation (Inches last 6 months) -0.012 0.004 -3.370 0.00 
Temperature (Average last 14 Days) 0.009 0.003 3.515 0.00 
Trend (1-29) -0.004 0.002 -2.319 0.03 
Indicator (2013 - 2015) -0.190 0.055 -3.467 0.00 
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Figure 3.5 Predicted vs. actuals: best fit model 
 
Figure 3.6 Errors: best fit model 
 
Although the prior model fits well, it is difficult to justify the indicator to control 
for the years from 2013 to 2015 because it is not clear that there was anything systematic 
that should (in principle) cause the series to decline over that period. The inclusion of a 
trend variable is also atheoretical; however, given the declining trend found in the 
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 demand analysis (as well as the seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis) it stands up to 
more scrutiny. As a result, the next model only includes the simple trend. 
Table 3.14 Peak day model: trend 
Regression Statistics 
   Multiple R 0.537 
   R Square 0.288 
   Adjusted R Square 0.262 
   Standard Error 0.115 
   Observations 29 
   
     Variable  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 9.462 0.044 215.560 0.000 
Trend (1-29) -0.008 0.003 -3.305 0.003 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Predicted vs. actuals: trend model 
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Figure 3.8 Errors: trend model 
 
The trend model captures the declining trend over time in peak use, which is consistent 
with the general trend of declining use in the city of Clovis. However, the model only 
explains about 26% of the variation and it is not uncommon for errors to be greater than 
15% in any given year. The next model includes temperature and precipitation but 
excludes the trend.   
Table 3.15  Peak day model: temperature & precipitation 
Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.641 
   R Square 0.411 
   Adjusted R Square 0.365 
   Standard Error 0.107 
   Observations 29 
   
      Variable  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 8.162 0.340 24.038 0.000 
Precipitation (Inches last 6 months) -0.014 0.006 -2.409 0.023 
Temperature (Average last 14 Days) 0.014 0.004 3.702 0.001 
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Figure 3.9 Predicted vs. actuals: temperature & precipitation model 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Errors: temperature & precipitation model 
 
Fit in the temperature and precipitation model is better overall than the trend model 
(given a higher R2 value); however, it begins to overestimate beginning in 2011 in a fairly 
significant fashion. Therefore, the following model incorporates temperature, 
precipitation and the trend.  
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 Table 3.16 Peak day model: temperature, precipitation and trend 
Regression Statistics 
   Multiple R 0.812 
   R Square 0.659 
   Adjusted R Square 0.618 
   Standard Error 0.083 
   Observations 29 
   
     Variable  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 8.312 0.266 31.281 0.000 
Precipitation (Inches last 6 months) -0.012 0.004 -2.824 0.009 
Temperature (Average last 14 Days) 0.013 0.003 4.615 0.000 
Trend (1-29) -0.008 0.002 -4.267 0.000 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Predicted vs. actuals: temperature, precipitation & trend model 
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Figure 3.12 Errors: temperature, precipitation & trend model 
 
While the last estimation does not provide the best fit, it is probably the most 
practical model. In order for this estimation to work, it would be necessary to basically 
compute expected demand each day based on temperature and precipitation while 
controlling for the annual trend. As final error figure shows, this method generally 
preformed within +/- 10% (at least in-sample). It is also important to reiterate that it is 
peak day demand that is being estimated; in other words, the relevant question is: if today 
is a peak day, level of demand should we expect? It is clear that most days will not be in 
the neighborhood of the peak day, but knowing what it could be should help to safeguard 
against inadequate supply. 
In any event, because temperature and precipitation data are available through the 
summer of 2016 (but the actual peak day volume is unknown), it is possible to estimate 
the maximum day volume for the year as well as estimate the date at which it was likely 
to have occurred. Specifically, the models shown in table 3.17 and table 3.14 are used to 
predict the date of max day as well as the volume.  
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Figure 3.13 Max day volume: left panel without additional indictor (from Table 3.17), right panel with 
additional indicator (from Table 3.14) 
In both cases, the models predict that the max day occurred on about July 19, 
2016 and near-peak day volumes are likely to have been demanded in the several days 
prior to and post July 19. The model that does not include an indicator from 2013 through 
the current date estimates that peak day volume was about 10.7 million gallons while the 
model that includes the atheoretical indicator for the period 2013 forward predicts that 
the volume was about 9.3 million gallons. In both cases, the predictions are above the 
2014 and 2015 volumes, while the prediction from the model that includes the indicator 
is near to the peak day volume experienced in 2013 (of about 9.4 million gallons).      
To improve the estimation, having information in addition to peak demand in a 
particular year would be useful. In particular, having daily data even at an aggregate 
level, would help to provide insight into rapid behavioral responses (rapid in the face of 
changing temperature and precipitation). It would also help in providing estimates of 
general daily demand because then it would simply be a model of demand – which, given 
drivers of behavioral response should still help to predict peak demand. Other factors 
such as day of the week, presence of holidays, and even items discussed in the demand 
models such as rebates (and especially landscaping rebates) could also be brought into 
the analysis. If daily data was brought to bear, it might be advisable to include a lagged 
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 term or control for autocorrelation. In other words, yesterday’s demand may impact 
demand today. In the present case, that was not necessary because of the temporal 
differences between data points.  
Another strategy would be to study the composition of the premises on each peak 
day. It might be the case that certain premises contribute most to the peaks while other 
premises do not change demand much even in the face of the conditions that bring about 
the peaks. If the premises that contribute the most to the peaks can be identified, and 
other premises are only marginal contributors, focus can be put on the high-contribution 
premises and characteristics governing behavior may be uncovered and leveraged. 
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 Chapter 4: Advertising Rebates for Water-Saving Technology: An 
Optimal Control Model for Utility Investment Decisions and Demand 
Management 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Water utilities regularly engage in advertising campaigns to promote public 
awareness for water conservation and manage demand. These campaigns may include 
investments in billboards, mailers that are included with water bills, television and radio 
advertisements – all of which are designed to influence consumer preferences. At the 
same time, some utilities also engage in advertising to entice water users to purchase and 
install water-saving technologies, and in some cases, utilities provide rebates for 
replacement of old, and relatively less efficient, technologies. These types of advertising 
and rebate programs have undoubtedly played a role in reducing municipal water use 
(Heiman, 2002; Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). However, given that 
advertisement encourages conservation, and conservation reduces demand, how does a 
utility justify investing scarce resources to reduce the demand for the product that it sells?  
This research investigates the conditions under which advertising investment by a 
water utility, for the purpose of inducing water users to purchase and install water saving 
technology, makes economic sense from the utility’s perspective. Along this front, one 
state engineer offers some guidance when it notes that the potential benefits of rebate 
programs (for the purchase and installation of water-saving technology) is that they 
effectively reduce water demand and thus eliminate some otherwise necessary water and 
wastewater treatment construction costs (OSE 2001, p. 76). In other words, by the utility 
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 engaging in demand management, including advertising for water rebate programs, costly 
investment and maintenance decisions can be delayed.13     
To assess this claim, a dynamic analytical framework using a capital 
accumulation approach that outlines the tradeoffs that a water utility faces when 
advertising for and engaging in a water rebate program is developed. In particular, 
infrastructure maintenance and expansion are costly, so the focus is on how advertising 
may be leveraged by an optimizing utility and how a utility may tradeoff between regular 
maintenance or investment and advertising for the purchase and installation of water 
saving technology. Specifically contemplated in this analysis are private water utilities.14 
The choice of investigating this issue from the perspective of a private utility informs the 
model design as behavior is assumed to flow directly from a private utility’s objective to 
profit maximize.15  
In this dissertation chapter, Chapter 4.2 provides a brief literature review on 
rebates, advertising, and water infrastructure. Chapter 4.3 develops the various elements 
considered by an optimizing utility, specifies the private utility’s objective, and develops 
the utility’s maximization problem. After solving the utility’s maximization problem, 
13 A key issue not considered in this analysis is that of conservation and delaying future supply 
augmentation. For example, a utility may be interested in advertising technologies that reduce demand and 
therefore slow the current rate of groundwater extraction so that it can postpone future supply investments. 
This issue is not addressed here but presents an additional economic justification for a utility to engage in 
advertising for water-saving technologies.  
14 In the United States, approximately 85% of all water utilities are publicly owned and about 15% are 
privately owned. This research focuses on private ownership due to its increasing popularity (Griffin, 
2006).  
15As discussed by Griffin (2006, p. 339-343), the two extreme ownership cases for a water utility are public 
ownership and private ownership. In the case of a publicly owned water utility, its objective, at least in 
principle, is a cost-minimizing one. In other words, given the demand for water, an efficient utility will 
provide the resource at the lowest cost. In the case of a privately owned water utility, the utility’s objective 
is to maximize profits. As the utility is typically a natural monopoly sanctioned by the state to provide 
service in a given territory, private utilities are incentivized to engage in typical monopolistic behavior, for 
which the state generally finds reason to regulate.    
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 Chapter 4.4 provides a qualitative assessment of optimal utility action under several 
scenarios. Chapter 4.5 develops an empirical model with hypothesized outcomes that can 
be tested with appropriate data and Chapter 4.6 concludes by enumerating limitations of 
the current work and offering possible directions for future investigation.   
4.2 Background & Literature Review 
Advertising for the purposes of water demand management is common among 
water utilities and has been demonstrated to reduce demand (Heiman, 2002). Similarly, 
water rebate programs, or utility subsidization of water-saving technologies, have also 
been shown to reduce demand (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). While the general 
impact of advertising in terms of altering preferences and shifting demand is well known 
in the marketing and economics literature (e.g. Dorfman & Steiner, 1954; Hamilton, 
1972; Krugman, 1965), the economic analysis of rebates is somewhat more arcane; and 
in particular, the analysis of rebates for the purchase of water-saving technology from the 
perspective of a cost minimizing or profit maximizing water utility has not yet been 
undertaken. While the model that is developed and presented in this dissertation assumes 
that the utility directly controls advertising efforts and not uptake of rebated technology, 
in order to frame the relevant issues, a brief discussion of the economics of rebates 
follows.    
Rebates offered by a producer or seller effectively reduce the purchase price of 
products for the individuals taking advantage of the rebate. In the economics literature, 
rebates are said to allow a business to price discriminate and thus extract greater surplus 
(Gerstner & Hess, 1991; Lu & Moorthy, 2007). According to Edwards (2007), a rebate is 
a “delayed incentive offered by either a product manufacturer or retailer that requires 
128 
 
 consumers to: (1) make a purchase at a pre-rebate shelf price; (2) submit a request for 
refund amount by mail or the Internet to the rebate offeror…; and (3) wait some period of 
time after the purchase and rebate submission for the rebate offeror… to send a rebate 
check or something of value…” Rebates are often distinguished with coupons based on 
the time at which the refund is provided with a coupon being instituted at the time of sale 
and a rebate being at a later date.  
Commentators have generally concluded that the economic purpose of rebates is 
that they offer a seller a means of price discrimination, thereby granting the seller larger 
surplus (Lu and Moorthy 2007; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1995; Gerstner and Hess 1991). 
In other words, some individuals will pay full price and either not know or not care about 
the rebate offer while other individuals, that would have not purchased the product at the 
listed shelf price, may be induced to purchase the product given the rebate opportunity. 
Of course, some consumers that would have purchased the product without the rebate 
will apply for the rebate, but the additional revenues obtained from induced customers 
will be greater than the loss from customers that would have purchased the product at the 
un-rebated price given the optimal rebate. However, at least one strand of research has 
suggested that rebates may be profitable even when all purchasers are induced to 
participate in the rebate program (Gerstner & Hess, 1991).       
Rebates for the purchase of water saving technology functionally operate in a 
similar fashion to other rebate programs at least from the perspective of the consumer. In 
that case, a water utility makes a public offer to the community whereby the utility agrees 
to remunerate consumers that purchase products that qualify for the rebate program and 
replace existing products in their homes or businesses. Qualifying products often include 
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 water saving showerheads, low flow toilets, high efficiency washing machines, or any 
device that the utility chooses to include in its program, each with stated purpose of 
reducing household water use. A distinguishing feature between a rebate granted by a 
manufacturer or retailer and a water utility, however, is that the utility does not build or 
sell the product for which it is rebating; rather, the utility is essentially providing a 
subsidy for the purchase of qualified technology produced and sold by another entity. 
Nevertheless, the “rebate” terminology generally persists. 
Whereas a typical rebate effectively reduces the product price and provides a 
means of price discrimination, a rebated product that lowers water use, effectively 
reduces the demand for the product that the utility sells: namely, water. Furthermore, 
rebates are costly because they are subsidized by the water utility. So, it would seem that 
with reduced water demand and increased costs to the utility, its profitability would be 
negatively impacted. For example, administration of the Albuquerque Bernalillo County 
Water Authority’s toilet rebate program from 1995 to 2002 was estimated to cost the 
utility more than $2.3 million (Smith, 2004; WRA, 2008). Meanwhile, from 2002 to 
2006, the city of Aurora, Colorado’s water utility spent nearly $1 million on toilet and 
high efficiency washing machine rebate programs (Aurora, 2007; WRA, 2008). Similar 
programs to those described above exist in other cities and municipalities across the 
United States. 
In addition, the utility, by encouraging the installation of water saving technology, 
effectively reduces the demand for the good that it sells – this has been demonstrated in 
theory as well as in practice (Kenney et al., 2008; Price et al., 2014). As a result, water 
rebate programs simultaneously impact the revenue and cost sides of the ledger in a 
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 negative manner. Therefore, it begs the question as to why an optimizing utility would 
engage in this type of activity.  
Several hypotheses could be offered that in some cases reducing demand may be 
optimizing. For example, a utility may be supply-constrained and if demand exceeds 
current supply, the utility may be obligated to engage in costly supply enhancement. 
Similarly, and especially for utilities reliant on a declining aquifer with little opportunity 
for supply augmentation, a forward-looking utility may directly or indirectly consider the 
value of the remaining underground stock (the shadow value), which rises as the 
available volume falls. It is clear that in the first case, rebated technology, and demand 
management in general, offers a near-term solution to excess demand. In the latter case, 
the focus is having adequate supplies over a relatively longer period and, by considering 
the value of the remaining water, the utility can extend the useful life of the aquifer.  
While these rationales likely play a role, the highly regulated nature of the water 
utility, and its inability to effectively set price, makes it difficult for the utility to 
adequately cover the rebate investment costs. Furthermore, a utility’s inability to adjust 
price in the face of changing supply and demand conditions can create operational 
difficulties for the utility and those conditions may run counter to the city or 
municipalities’ stated conservation goals (Timmins, 2003).     
An alternative hypothesis that may explain how rebate investment may be optimal 
for a utility is that reduced system and infrastructure demands that occurs due to lowered 
water demand, reduces the investment that is required by the utility for infrastructure 
replacement and expansion. In this chapter, the term infrastructure is used to generally 
describe various municipal water utility capital assets including water reservoirs, 
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 treatment facilities, groundwater wells, and any other component of the utility’s water 
collection, management and distributions systems. This rationale, at least with regard to a 
desire to put off investment, has particular merit given the current state of water 
infrastructure. As water infrastructure in the United States nears the end of its useful life 
(American Water Works Association 2012), rebate and demand management programs 
can help postpone costly maintenance, replacement, and expansion. However, this 
attitude has led to underfunding: according to the American Society of Civil Engineers 
(2017), United States’ drinking water infrastructure is currently underfunded to the tune 
of about $100 million nationwide in 2017, earning it a grade of “D” in annual report card. 
In addition, as a result of continued infrastructure underinvestment, as well as population 
shifts in some parts of the country (which requires infrastructure expansion in some 
cases), the investment costs are projected to total $1 trillion over the next 25 years 
(American Water Works Association 2012). These statistics make attempting to better 
understating optimal utility investment all the more critical.  
4.3 The Model 
To determine whether an advertising program that promotes the purchase of water 
saving technology is optimal for a water utility in the face of infrastructure costs and 
investment, a capital accumulation model is developed. Because the focus is on the 
utility’s capital infrastructure and its ability to adequately supply the customer base, this 
research also applies an adjustment cost model to the capital accumulation problem 
(Carey & Zilberman, 2002; Hansen, 2009; Rubio, 1992). The practical effect of this 
model is that investment decisions by the water utility constrain the utility’s production 
capacity in the current period and therefore does not positively affect instantaneous 
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 output (Hansen, 2009). In an effort to analyze this problem, the following sub-chapters 
develop relevant aspects of the model in per capita terms (Chapter 4.3.1), specify the 
private utility’s objective (Chapter 4.3.2), and define and solve the utility’s profit 
maximization problem (Chapter 4.3.3).    
 4.3.1 Model development in per capita terms 
It is natural to assume that the objective for a generic publically owned and 
optimally-performing utility is to minimize its costs given a particular level of production 
or output. In other words, the volume demanded by water users must be fulfilled by the 
utility, and the optimizing utility seeks to satisfy demand at the lowest possible cost. This 
cost-minimizing approach makes particular sense for a public utility that is uninterested 
in profit. However, there exist a set of private water utilities that are indeed driven by 
profits rather than cost minimization.16  
While duality between cost minimization and profit maximization should generate 
identical results, the present research focuses on profit maximization rather than cost 
minimization; this approach is taken for two main reasons. First, and most obvious, is 
that a private business is generally expected to be driven by the profit motive, making the 
profit maximization problem the most direct avenue of study. Second, some model 
parameters, such as water price, for example, do not appear in a cost minimization 
problem but are included in a profit maximization problem.17 In an effort to retain those 
parameters of interest, this analysis focuses on profit maximization. The examination of a 
16 EPCOR, the water utility that provides service to Clovis and Edgewood, New Mexico is an example of a 
private utility that arguably seeks to maximize profit. Private water utilities are discussed in Griffin (2006).   
17 Conceptually, this is because in a cost minimization problem, demand must be fulfilled regardless of 
water price. Focusing in the dual profit maximization problem retains that key parameter in the analysis and 
could allow for further comparative static analysis.  
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 water utility from the perspective of a profit maximizing firm is not new and has been 
used in similar contexts (Hansen, 2009; Timmins, 2003).  
Additionally, in an effort to proxy for a socially optimal outcome, the water utility 
is assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive market. While the market is not perfectly 
competitive in practice, due to the highly regulated environment that a water utility 
operates in, this framework allows for the utility to act as a price taker, where water price 
is taken as given and the regulator sets the price 𝑝𝑝.  
Water production, 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡), at any point in time is a function of existing capital, 
𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), labor, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡),18 direct capital infrastructure investment, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), and indirect 
investment via advertising for rebated water saving technology, 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡). The utility’s 
production function is given by 
 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡),𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)]  (4.1) 
The utility seeks to choose its optimal level of investment 𝐿𝐿∗(𝑡𝑡) and advertising 
𝑙𝑙∗(𝑡𝑡) such that it maximizes the present value of it stream of profits. The firm uses 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) 
to replace worn out existing capital, if needed, and to expand capital to meet the demands 
of a growing consumer base. The firm uses 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) to effectively reduce demand on its 
existing capital.  
Consistent with economic theory, 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾 > 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 < 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 > 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 < 0. In other 
words, production increases with greater levels of capital and larger populations, but each 
increase at a decreasing rate. The theory of the adjustment cost model says that 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 ≤ 0, 
𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ≤ 0. Similarly, 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ≤ 0, 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≤ 0. Because budgets are assumed to be fixed in each 
18 In this analysis, labor is assumed to be synonymous to population. Similarly labor growth is assumed to 
equal population growth.  
134 
 
                                                          
 time period, these assumptions suggest that by spending costly resources on 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) or 
𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡), production in the current period is reduced commensurate with the amount invested 
or spent. This model is similar to Hansen (2009), however, in the current model, 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) is 
included in the production function; the inclusion of 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) recognizes that advertising 
assists the transition to water saving technologies, which reduces stress on existing 
capital and may delay costly investment in capital expansion.         
The effect of population growth19 enters the production function and translates the 
utility’s decisions into per capita terms. Assuming homogeneity of degree one in the 
production function 
 𝐹𝐹[𝜇𝜇𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)] = 𝜇𝜇𝐹𝐹[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡),𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)]   ∀  𝜇𝜇 > 0   (4.2) 
Given, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) > 0, let 𝜇𝜇 = 1
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) , 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) , 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡). Substituting into 
equation (4.2), and assuming that the production function is multiplicatively separable  
 𝑓𝑓[𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), 1] = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)−1𝐹𝐹[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡),𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)] (4.3) 
such that 
 𝐹𝐹[𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡),𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)] = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓[𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), 1] (4.4) 
The right hand side of equation (4.4) is the population weighted production function in 
per capita terms.  
Advertising, 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) induces the purchase of water saving technologies that are 
rebated by the utility. This produces a stock of rebated technology that changes according 
to 
 ?̇?𝑂 = 𝐷𝐷�𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)� (4.5) 
19 Again, population growth and labor growth are assumed to be equivalent.  
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 Where 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡) is the stock of rebated low-flow technology installed as a result of utility 
advertising efforts. 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡) is functionally related to 𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) via 𝐷𝐷(∙), which corresponds to 
uptake of rebated water saving technologies that occurs as a result of advertising efforts. 
Assuming constant returns to scale, dividing through by the population size, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), to 
express the equation in per-capita terms produces   
 ?̇?𝑂(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� (4.6) 
?̇?𝑂(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) is the path of rebated technology expressed in per-capita terms and 𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� is uptake 
of advertised technology per capita.  
Next, define the stock of rebated technology in per-capita terms as: 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡). 
Rearranging this equation produces 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡), which is a new equation for the 
stock of rebated technology that, for the moment, is no longer in per-capita terms. In 
particular, the left hand side of the equation corresponds to the stock of rebated 
technology and the right hand side is the population weighted per capita stock of rebated 
technology. Differentiating with respect to time elicits equation (4.7). 
 ?̇?𝑂(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)?̇?𝐼(𝑡𝑡) + ?̇?𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) (4.7) 
The left hand side of equation (4.7) shows the time-path of the stock of rebated 
technology and must be equal to the sum of the product of the per-capita path of rebated 
technology and population size (𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)?̇?𝐼(𝑡𝑡)), and the product of the population path and 
per-capita rebated technology (?̇?𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)). Dividing both sides by the population size 
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), to formulate a new equation in per-capita terms produces  
 ?̇?𝑂(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = ?̇?𝐼(𝑡𝑡) + ?̇?𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) (4.8) 
136 
 
 Defining the rate of population growth as ?̇?𝐿(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜂𝜂, and substituting, yields 
 ?̇?𝑂(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = ?̇?𝐼(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) (4.9) 
Equations (4.6) and (4.9) are now both expressed in terms of the time path of rebated 
technology stock in per capita terms �?̇?𝑂(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�, so setting them equal and solving for ?̇?𝐼(𝑡𝑡) 
produces the per capita time path for rebated technology 
 ?̇?𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) (4.10) 
In equation (4.10), 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) corresponds to the additional per capita rebated technology 
required to accommodate the rate of population growth. Therefore, at the steady state, 
when ?̇?𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 0 ⇒ 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�
𝜂𝜂
. In other words, per capita rebated technology, 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡), 
must equal the per capita uptake in advertised technology, 𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�, while accounting for 
the effect of population growth, 1
𝜂𝜂
.  
Investment (i.e. capital replacement and expansion), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), in any period impacts 
the utility’s capital stock, 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), as does the rate of depreciation, 𝛿𝛿; for simplicity, only 
used capital is assumed to depreciate. Additionally, water saving technology 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡) 
reduces the demand on capital and therefore effectively reduces the amount of capital 
used (or consumed) and that is subject to deprecation. Therefore 
 ?̇?𝐾(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛿𝛿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑂𝑂(𝑡𝑡)� (4.11) 
Next, define investment and capital stock in per capita terms as 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)  and (𝑡𝑡) =
𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) , respectively. Dividing both sides of equation (4.11) by population, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), produces 
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  ?̇?𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛿𝛿�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)� (4.12) 
Next, recall that capital per capita is defined as 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡). Rearranging in terms of total 
capital stock produces  𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), which sets the capital stock equal to the 
population weighted per capita capital stock. Taking a time derivative elicits 
 ?̇?𝐾(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)?̇?𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + ?̇?𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) (4.13) 
Dividing by 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) and using the definition of the population growth rate, ?̇?𝐿(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜂𝜂 
produces equation (4.14).    
 ?̇?𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = ?̇?𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) (4.14) 
In other words, the change in capital divided by population size is equal to the change in 
capital in per capita terms plus the current level of capital multiplied by the rate of 
population growth. 
Equations (4.12) and (4.14) provide equations expressed in terms of the time path 
of the total capital stock divided by the population size �?̇?𝐾(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�. Setting the equations equal 
and solving for ?̇?𝑘(𝑡𝑡) produces equation (4.15), which is the time path for 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and is a 
function of per capita infrastructure investment, per capita capital, and water saving 
technology stock 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡).  
 ?̇?𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) (4.15) 
In steady state, ?̇?𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 0 ⇒  𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡)+𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)(𝛿𝛿+𝜂𝜂)  . In other words, for ?̇?𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 0, per capita 
capital 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), must be fulfilled by a combination of direct per capita investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), per 
capita rebated technology that takes the place of capital that would have been depreciated 
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 but for the technology, 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡), and the combined effect of depreciation and population 
growth, 1(𝛿𝛿+𝜂𝜂).  
 4.3.2 The (private) utility’s objective 
 With all of the key pieces in per capita terms, it is helpful to briefly take stock of 
the utility’s objective before developing the utility’s dynamic problem. Recall that a 
private water utility is interested in maximizing its profits (Π), or the difference between 
its total revenue (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) and (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) total costs (i.e. Π = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇). In this case, the utility’s 
total revenue is given by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�, where total revenue is the 
product of unit price, 𝑝𝑝, population size 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), and the volume produced by the utility per 
the utility’s production function (e.g. 𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�). The utility charges price 𝑝𝑝 for 
water, which is exogenous and determined by the regulator.  
The volume produced by the utility is a function of capital stock, 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), 
infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), and advertising investment, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) (all in per capita 
terms). The utility will choose the optimal levels of infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚∗(𝑡𝑡), and 
advertising, 𝑎𝑎∗(𝑡𝑡). Due to the application of the adjustment cost model, both 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ≤ 0, 
meaning that investment is costly in terms of foregone production in the current period; 
resources that are expended are not part of current revenues, since according to the 
adjustment cost model, current period investment does not bring about instantaneous 
adjustment (Hansen, 2009).20  
20 Following the adjustment cost model in per capita terms, 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ≤ 0 (Hansen, 2009). While the second 
derivative of production with regard to investment or advertising appears to be somewhat abstract, the 
direction is needed for appropriately signing the investment and advertising time paths.     
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 The utility’s total costs are given by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), where 𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0, 
𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0, and 𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0 are the unit costs for repair, infrastructure investment, and advertising, 
respectively. In other words, investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), is costly and comes at 𝑙𝑙 dollars per unit 
of capital investment, resulting in a capital investment expenditure of gm(t). Similarly, 
advertising, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), is costly and comes at 𝑠𝑠 dollars per unit investment, resulting in an 
advertising expenditure of sa(t).21 Therefore, the utility maximizes profit according to 
Π = 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − �𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�, and, to reiterate, does so by 
choosing the optimal level of infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), and advertising, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡). 21F22 
 4.3.2 The utility’s dynamic maximization problem in continuous time 
In order to construct the dynamic model a few other assumptions are required. 
First, the utility anticipates that the population grows according to the logistic equation 
𝐿𝐿(0)𝑒𝑒𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 where 𝐿𝐿(0) is the population size at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝜂𝜂 is the rate of population 
growth. In addition, the utility’s internal discount rate is 𝜌𝜌. Accounting for the utility’s 
profit maximizing objective (i.e. the revenues and costs discussed in the prior section), 
the utility maximizes the following model in continuous time 
 
max
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)𝑉𝑉 =�𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿(0)𝑒𝑒𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇
0
− 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)�𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 (4.16) 
Setting 𝐿𝐿(0) = 1, the objective function becomes,  
21 Clearly repair is also costly and comes at 𝑙𝑙 dollars per unit of repair, resulting in repair expenditure of 
𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡), but capital is not directly chosen by the utility so is ignored for the purpose of highlighting the 
choice variables.     
22 For simplicity, it is assumed that the utility advertises the purchase of water saving technology but does 
not subsidize it. 
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  max
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)𝑉𝑉 =�𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇
0
 (4.17) 
Where 𝑙𝑙 = 𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and for 𝑙𝑙 < 0, 𝜌𝜌 > 𝜂𝜂.    
The maximization problem is constrained by the various stocks described in equations 
(4.10) and (4.15), as well as the additional starting, terminal, and range conditions shown 
in (4.18).    
 
?̇?𝑘 = 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) 
?̇?𝐼 = 𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑘𝑘(0) = 𝑘𝑘0;  𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝑘𝑘;  𝑘𝑘(𝑇𝑇) = 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 
𝐼𝐼(0) = 𝐼𝐼0;  0 ≤ 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝐼𝐼; 𝐼𝐼(𝑇𝑇) = 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇) = 0,∀𝑖𝑖    
𝑇𝑇 fixed 
(4.18) 
In other words, the utility chooses 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) in order to maximize its stream of 
profits over the planning horizon 𝑇𝑇 under the constraints given by 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡). As the 
planning horizon is fixed at terminal time 𝑇𝑇, this can be also be interpreted as a 
management horizon over which a utility operates. Minimum and maximum values of 
𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) are given, indicating that per capita levels of capital and rebated 
technology must be contained within the given intervals. In addition, 𝑙𝑙, which is given by 
the difference between the population growth rate (𝜂𝜂) and the utility’s internal discount 
rate (𝜌𝜌), is the social discount rate and is assumed to be less than zero. This condition 
requires that the utility’s internal discount rate, 𝜌𝜌, be greater than the rate of population 
growth, 𝜂𝜂. Given this framework, the current value Hamiltonian is:  
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𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓�𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡),𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)+ 𝜆𝜆1[𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)]+ 𝜆𝜆2�𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)� (4.19) 
𝜆𝜆1and 𝜆𝜆2 represent the shadow (or option) values of capital and water saving technology 
(or the state variables) respectively. Dropping the time subscripts for simplicity, the first 
order necessary conditions are:  
 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚
= 0 ⟺ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 − 𝑙𝑙 + 𝜆𝜆1 = 0 
 
(4.20) 
 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎
= 0 ⟺ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑠𝑠 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0 
 
(4.21) 
 −
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘
= ?̇?𝜆1 − 𝑙𝑙𝜆𝜆1 ⟺ ?̇?𝜆1 = −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑙𝑙 + 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) 
 
(4.22) 
 −
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
𝜕𝜕𝐼𝐼
= ?̇?𝜆2 − 𝑙𝑙𝜆𝜆2 ⟺ ?̇?𝜆2 = 𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 
 
(4.23) 
 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆1
= ?̇?𝑘 ⟺ ?̇?𝑘 = 𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘 − 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼 
 
(4.24) 
 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆2
= ?̇?𝐼 ⟺ ?̇?𝐼 = 𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎) − 𝜂𝜂𝐼𝐼 
 
(4.25) 
 
lim
𝑡𝑡→𝑇𝑇
𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻(𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎, 𝐼𝐼, 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2) = 0 
 
(4.26) 
 Assuming that an interior solution exists, and solving equations (4.20) and (4.21), 
yields equations in terms of  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎, or the marginal revenue products of 
investment and advertisement, respectively. Because 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 < 0 correspond to 
production in the current period that is given up in favor of investment,  𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 
therefore represent opportunity costs of investment and imply tradeoffs between 
production in the current period and investment (or advertising). Additionally, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 0, or 
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 the marginal impact of advertising on rebate uptake, enters equation (4.21) and plays a 
key role in the optimal advertising decision.  
 Given the potentially costly tradeoffs that a utility must make in terms of 
investment decisions and production, at the optimum the utility invests up to the point 
where the costs of investment are equal to the benefits from investment. As such, solving 
for 𝜆𝜆1 in equation (4.20) gives  
 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 (4.27) 
In this case, 𝑙𝑙 is the unit cost of infrastructure investment and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 is the opportunity cost 
of investing. Therefore, given that 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 is the marginal cost of investment,  𝜆𝜆1 
represents the marginal benefit, or marginal value, to the utility of infrastructure 
investment.  
Similarly, the utility optimally chooses advertising investment such that the 
marginal costs of advertising equal the marginal benefits of advertising. Solving for 𝜆𝜆2 in 
equation (4.21) 
 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  (4.28) 
The term 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 corresponds to the combined costs of the direct and opportunity cost of 
advertising. The term in the denominator, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, scales the marginal cost by marginal 
advertising effectiveness In particular, as 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 increases, relatively less advertising is 
required to achieve the same marginal cost outcome, all else equal. As a result, 𝜆𝜆2 
represents the marginal value to the utility of advertising, or the marginal value of rebated 
technology.  
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 Critical to the analysis is that 𝜆𝜆1,𝜆𝜆2 > 0.23 In the case of 𝜆𝜆1, the unit cost of 
investment, 𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡), is positive (𝑙𝑙 > 0) and because the opportunity cost of infrastructure 
investment is negative (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 < 0), the shadow (or option) value of infrastructure 
investment is positive (𝜆𝜆1 > 0). Similarly, because the unit cost of advertising, 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡), is 
positive (𝑠𝑠 > 0), the opportunity cost of advertising investment is negative (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 < 0), 
and the marginal effect of advertising on technology uptake is positive (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 0), the 
shadow (or option) value of advertising is also positive (𝜆𝜆2 > 0).         
Taking the time derivative of equation (4.27) produces a time path for the shadow 
value of investment, 𝜆𝜆1 
 ?̇?𝜆1 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎� (4.29) 
Taking the time derivative of equation (4.28) produces a time path for the shadow value 
of advertising, 𝜆𝜆2 
 ?̇?𝜆2 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� + ?̇?𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  (4.30) 
Equations (4.29) and (4.30) must hold if 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑎𝑎 are optimally chosen.    
Equations (4.22) and (4.23) also provide time paths for the shadow values of 
investment and infrastructure (𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2, respectively) and correspond to how the 
objective changes given changes in the respective stocks, 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) and 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡). These time paths 
can be used in conjunction with equations (4.29) and (4.30), respectively, to solve for 
time paths of the choice variables, ?̇?𝑚 and ?̇?𝑎. Therefore, setting equation (4.23) equal to 
equation (4.30) and solving for ?̇?𝑎 produces and equation that is a function of the time path 
of infrastructure investment, ?̇?𝑚   
23 Recall that 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 .   
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  ?̇?𝑎 = −𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑚 (4.31) 
Similarly, setting equation (4.22) equal to equation (4.29) and solving for ?̇?𝑚 produces 
and equation that is a function of advertising time path, ?̇?𝑎   
 ?̇?𝑚 =  [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
?̇?𝑎 (4.32) 
Equations (4.31) and (4.32) provide a system of equations that can be solved for both ?̇?𝑎 
and ?̇?𝑚. Equation (4.32) is particularly noteworthy because it similar to the result found in 
(Hansen, 2009), but because the present analysis incorporates the effect of advertising, it 
includes the additional term 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
?̇?𝑎. In addition, this term is subtracted on the right hand 
side of equation (4.32) implying that as advertising investment increases, the optimal 
infrastructure investment path decreases because the utility is effectively trading off 
between the two investment types. Plugging equation (4.31) into (4.32) and solving ?̇?𝑚 for 
produces    
 
?̇?𝑚 =  (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2� �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
− �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘� + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � 
(4.33) 
Equation (4.33) is the optimal path for 𝑚𝑚.  
Substituting equation (4.33) back into (4.31) and solving for ?̇?𝑎  produces the 
optimal path for 𝑎𝑎.  
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?̇?𝑎 = − �(1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚)�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − (𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚)2) �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙]
− [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘��� 
(4.34) 
For complete solutions, the shadow values of infrastructure investment and advertising, 
𝜆𝜆1and 𝜆𝜆2, respectively, should be substituted into optimal 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑎𝑎 paths and ?̇?𝑘 should be 
replaced by the restriction given in equation (4.18); however, those terms are left in the 
present analysis for compactness. Furthermore, because 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2 > 0, they pose no special 
difficulty with regard to understanding the behavior of each path.24  
4.4 Signing and Analysis 
 
In an effort to better characterize the optimal choice for a utility (given a variety 
of underlying assumptions), this section provides qualitative results for key terms, 
parameters, and relationships. To facilitate this discussion, assume that 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 0, or that 
the cross partial derivatives of the production function with respect to both control 
variables are equal to zero.25 Simplifying equation (4.32) yields  
 
?̇?𝑚 =  1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
+ 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘� (4.35.1) 
24 Although, depending on the assumed signs for augmented depreciation (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) and the population 
effect (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌), the relative magnitudes for 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2 may make a difference.  
25 This is indeed a strong assumption. However, simplification is required to make meaningful qualitative 
comparisons.  
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 Equation (4.35.1) is in the same general form given in (Hansen, 2009) but it includes the 
additional term 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘, which accounts for the effect of advertising on the 
changing capital. Equation (4.35.1) is rearranged in equation (4.35.2) in order to capture 
the full effect of ?̇?𝑘 in the path for 𝑚𝑚.  
 
?̇?𝑚 =  1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
− �
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � 𝑝𝑝?̇?𝑘� 
(4.35.2) 
In addition, applying the assumption 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 0 to equation (4.34) produces 
equation (4.36.1)     
 
?̇?𝑎 = −𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  (4.36.1) 
For comparability, equation (4.36.1) is rearranged in equation (4.36.2) to be consistent 
with equation (4.35.1). In particular, each contain the same 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� ?̇?𝑘  term. This 
demonstrates that both the infrastructure (?̇?𝑚) and advertising (?̇?𝑎) paths are subject to 
similar offsetting factors.  
 
?̇?𝑎 = −�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎� ?̇?𝑘� (4.36.2) 
However, for the purpose of analyzing the 𝑎𝑎 path, equation (4.36.3) is derived,   
 
?̇?𝑎 = −𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)𝜆𝜆2
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎� ?̇?𝑘 (4.36.3) 
By assumption,  𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 < 0 (i.e. the social discount rate 𝑙𝑙 < 0); however, the sign 
of  𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌, which essentially accounts for the combined effects of population 
augmented depreciation (augmented depreciation) and the utility’s internal discount rate, 
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 in the  ?̇?𝑚 path in equation (4.35.2), is unknown. Similarly the direction of ?̇?𝑎 turns in part 
on the sign of 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌, which is essentially the difference between the scaled rate of 
population growth rate (population effect) and the utility’s internal rate of discount, and is 
also unknown. In both cases, empirical data are necessary to uncover the true signs for 
the augmented depreciation and population effect terms. Nevertheless, the following 
scenarios demonstrate the various relationships given the various possible signs of 
𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌; in other words, the paths depend on the strength and direction of 
the effects of augmented depreciation and the population effect.   
 4.4.1 Scenario 1:Population effect greater than utility discount rate 
(𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 > 𝟎𝟎) and augmented depreciation greater than utility discount rate 
(𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 > 𝟎𝟎)   
Based on the 𝑚𝑚 path shown in equation (4.35.1), there exist several possible 
directions of ?̇?𝑚 depending on whether capital is accumulating or declining; i.e. given the 
sign of ?̇?𝑘.  
Define 𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎−𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
; 𝐵𝐵 = 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿+2𝜂𝜂−𝜌𝜌)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
; and 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
; and 𝐷𝐷 = 1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
�
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘. 
𝑙𝑙 can be described as the marginal net benefit (𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚) of repairing existing 
infrastructure. A prudent manager would not spend more fixing existing infrastructure 
than it receives in benefits, so 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0. However, 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0, so 𝑙𝑙 < 0.  
Because 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚,  𝐵𝐵 is the marginal value of infrastructure investment 
(𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚). The marginal benefit of infrastructure investment is equal to the costs of 
investment, so it must be that 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 > 0. However, the relationship between 
augmented depreciation and the utility’s internal discount rate (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) is unknown, 
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 which makes assessing the sign of 𝐵𝐵 and empirical question. In this case it is assumed 
that 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0, or that augmented depreciation is positive; therefore, 𝐵𝐵 > 0.  
𝑇𝑇 and 𝐷𝐷 both capture effects from the change in capital stock modeled through ?̇?𝑘. 
Specifically, 𝑇𝑇 accounts the marginal capital changes occurring due to infrastructure 
investment and 𝐷𝐷 accounts for marginal changes in capital due to advertising investment. 
With regard to 𝑇𝑇, 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 < 0 and 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0; however, because of the leading negative sign 
on 𝑇𝑇, the sign is opposite of  ?̇?𝑘. For 𝐷𝐷, 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) > 0 and 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0, so like 𝑇𝑇, the sign 
is opposite of ?̇?𝑘. Table 4.1 shows the optimal direction for infrastructure investment given 
the assumptions already described.   
Table 4.1 Summary of impacts for optimal path of ?̇?𝒎 when 𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 > 𝟎𝟎 
 ?̇?𝑘 < 0 ?̇?𝑘 = 0 ?̇?𝑘 > 0 
?̇?𝑚 < 0 𝑙𝑙 > (𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 𝑙𝑙 > 𝐵𝐵 (𝑙𝑙 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) > 𝐵𝐵 
?̇?𝑚 = 0 𝑙𝑙 = (𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 𝑙𝑙 = 𝐵𝐵 (𝑙𝑙 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) = 𝐵𝐵 
?̇?𝑚 > 0 𝑙𝑙 < (𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 𝑙𝑙 < 𝐵𝐵 (𝑙𝑙 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) < 𝐵𝐵 
 
 In situations when the change in capital stock is negative, i.e. when ?̇?𝑘 < 0, the 
optimal path for infrastructure investment, or the direction of ?̇?𝑚, depends on the 
magnitude of the 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 from repairs. If the 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 from repairs exceeds the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 and 
the joint effects from the change in capital stock (i.e. capital stock changes coming from 
direct investment and advertising), then the utility should shift its focus away from new 
capital investment and toward repairs. However, if 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 from repairs is less than the 
𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 and the joint effects from the change in capital stock, then the utility should shift 
its focus to capital investment. 
 When changes to capital stock are positive, i.e. when ?̇?𝑘 > 0, the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 tends to 
dominate. For example, if the combined 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 from repairs and the joint effects from 
change in capital stock are less than the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚, the utility should focus its efforts on new 
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 investment; however, if the combined impact is greater than 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚 then the utility should 
focus on repairs. Finally, the ?̇?𝑚 = 0 row provides steady state relationships for each 
instance of ?̇?𝑘 when net infrastructure investment is equal to zero – in other words, it 
provides situations when a utility would be indifferent between infrastructure investment 
and repairs.26        
Similarly, to outline the various possible directions of ?̇?𝑎 given the various signs of 
?̇?𝑘, define 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎(2𝜂𝜂−𝜌𝜌)𝜆𝜆2
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
, 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 and 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� ?̇?𝑘. Because 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 , 
𝑋𝑋 is the marginal value of advertising investment (𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎); 𝑌𝑌, in a manner of speaking, is 
the marginal value of infrastructure investment (𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎) put in advertising terms; and 𝑍𝑍 is 
the impact on the ?̇?𝑎 path due to changing capital stock. Because 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 0, the 
denominator for each quantity, 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, and 𝑍𝑍 is negative. Due to the increasing effect of 
advertising on rebate uptake, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 > 0, the positive shadow value for advertising, 𝜆𝜆2 > 0, 
and given the assumption that the population effect outweighs the effect of the utility’s 
internal discount rate, 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0, the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 < 0. By similar logic, because the 
depreciation term is positive, 𝛿𝛿 > 0, the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 < 0. Finally, because 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 < 0, 
𝑝𝑝 �
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� < 0, so the sign for 𝑍𝑍 depends on the direction of the capital effect ?̇?𝑘. 
26 Note that the critical comparison in this case is between the marginal benefit of repair and the marginal 
benefit of investment – the effect of advertising only indirectly enters through the capital effect, and 
specifically through 𝐷𝐷 = 1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
�
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘. However, the following paragraphs describe the advertising 
relationship and specifically how the marginal value of advertising is compared against the marginal value 
of investment (i.e. how they are traded off). To put this in a concise fashion, in order for the utility to 
behave optimally, it must choose the proper directions for ?̇?𝑚 and ?̇?𝑎 given the various assumptions already 
described regarding the population effect and augmented depreciation, as well as the observed direction of 
?̇?𝑘. In other words, the qualitative results describe whether it is optimal for a utility to increase (or decrease 
or keep level) investment or advertising.       
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 Given the relations as shown in equation (4.36.3), and the assumption 2𝜂𝜂 > 𝜌𝜌, the 
possible directions for the ?̇?𝑎 path are shown in table 4.2.           
Table 4.2 Summary of impacts for optimal path of ?̇?𝒂 assuming 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 > 𝝆𝝆 
 ?̇?𝑘 < 0 ?̇?𝑘 = 0 ?̇?𝑘 > 0 
?̇?𝑎 < 0 (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑍𝑍) < 𝑌𝑌 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 𝑋𝑋 < (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
?̇?𝑎 = 0 (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑍𝑍) = 𝑌𝑌 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌 𝑋𝑋 = (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
?̇?𝑎 > 0 (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑍𝑍) > 𝑌𝑌 𝑋𝑋 < 𝑌𝑌 𝑋𝑋 > (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
 
 In this case, there is no analogue to 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚; rather, the relevant comparisons are 
based on the marginal values of advertising and infrastructure investment. In this case, 
when  ?̇?𝑘 < 0, the optimal path for advertising investment, or the direction of ?̇?𝑎, depends 
on the magnitude of the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 and the capital effect. Specifically, if the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 and the 
capital effect are less than 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎, then it makes sense to shift resources away from 
advertising and toward infrastructure investment. However, if the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 and the capital 
effect are greater than 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎, then it makes sense to shift resources toward advertising.  
 In cases when ?̇?𝑘 > 0, the magnitude of 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 dominates. If 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 is less than the 
joint impact of 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 and the capital effect, then it makes sense to invest in infrastructure. 
However, if  𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 is greater than the joint impact of 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 and the capital effect, then it 
makes sense to invest in advertising. The ?̇?𝑎 = 0 row provides steady state relationships 
for each instance of ?̇?𝑘. These steady state outcomes occur when the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 of repairs 
equals the 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 of investment.                  
Of particular interest for ?̇?𝑎 and ?̇?𝑚 is that both depend on 𝜆𝜆1and 𝜆𝜆2; in other words, 
the marginal value of both investment-types play a role in determining optimal 
investment paths and illustrates that tradeoffs between investments depend on the 
marginal values of each. The ?̇?𝑎 path is the most direct version of this and, as the signing 
results suggest, it allows for a direct comparison of the various values of each investment 
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 type and provides qualitative guidance for when investment tradeoffs should occur. 
However, even the ?̇?𝑚 path includes a correction for advertising as that path incorporates 
the shadow value (or option value) of advertising, illustrating that both investment types 
should be considered when attempting to achieve the optimal paths.       
 4.4.2 Scenario 2: Population effect equal to utility discount rate (𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 =
𝟎𝟎) or augmented depreciation equal to utility discount rate (𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 = 𝟎𝟎)   
 Although Scenario 1 produces the most likely set of outcomes, given the assumed 
signs for 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌, nothing in principle prevents those expressions taking 
on different signs. In this particular scenario, either (twice) the population growth rate is 
equal to the utility’s internal rate of discount (2𝜂𝜂 = 𝜌𝜌) or the rate of augmented 
deprecation is equal to the utility’s internal rate of discount (𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 = 𝜌𝜌), but not both 
(assuming that 𝛿𝛿 > 0). If the utility’s rate of augmented depreciation is equivalent to its 
internal discount rate, then the various time paths for ?̇?𝑚, given the three conditions for ?̇?𝑘, 
are given in table 4.3.            
Table 4.3 Summary of impacts for optimal path of ?̇?𝒎 when 𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 = 𝟎𝟎 
 ?̇?𝑘 < 0 ?̇?𝑘 = 0 ?̇?𝑘 > 0 
?̇?𝑚 < 0 0 > (𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 0 > 𝐵𝐵 (𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) > 𝐵𝐵 
?̇?𝑚 = 0 0 = (𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 0 = 𝐵𝐵 (𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) = 𝐵𝐵 
?̇?𝑚 > 0 0 < (𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 0 < 𝐵𝐵 (𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) < 𝐵𝐵 
 
In this case, because the effects of augmented depreciation are offset against the 
utility’s internal discount rate, 𝑙𝑙, or the marginal net benefit of repairs (𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚), is zero. 
Therefore, outcomes shown in the table do not offer insight into a meaningful tradeoff 
between repairs and investment, but rather show conditions that must exist when the 
directions for ?̇?𝑘 and ?̇?𝑚 and known.     
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 Similarly, if the population’s growth rate is equivalent to its internal discount rate, 
then 𝑋𝑋 in the ?̇?𝑎 path, or the marginal value of advertising (𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎),  is equal to zero.  The 
various time paths for 𝑎𝑎, given the three conditions for ?̇?𝑘, are given in table 4.4. Like 
table 4.3, the results demonstrate that there is no meaningful tradeoff between investment 
types and instead provides conditions that must exist for an optimally managed utility 
given the various directions for ?̇?𝑎 and ?̇?𝑘.               
Table 4.4 Summary of impacts for optimal path of ?̇?𝒂 when 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 = 𝟎𝟎   
 ?̇?𝑘 < 0 ?̇?𝑘 = 0 ?̇?𝑘 > 0 
?̇?𝑎 < 0 𝑍𝑍 < 𝑌𝑌 0 > 𝑌𝑌 0 < (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
?̇?𝑎 = 0 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑌𝑌 0 = 𝑌𝑌 0 = (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
?̇?𝑎 > 0 𝑍𝑍 > 𝑌𝑌 0 < 𝑌𝑌 0 > (𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
 4.4.3 Scenario 3: Population effect less than utility discount rate (𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 −
𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎) 
 In this scenario, it is assumed that the population growth is outweighed by the 
utility’s discount rate 2𝜂𝜂 < 𝜌𝜌. This term enters into the ?̇?𝑎 time path, but not the ?̇?𝑚 time 
path, and effectively changes the sign of 𝑋𝑋, or the 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚. In essence, this change forces 
𝑋𝑋 to the opposite side of the inequality compared to table 4.2.      
Table 4.5 Summary of impacts for optimal path of ?̇?𝒂 when 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎 
 ?̇?𝑘 < 0 ?̇?𝑘 = 0 ?̇?𝑘 > 0 
?̇?𝑎 < 0 𝑍𝑍 < (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌) 0 > (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌) 0 < (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
?̇?𝑎 = 0 𝑍𝑍 = (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌) 0 = (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌) 0 = (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
?̇?𝑎 > 0 𝑍𝑍 > (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌) 0 < (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌) 0 > (𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑍𝑍) 
 
In this instance, there is no tradeoff between 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 and 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎 and the results simply 
illustrate the conditions that must be true given various directions for ?̇?𝑎, conditions for ?̇?𝑘, 
and assuming that the utility is behaving optimally. However, the implication of the 
utility’s discount rate being larger than the population growth rate is that it incentivizes 
the acquisition of near-term profits at the expense of any other type of investment – 
including advertising investment, which are expected to reduce future capital demands.           
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  4.4.4 Scenario 4: Augmented depreciation less than utility discount rate 
(𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎)   
The logic for the ?̇?𝑚 path, assuming that augmented depreciation is less than the 
utility’s discount rate, is similar to scenario 3; when 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 < 𝜌𝜌, the utility no longer 
trades off between repairs and capital investment. Results are shown in table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 Summary of impacts for optimal path of ?̇?𝒎 when 𝜹𝜹 + 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝝆𝝆 < 𝟎𝟎    
 ?̇?𝑘 < 0 ?̇?𝑘 = 0 ?̇?𝑘 > 0 
?̇?𝑚 < 0 0 > (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 0 > (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵) (𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) > (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵) 
?̇?𝑚 = 0 0 = (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 0 = (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵) (𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) = (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵) 
?̇?𝑚 > 0 0 < (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) 0 < (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵) (𝑇𝑇 + 𝐷𝐷) < (𝑙𝑙 + 𝐵𝐵) 
 
When the utility’s internal discount rate exceeds the rate of depreciation and the 
population effect, near-term profits are encouraged, which disincentives investment 
because investment will bring the utility profits at a later date.   
 4.4.5 Scenario discussion  
While the most interesting set of results occur when 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0 and when 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 > 0, the previous analysis demonstrate the possible outcomes when those 
conditions are not met. Additionally, the results provide some bounds when some pieces 
of information are known and may make it possible to deduce, or at least narrow down, 
the list of possible options if some information is unknown. For example, if it is known 
that 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 = 0, then it must be the case that 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 ≥ 0 because 𝛿𝛿 ≥ 0. In 
addition, if ?̇?𝑘 > 0, for instance, then that only leaves a limited set of possible relations for 
an optimally behaving utility for ?̇?𝑎 and ?̇?𝑚. While this assessment provides the possible 
list of outcomes, the actual set of outcomes expected in a particular case is ultimately an 
empirical question.         
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 4.5 Developing Testable Empirical Models 
 While previous analysis qualitatively describes the conditions that must be 
satisfied to determine the directions of the various paths given the proposed models, and 
produces generally intuitive results, it does not mean that the proposed models 
necessarily behave in in the manner suggested in practice. Therefore, the time paths (for 
?̇?𝑚, ?̇?𝑎, and ?̇?𝑘 are manipulated in an effort to develop statistical models that may be tested 
empirically and compared against expected parameter outcomes. Beginning with 
equation (4.35.2) and distributing  1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 produces equation (4.37) 
 
?̇?𝑚 =  [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
�𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) (4.37) 
Substituting 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎  and collecting like terms yields    
 
?̇?𝑚 =  𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
� −
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�?̇?𝑘�
+ � 1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
� �
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝� (4.38) 
Similarly, distributing − 1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 in equation (36.2) produces 
 
?̇?𝑎 = −�[𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1)] + �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘��𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎)  (4.39) 
Substituting 𝜆𝜆1 = 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 and 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎  and collecting like terms    
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?̇?𝑎 = �𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚�
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2𝛿𝛿
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙
−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝?̇?𝑘 
(4.40) 
?̇?𝑘 is straightforward,  
 ?̇?𝑘 =  𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼 (4.41) 
Full algebraic derivations are provided in Appendix 4.1.1.  
In equation (4.38), the 1
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 term is estimated econometrically but requires 
knowing 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎)+𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 . While the unit costs 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑠𝑠 are likely to be known from 
underlying data, the various embedded partial derivatives and cross-partial derivatives of 
𝑎𝑎(∙) and 𝑓𝑓(∙) are unknown. However, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝(𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎)+𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is estimated directly in 
equation (4.40) using known data; that estimate can be applied in the estimation of 
equation (4.38).  
To develop models that can be estimated econometrically, the continuous time 
paths are converted into discrete time where, generally, ?̇?𝐺 = 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝐺𝐺. In other 
words, the time paths are first-differenced. Therefore, the following three models are 
estimated econometrically  
 ∆𝑎𝑎 =  𝜏𝜏0 + 𝜏𝜏1𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏2𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏3𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏4(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∆𝑘𝑘) + 𝜖𝜖1𝑡𝑡 (4.42) 
 ∆𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3 �𝜏𝜏4� ∆𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡� + 𝜖𝜖2𝑡𝑡 (4.43) 
 ∆𝑘𝑘 =  𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾3𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖3𝑡𝑡 (4.44) 
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 Table 4.7 describes signs that are expected for each estimated coefficient given variables 
used in the estimation as well as the underlying theory described by each coefficient. 
In this case, the data variables for the ∆𝑎𝑎 estimation are unit price, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, advertising 
cost, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡, infrastructure investment cost, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡, and the change in capacity multiplied by price, 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∆𝑘𝑘. With regard to the ∆𝑚𝑚 estimation, data variables include the infrastructure 
investment price ratio, 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
, the change in capacity, ∆𝑘𝑘, and the negative of the sum of 
capacity change times the appropriate estimated parameter from the ∆𝑎𝑎 estimation plus 
the capital repair cost to price ratio, −�𝜏𝜏4� ∆𝑘𝑘 −
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
�. For the ∆𝑘𝑘 estimation, the data 
variables include the levels at each point in time for infrastructure investment, 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 
capacity, 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡, and rebated technology, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡. 𝜖𝜖1𝑡𝑡, 𝜖𝜖2𝑡𝑡, and 𝜖𝜖3𝑡𝑡 are model errors from the ∆𝑎𝑎, 
∆𝑚𝑚, and ∆𝑘𝑘 estimations, respectively. Signs on estimated coefficients can be compared 
against the column of expected signs to test for model consistency. However, in four 
cases, the expected signs are ambiguous. Contributing to the ambiguity is the fact that 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 and 𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌 could take on positive or negative values depending on the 
relative sizes of the respective elements. Additionally, because the underlying data and 
models were defined in per capita terms, population effects enter the model through 𝜏𝜏4, 
𝛽𝛽2, 𝛾𝛾1, 𝛾𝛾2, and 𝛾𝛾3. Capital effects come into the model via 𝜏𝜏4 and 𝛽𝛽3. And policy effects 
enter from 𝜏𝜏2, 𝜏𝜏3, and 𝛽𝛽1.   
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 Table 4.7 Summary of coefficients, theory, variables, and expected signs 
Model & 
Coefficients Theory Data Variable Expected sign 
For ∆𝑎𝑎 estimation    
𝜏𝜏0 0 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 
𝜏𝜏1 
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 
𝜏𝜏2 −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 
𝜏𝜏3 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
2𝛿𝛿
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙 − 
𝜏𝜏4 −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝∆𝑘𝑘 − 
For ∆𝑚𝑚 estimation    
𝛽𝛽0 
𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 
𝛽𝛽1 −
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 
𝛽𝛽2 −
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 ∆𝑘𝑘 − 
𝛽𝛽3 
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
 −�𝜏𝜏4� ∆𝑘𝑘 + 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝� − 
For ∆𝑘𝑘 estimation    
𝛾𝛾0 0 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 
𝛾𝛾1 1 𝑘𝑘 + 
𝛾𝛾2 −(𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂) 𝑚𝑚 − 
𝛾𝛾3 𝛿𝛿 𝐼𝐼 + 
 
Because there are multiple equations to be estimated and because they are likely 
to be related either directly or through their error structure, proper estimation suggests the 
use of simultaneous estimation or seemingly unrelated regression techniques as well as 
the integration of additional model controls. In order to commence estimation, data are 
needed for each variable and Hansen (2009) provides some direction with regard to this 
analysis; however, the inclusion of advertising makes estimation challenging. In order to 
estimate the proposed models, advertising budgets and advertising unit costs would need 
to be collected.  
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 4.6 Conclusions 
 The act of advertising is costly to a profit maximizing business or entity. 
However, while advertising is typically done for the purpose of encouraging the purchase 
of the product or service that the entity sells, and effectively shifting the demand curve 
rightward, utility-level advertising for water-saving technology does the opposite: it 
reduces the demand for the product that it sells. The fact that this activity increases a 
utility’s cost and reduces demand for the product it sells operates to make the rationale 
for the activity unclear at least on the surface, especially in the case of a profit 
maximizing private utility. One justification that is often given is that by encouraging the 
purchase of water-saving technology, the utility can put off infrastructure investment and 
repairs. To investigate this claim, a capital accumulation framework is utilized that 
illustrates the conditions that must be present for this type investment.    
A key result from this analysis is that the optimal path for each investment type 
depends on the other. This is immediately apparent from equations (4.31) and (4.32), as ?̇?𝑎 
is a function of ?̇?𝑚 and vice-versa. In addition, after substituting to find the optimal paths 
and simplifying (equations (4.35.1) and (4.36.3)), it is clear that each path contains the 
same capital accumulation term: 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎+𝜆𝜆2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
� ?̇?𝑘. Furthermore, in the ?̇?𝑚 path, that term is 
positive and in the ?̇?𝑎 path it is negative, implying that there is an inverse relationship 
between the two paths and suggesting that there are tradeoffs between investment types. 
Additionally, supporting this conclusion is that embedded in both paths are 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2, 
which are essentially the marginal values (or option values) associated with both 
investment types. Therefore, in order to assure that the optimal paths are reached, it is 
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 critical to not only consider how that investment compares against the benefits of repairs, 
but also how one investment type impacts the other.  
One element that is not included in the model is utility payment for qualifying 
rebated technology. This analysis essentially assumed that the cost to the utility was zero; 
however, because the utility subsidizes the purchase, the cost to the utility should be 
included. This assumption was used for simplicity as adding another element to the 
model significantly increases its complexity and reduces its ability to be easily 
understood. Future work could be done to add this element. In addition, the simplifying 
assumption that the cross partial derivative of production with respect to advertising and 
direct investment is equal to zero (i.e. 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 0) was employed to facilitate the qualitative 
signing analysis. In a future investigation, this assumption could be relaxed.    
 While the analytical model and qualitative results provide some insight into when 
a utility should invest in infrastructure or advertising, they provide no assistance with 
regard to determining whether the model accurately describes the utility decision. 
Therefore, empirical models were developed which, assuming the availability of 
appropriate data, can be compared against expected outcomes. While the empirical 
methodology will likely require estimation by a system or a similar method, the inclusion 
of various controls, and the testing of various model specifications, the necessary data are 
not currently available. Specifically, although Hansen (2009) provides insight into some 
data that could be used to estimate the models, the current unavailability of advertising 
costs and budget data, rebate uptake data (or how advertising translates into purchases), 
and rebated water-saving technology stock data make estimation impossible. Future work 
160 
 
 could be devoted to attempting to collect or estimate this data and simulation 
methodology may be employed for certain variables.   
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 Appendix 4.1 Detailed Mathematical Appendix 
Appendix 4.1.1: Developing time paths 
Take the time derivative of equation (4.27) to produce equation (4.30), 
 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎  (4.27) 
 ?̇?𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎� 
 
 
 ?̇?𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎� − 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 
 
 
 ?̇?𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 − 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 
 
 
 ?̇?𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� − ?̇?𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
 
 
 ?̇?𝜆2 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� + ?̇?𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  
 
(4.30) 
Set equation (4.22) equal to equation (4.28) and solve for ?̇?𝑚 to produce equation (4.32)    
 ?̇?𝜆1 = −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑙𝑙 + 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)  (4.22) 
 ?̇?𝜆1 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎� (4.29) 
 −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎� = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑙𝑙 + 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)  
 −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 = −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑙𝑙 + 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)  
 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 − 𝑙𝑙 − 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚  
 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 = 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 − 𝑙𝑙 − 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)  
 ?̇?𝑚 = 1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘−𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 − 𝑙𝑙 − 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�  
 ?̇?𝑚 = − 1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘+𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�  
 
 
?̇?𝑚 = − 1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘+𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘�𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)(𝑘𝑘 − 𝐼𝐼)� + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎
+ 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�  
162 
 
  
?̇?𝑚 = − 1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘+𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘�𝑚𝑚 − (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)(𝑘𝑘 − 𝐼𝐼)� + 𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)�
−
1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎?̇?𝑎 
 
 ?̇?𝑚 = [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] + [(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 − 𝑙𝑙)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
?̇?𝑎 (4.32) 
 
Set equation (4.23) equal to equation (4.30) and solve for ?̇?𝑚 to produce equation (4.31) 
 ?̇?𝜆2 = 𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1  (4.23) 
    ?̇?𝜆2 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� + ?̇?𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  (4.30) 
    𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1 = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� + ?̇?𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎   
    𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) = −�𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� + ?̇?𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)�  
    ?̇?𝑎(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)  = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1)  
    ?̇?𝑎  = −𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚� + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1)(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)   
    ?̇?𝑎  = −𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘 + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚?̇?𝑚 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1)(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) −  
 
 
 ?̇?𝑎 = −𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑚 (4.31) 
 
Substitute equation (4.31) into equation (4.32) to produce equation (4.33) 
 ?̇?𝑚 = [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] + [(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 − 𝑙𝑙)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
?̇?𝑎 (4.32) 
163 
 
  
?̇?𝑚 = [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
+ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑚� 
 
 
?̇?𝑚 = [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) �
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑚 
 
 
?̇?𝑚 −
𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚
2
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑚=  [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚+ 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � 
 
 
 
 
?̇?𝑚 �
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) �=  [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚+ 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � 
 
 
 
?̇?𝑚 =  (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2� �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
− �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘� + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � 
(4.33) 
Substitute equation (4.33) into equation (4.31) to produce equation (4.34) 
164 
 
  ?̇?𝑎 = −𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑚 (4.31) 
 
?̇?𝑎 = −𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
−
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑝𝑝�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2� �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
− 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�
+ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) �� 
 
 
?̇?𝑎 = −�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)+ 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚
�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2� �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙]
− [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)] − �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�+ 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) �� 
 
(4.34) 
  
165 
 
 Appendix 4.1.2: Developing empirical models 
 
To develop testable empirical models, substitute for 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 and collect terms for 
variables for which data are likely to be available. To derive the empirical model for ?̇?𝑚, 
begin with equation (4.35.2).    
 
?̇?𝑚 =  1
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
− �
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) − 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � 𝑝𝑝?̇?𝑘� 
(4.35.2) 
 
?̇?𝑚 =  �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)�  
 
?̇?𝑚 =  �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ �− 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘� 
 
 
?̇?𝑚 = �[𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙] − [𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ �− 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘�  
 
 
?̇?𝑚 = [𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙]
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
[𝜆𝜆1(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)]
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ �𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � ?̇?𝑘   
 
?̇?𝑚 =  𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑙𝑙(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ �𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � ?̇?𝑘  
166 
 
  
?̇?𝑚 = 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
𝑙𝑙(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ �𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � ?̇?𝑘   
 
?̇?𝑚 = 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
+ �𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 − (𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) � ?̇?𝑘   
 
?̇?𝑚 = 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
?̇?𝑘
+ � 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎)�� ?̇?𝑘   
 
 
?̇?𝑚 = 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
?̇?𝑘
+ � 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘   
 
?̇?𝑚 = 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
?̇?𝑘
+ � 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)� ?̇?𝑘   
 
?̇?𝑚 = 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
−
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
?̇?𝑘
+ � 1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑘   
167 
 
  
?̇?𝑚 =  𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
−
(𝛿𝛿 + 2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�
𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
� −
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
�?̇?𝑘�
+ � 1
𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
� �
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) ?̇?𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝� (4.38) 
Equation (4.38) can now be converted into equation  (4.43), 
 ∆𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝 − 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3 �𝛼𝛼4�∆𝑘𝑘 − 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝� + 𝜖𝜖2 (4.43) 
To derive the empirical model for ?̇?𝑎, begin with equation (4.36.2). 
 
?̇?𝑎 = −�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝜆𝜆2(2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆1)
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑝𝑝 � 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎� ?̇?𝑘� (4.36.2) 
 
?̇?𝑎 = −��𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �(𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (2𝜂𝜂 − 𝜌𝜌) − 𝛿𝛿(𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚)�� + �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘?̇?𝑘�� 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎) + 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝?̇?𝑘 
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(4.40) 
Equation (4.40) can now be converted into equation  (4.42), 
 ∆𝑎𝑎 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑝𝑝 − 𝛼𝛼2𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑙𝑙 − 𝛼𝛼4(𝑝𝑝∆𝑘𝑘) + 𝜖𝜖1 (4.42) 
The ?̇?𝑘 equation is simple and is given directly by equation (4.24).  
 ?̇?𝑘 = 𝑚𝑚− (𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂)𝑘𝑘 − 𝛿𝛿𝐼𝐼  (4.24) 
Equation (4.24) can now be converted into equation (4.44), 
 ∆𝑘𝑘 =  𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑚𝑚 − 𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝛾3𝐼𝐼 + 𝜖𝜖3 (4.44) 
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 Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Work 
Understanding water use trends and drivers of demand is important particularly in 
arid locations often subject to risks related to water shortage. This is especially true in 
areas such has the American West that generally have increasing populations and may 
experience serious disruptions from climate change and extreme weather events including 
severe drought. While supply augmentation is one way to manage shortage, due to 
possible legal, technical, environmental, and financial constraints, this dissertation 
focused instead on understanding the demand side. Focusing on demand is particularly 
attractive in this context because demand-side responses may be more flexible and are 
likely to operate more quickly to clear a shortage than supply enhancement.  
Furthermore, the analysis presented in this dissertation provides qualitative and 
quantitative estimates of demand behavior via both utility action and exogenous stimuli. 
Results may be leveraged for planning purposes by a city or municipality. In any event, 
this dissertation argued that it is paramount to acquire a better understating of the drivers 
of demand to ensure that water resources are effectively managed.  
While it is true that demand estimation has been undertaken many times, largely 
ignored in the literature are small cities and municipalities, so this dissertation made a 
concerted effort to focus on the small city experience; without additional evidence, it is 
unclear that demand estimation from large cities should be used as a proxy for the 
experience of small cities. Therefore, relatively small New Mexico cites such as Clovis, 
Rio Rancho, and Edgewood are highlighted (along with the large city Albuquerque) in 
Chapter 2, with specific attention to Clovis in Chapters 2 and 3. The analysis was 
broadened from the small city context to the non-specific context in Chapter 4 as the 
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 general optimizing behavior of a private utility engaging in a rebate program for water 
saving technology was investigated.          
5.1 Key Results and General Conclusions 
This dissertation demonstrated not only that demand is declining in the small set 
of New Mexico municipalities examined, but that key drivers of declining demand are 
price (rate increases)27 and water-saving rebate programs. Specifically, Chapter 2 
identified declining demand in all New Mexico municipalities studied (Albuquerque, Rio 
Rancho, Clovis, and Edgewood); this pattern is generally true for high and low volume 
users on a per premises basis, and perhaps more significantly, in terms of aggregate water 
use.  
Aggregate declines may present two interrelated management challenges: first, 
most projections for aggregate demand call for increasing demand over the next few 
decades – despite generally declining demand over the last decade (or longer). However, 
if demand stays flat or continues to fall, the assumption of increasing demand may call 
for unnecessary costly overinvestment in infrastructure and supply enhancement. Second, 
all else equal, declining aggregate demand will lead to reduced revenues which will 
constrain a utility’s financial ability to make necessary infrastructure investments and 
repairs. Due to these vulnerabilities, it is critical to develop a better qualitative 
understanding of the factors contributing to demand as well a better quantitative estimates 
of responsiveness to utility and non-utility stimuli (including rate changes, climate, etc.).          
27 However, it is important to reiterate the fact that the price-inelastic nature of municipal water dictates that 
price changes only have a modest impact on water use. In addition, elasticity heterogeneity with regard to 
group (e.g. low versus high water users, rebate program participants, etc.) highlights the value of deeper 
investigation into the various population cross-sections examined in this type of analysis. 
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 Also found in this analysis were statistically significant breaks in trend, which 
were uncovered for the cities of Clovis for all users, and Rio Rancho for high volume 
users. Despite the generally declining trend in water demand in the city of Clovis, upward 
breaks appear to relate to severe drought conditions. This is interesting because, despite 
the fact that all municipalities experienced drought over their respective series, no other 
municipality exhibited sufficient climate sensitivity to induce a break in trend. The break 
observed in the Rio Rancho series is likely associated with the large rate increases 
experienced in the municipality and the associated reduction in demand from industrial 
users.  
Focusing specifically on Clovis, an econometric model of demand was developed 
at the spatial scale of the entire city and compared against results from premises-level and 
US Census block group spatial scale estimations. That analysis confirmed that price and 
weather responses were not dissimilar to more disaggregated analysis. However, the 
estimation also uncovered estimation limitations at this spatial scale; in particular, 
premises-level inferences are at the very least imprecise, and at most impossible, when 
using highly aggregated data.  
Due to the limitations discussed in Chapter 2 related to trying to understand 
premises-level response with city-level data, Chapter 3 investigated factors contributing 
to declining water demand in Clovis, New Mexico at the premises level. This approach 
allows for a detailed understanding of the effects of various demand-side factors. Key 
results indicate that rebate programs for landscaping changes and for the installation of 
water saving technology successfully reduce premises-level water use. Overall, after 
controlling for confounding factors such as temperature and precipitation, the installation 
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 of a rebated toilet reduced water use by an average of nearly 32 gallons per day, 
installation of a water saving washing machine reduced water use by an average of about 
38 gallons per day, and an average household receiving a landscaping rebate saved 19 
gallons per day. While it might be surprising that landscaping rebates save so little water, 
it is likely due to the fact that irrigation only takes place in part of the year; washing 
machines and toilets, on the other hand, are used year-round.          
In addition, this analysis found that water demand is price inelastic at current 
prices in Clovis; however, elasticity varies depending on which data are studied, with 
data subsets based on rebate type experiencing different levels of (in)elasticity. Elasticity 
for the entire dataset, as well as those households that did not receive a rebate was 
estimated to be around -0.50. When the data is subset to only include premises that 
received toilet or washing machine rebates, price becomes relatively more inelastic; 
however, premises that received landscaping rebates, while still price inelastic, were 
much less so, indicating the relative ease at which premises can reduce their outdoor 
water consumption in the face of price increases.  
Additionally, in an analysis of low, medium, and high water users, results suggest 
that low water users are both more price and income elastic than high water users (though 
still inelastic). Given the relatively higher income elasticity, it is likely the case that low 
volume water users have relatively lower incomes; however, that in concert with their 
increased price sensitivity possibly raises equity concerns that call for increased 
investigation by the utility and regulator prior to a new rate increase. 
This analysis also confirmed that weather and climate plays an important role in 
influencing water demand at the premises level; as the temperature increases water use 
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 increases and as precipitation increases, water use declines. This result provides useful 
evidence of the relationship between climate and water use, which can be brought to bear 
in times of high temperature or low precipitation, such as the period from 2011 to 2014 
when Clovis experienced prolonged drought. In addition, income variables show that 
water is a normal good – as income increases, water demand increases.  
Although the cost to the utility of the washing machine rebate and the toilet rebate 
is the same (USD 150), toilet rebates are the most cost-effective rebate program of the 
three programs because of the relatively longer expected useful life of a new toilet 
compared to a new washing machine (25 years versus 12 years). This implies that toilet 
rebates should generally be prioritized before washing machine rebates and both should 
be prioritized before landscaping rebates. However, it is important to note that it is not 
uncommon for premises that received landscaping rebates to have already participated in 
other rebate programs. So if a water user has a relatively high propensity to participate in 
rebate programs and they have already received a toilet or washing machine rebate, the 
landscaping rebate program may be the only way to significantly reduce that user’s actual 
demand.    
In addition, although data on the year each structure was built is not available, two 
separate analyses provided evidence that relatively newer construction used more water 
than older construction – this result was unexpected. In particular, the coefficient on the 
building permit variable in the underlying econometric estimation, which was used to 
proxy for new construction, was positive and statistically significant, indicating that as 
permits for new construction increases, water use also increased. This was confirmed by 
a subset analysis, which compared water use for premises that were on the utility’s rolls 
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 in January 2006 with premises that entered the rolls during or after January 2009. In that 
case, estimated mean water use for the relatively new construction was higher than the 
old construction. However, estimated median use for the new construction was relatively 
lower than the old construction, implying the existence of outliers that operated to inflate 
the mean.         
Given that rebates for water-saving technology effectively reduced demand in 
Clovis, Chapter 4 turned to investigating optimal investment by a water utility in the 
context of advertising (by the utility) for the installation of water-saving technology. 
While advertising is typically done for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of the 
product or service that the entity sells, and effectively shifting the demand curve 
rightward, utility-level advertising for water-saving technology does the opposite: it 
reduces the demand for the product that it sells. The fact that this activity increases an 
element of a utility’s cost and reduces demand for the product it sells, operates to make 
the rationale for the activity unclear at least on the surface. To investigate a possible 
justification for this behavior, a capital accumulation framework is utilized.    
A key result from this analysis is that the optimal path for each investment type 
(e.g. advertising investment and infrastructure investment) depends on the other and both 
impact the optimal repair behavior – in other words, the path of infrastructure investment 
depends on the path of advertising investment and vice-versa. Therefore, in order to 
ensure that the optimal paths are reached, it is critical to not only consider how 
investment compares against the benefits associate with repairs, but also how one 
investment type impacts the other. While the analytical model and qualitative results 
provide some insight into when a utility should invest in infrastructure or advertising, 
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 they provide no assistance with regard to determining whether the model accurately 
describes the utility decision. Therefore, empirical models are developed which, 
assuming the availability of appropriate data, can be compared against expected 
outcomes. While the empirical methodology will likely require estimation by a system or 
a similar method, the inclusion of various controls, and the testing of various model 
specifications, the necessary data are not yet available.  
5.2 Discussion of Methodologies and Analytical Tools 
This dissertation highlighted several analytical techniques that can be leveraged to 
better understand factors affecting water demand. Because the many techniques and 
empirical approaches are diverse, this section is designed to demonstrate how the various 
pieces may be used in concert to more broadly describe demand.  
Chapter 2 utilized seasonal trend and breakpoint analysis which can help inform 
water demand analysis by stripping away seasonal noise in an effort to uncover trends in 
demand as well as systematic series breaks. Given the relatively light data requirements, 
these analyses can be useful in quickly identifying patterns or trends that can be 
qualitatively compared against known events. It is important to note that seasonal trend 
and breakpoint analysis provides only a preliminary approach to understanding demand; 
however, trends and qualitative analysis may be leveraged in the development of 
economic models and further econometric estimation. Also developed was a simple 
instrumental variable demand model (2SLS) that controlled for water price and weather 
conditions and produced estimation results for those variables that were not dissimilar to 
results from more disaggregated analysis.  
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 However, the benefit of large scale estimation is limited; while it is possible to 
make some useful inferences regarding general water use, it is nearly impossible to 
develop more fine-tuned inferences. Therefore, Chapter 3 used premises-level data to 
investigate demand using a fixed effects instrumental variable model (FEIV). Analysis at 
a more refined geographic scale allows for estimation of effects at the premises-level, 
such as uptake in water-saving rebated technologies or landscaping changes. Results, 
such as elasticity estimates, responsiveness to weather or climate conditions, behavioral 
response to rebate programs, and the like, can be directly useful for setting more targeted 
policy. In addition, estimation results can be further leveraged to gain additional useful 
insight. For example estimated marginal effects of the rebate variables can be used to 
estimate relative cost effectiveness of rebate programs per volumes of water conserved 
using techniques such as levelized cost analysis.         
Both intuition and diagnostic testing suggested that water use may have spatial 
characteristics that require empirical correction; therefore, spatial panel econometric 
estimation was undertaken in Appendix 3.3. In particular, spatial lag and spatial error 
models were employed. Although spatial lag models appear to fit well, there may be little 
theoretical justification for spatial lag estimation in this context. This is especially true 
where premises are subject to similar exogenous factors such as climate and pricing. 
Furthermore, due to data constraints such as incomplete panels and high computational 
requirements in spatial panel estimation, the benefits may not outweigh the costs of 
losing the additional detail from a more fine-grained premises-level analysis. 
Nevertheless, if data are only available at relatively large geographic scales, testing and 
controlling for spatial effects, and particularly accounting for spatial error, is prudent. 
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 Both Appendix 2.2 and Appendix 3.4 discussed in-sample and out-of-sample 
prediction using straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques. In 
the case of Appendix 2.2, the focus was on city-level econometric estimation using 
monthly price and climate data; that estimation offered a significant improvement over 
simple trend models. Appendix 3.4 focused on peak-day estimation. From the perspective 
of a water utility, ensuring adequate water supply each day is paramount; this includes 
the day of highest (or peak) demand during the year. While it is unclear from year to year 
what day the peak will occur, this appendix showed how it may be possible to predict the 
peak volume using lagged temperature and precipitation data, which is readily available 
to the water manager. Both of these appendices demonstrate that the inclusion of simple 
information and/or a few variables (e.g. price, temperature, precipitation, PDSI), it is 
possible to produce reasonably accurate predictions of water use.      
Finally, an optimal control model was used in Chapter 4 that investigated optimal 
investment by a water utility. This technique is useful for first identifying the key 
elements of the utility’s decision: this includes identifying what the utility is optimizing, 
what the utility is choosing, and quantifying additional key parameters. Uncovered are 
the various tradeoffs that are faced when the utility is attempting to make the optimal 
decision and it allows the analyst to infer whether a particular course of action is likely to 
place the utility on the optimal path. While the outcomes presented in the chapter are 
generally qualitative in nature, also developed is an econometric model along with 
expected signs for the parameters to be estimated. With appropriate data, this system may 
be estimated and coefficients can be compared to expected signs, which will provide 
evidence about whether a utility is behaving optimally.      
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 5.3 Limitations and Future Work 
It is important to note the limitations in this dissertation – some of which may be 
investigated in future work. As has already been discussed in the text, although it is 
possible to conduct rapid ad hoc analyses, the primary disadvantages of the seasonal 
trend and breakpoint analysis presented in Chapter 2 is that the model is both atheoretical 
and does not quantitatively tie the breaks and trends to exogenous events; in other words, 
it does not explicitly capture behavioral responses. Nevertheless, it does provide some 
information regarding the direction of the trend and timing of breaks, both of which can 
be leveraged when attempting to fit an econometric model. Additionally, the large spatial 
scales used (entire city) in the seasonal trend analysis as well as the econometric model in 
Chapter 2 do not allow for an accurate estimation of premises-level responses; rather, 
they provide a more general understanding of demand behavior for variables that are 
likely impacting all premises in a similar fashion. Therefore, Chapter 3 focused on the 
spatial scale of the individual premises (main text) and the US Census block group 
(Appendix 3.3).    
In addition, the issue of declining demand discussed principally in Chapters 2 and 
3 do not fully tackle certain aspects of premises characteristics including new 
construction and renovation. Although Chapter 3 attempts to model, or at least proxy for, 
new construction, the fact that new construction uses more water than old construction 
(on average) is puzzling and calls for a better understanding of individual building and 
premises characteristics for both existing and new premises. With more accurate 
information about property and building characteristics (such as property size, number of 
bathrooms, and the like), water use estimates can almost certainly be tightened.   
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 Similarly, more fine-grained data regarding household characteristics could be 
employed to better control for inter-household differences. While Chapter 2 described 
demographic data generally and Chapter 3 used household income and household size as 
explanatory variables, the fact that a county-level spatial scale was employed in 
estimations make the results less robust. Better information about the residents of the 
households at a premises-level (or at least at a scale smaller than the county) can provide 
necessary variation required to produce stronger estimates. This, along with acquiring 
additional premises information, will likely require surveying and direct communication 
with occupants.           
In addition, building upgrades, such as expansion (e.g. increase in the number of 
bathrooms), or such as pipe and plumbing replacement and new efficient building 
practices also likely play a role in reducing water demand, but were not estimated in this 
analysis. Having this information would be extremely useful as the fixed effects 
methodology used in Chapter 3 essentially assumes that building characteristics remain 
static throughout the analysis. And while the fixed effects treatment may be valid in 
general, it is almost certainly true that characteristics of at least some premises changed 
throughout the ten year timeframe. Similarly, although rebated technology certainly 
reduced water use, there are likely to be numerous premises that switched to low flow 
toilets and washing machines, and maybe even engaged in landscaping changes, but did 
not avail themselves of the benefits of the rebate program. Therefore the signals 
corresponding to installation of a low flow device or landscaping change may be 
somewhat muted.     
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 Controlling for other factors such as vegetation and drought indices appears (in 
this case) to only provide marginal analytic benefit – at least in terms of the premises-
level analysis presented in Chapter 3 (although drought indices provided a tighter model 
fit in the simple estimations in Appendix 2.2). The marginal benefit is not surprising 
given that those variables were correlated with the more straightforward temperature and 
precipitation variables. Also, the vegetation variable presented in Chapter 3, suffered 
from a relatively shorter time series (8 years versus 10 years) and also because the data 
were annual in nature. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this conclusion is the end of the 
investigation with regard to trying to understand vegetation and water demand; a longer 
time series in concert with more frequent readings (and perhaps even finer spatial scale) 
could help to better explain water use going forward.     
Also with regard to the issue of spatial scale is the spatial analysis conducted in 
Appendix 3.3. In that section, spatial panel econometric techniques were employed at the 
spatial scale of the US Census block group. The major conclusion was that premises-level 
data and analysis are likely preferable if they are available due to estimation challenges 
and the current requirement of balanced panels – even despite the likely presence of 
spatial effects (and in particular spatial error). However, it is likely that the frontier for 
this type of estimation will move forward and allow for more robust techniques taking 
advantage of the spatial dependencies apparently inherent in water demand.       
Changes to preferences, or an increasing desire of the population to conserve, may 
also play a role in declining demand. Future work could include an assessment of some of 
those factors. For example, panel or repeated cross section surveying methods may be 
used to uncover true household-level responses. In addition, improved accuracy with 
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 regard to spatial scale, especially with regard to vegetation, could better pinpoint 
landscaping changes and its impact on water use. 
Finally, and with specific regard to Chapter 4, an element that is not included in 
the optimal control model of utility investment is utility payment for qualifying rebated 
technology. Rather, the model assumes that the utility engages in advertising but it does 
not subsidize the purchase of low flow technologies. In other words, that analysis 
assumed that the cost to the utility was zero; however, because the utility subsidizes the 
purchase, the cost to the utility should be included. This assumption was incorporated for 
simplicity as adding another element to the model significantly increases its complexity 
and reduces its ability to be easily understood. A natural addition to the model would be 
to include the cost to the utility for subsidizing the purchase of new technology. In 
addition, although econometric models were developed in that chapter and expected signs 
were hypothesized, actual estimation was not undertaken. Therefore, this chapter could 
be pushed ahead through data collection and model estimation. An alternative approach 
would be to develop model simulations or phase diagrams based on the solved time paths 
which could be leveraged to better understand the dynamic nature of utility choice and 
response.   
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